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## ARTICLES

New Names of God. By Friedrich Spiegelberg ..... 257
Evil and Suffering—The Reflections of a Minister. By George Stewart ..... 268
Russian Nationalism and the Old Believers. By Clarence A. Manning ..... 284

## COMMUNCATIONS

The Swedenborg Commemoration ..... 296
Relic Casket of Buddha Found in Frontier Province ..... 297

## BOOK REVIEWS

Emil Brunner: *The Philosophy of Religion; The Divine Imperative; God and Man; Our Faith.* (David E. Roberts) ..... 298

*(Continued on next page)*

The Most Reverend William Temple: *The Church and Its Teaching Today; Basic Convictions; The Centrality of Christ; Christianity in Thought and Practice.* (Albert T. Mollegen) ..... 314

James Bissett Pratt: *Personal Realism.* (Russell J. Compton) ..... 318

William Ernest Hocking: *Thoughts on Death and Life.* (Corliss Lamont) 323

Hartley Burr Alexander: *God and Man's Destiny.* (J. E. Boodin) .... 326

Reinhold Niebuhr: *Beyond Tragedy.* (Cyril C. Richardson) ..... 331

Georgia Harkness: *The Resources of Religion; The Recovery of Ideals.* (Raymond C. Knox) ..... 338

Anton T. Boisen: *The Exploration of the Inner World.* (Henry J. Wegrocki) ..... 341

Arthur O. Lovejoy: *The Great Chain of Being.* (John Herman Randall, Jr.) ..... 343

Ernest C. Mossner: *Bishop Butler and the Age of Reason.* (William J. Norton, Jr.) ..... 354

Hans Joachim Schoeps: *Jüdischer Glaube in dieser Zeit; Geschichte der jüdischen Religionsphilosophie in der Neuzeit; Jüdisch-christliches Religionsgespräch in 19 Jahrhunderten.* (Salo W. Baron) ..... 358

Mordecai M. Kaplan: *The Meaning of God in Modern Jewish Religion.* (Joseph L. Blau) ..... 361

Book Notes. Swami Vireswarananda: *Brahma-Sutras.* M. Dréano: *La Pensée Religieuse de Montaigne.* J. F. Mozley: *William Tyndale.* J. W. Lydekker: *The Life and Letters of Charles Inglis.* T. W. Rosmarin: *Religion of Reason.* A. Fanfani: *Catholicism, Protestantism, and Capitalism.* E. E. Aubrey: *Present Theological Tendencies.* Shailer Mathews: *New Faith for Old.* H. V. White: *A Theology for Christian Missions.* U. A. Padovani: *La filosofia della religione e il problema della vita.* F. Converse: *Collected Poems.* C. S. Macfarland: *Trends of Christian Thinking.* P. Guilday, Ed.: *The Catholic Philosophy of History.* H. C. Ives: *Portals to Freedom.* Etc. ..... 365

Among the Periodicals ..... 378

# NEW NAMES OF GOD*

By Friedrich Spiegelberg

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New names for God are always appearing in the history of mankind whenever the spirit of a great revelation overcomes the outworn symbols of a former period. This very moment of overcoming the old forms and names and ceremonies, in order to find a more direct approach to that reality which can be seen behind them all, is a very important moment in the history of religions; and as long as its motives are clear and pure we may speak of a something super-religious which I have called The Religion of Non-Religion. But this moment of realization of some high ideal is always a brief one, passing away at the very moment when it tries to give shape to the new feeling. For then, of course, the tendencies of super-religion become once more religion.

This can be seen most clearly in the Indian doctrine of a neutral divine power, *brahman,* which overwhelmed the ancient Vedic deities, only to become in a short time itself a personal god, called Brahmā. The Vedic gods were numerous, and today scholars disagree about their original meaning—whether they were personifications of astronomical or meteorological facts, of physiological or psychological experiences—or whether they were local spirits, or even human personalities of importance deified in a euhemeristic way. Thus naturalistic and sociological explanations of various kinds contend with each other in the different schools of Indology. Where is the truth? It would be too simple to say that it lies in the middle. It is likely that none of these opinions are wholly wrong, but that they are all right, as far as they go. For such a symbol as a god's name is always so rich in itself, and so manifold, that no single description of its meaning is sufficient to cover the whole truth.

Indra, for instance, is at the same time a star, and the power in a thunderstorm; he is a hero-king, and the inspirer of ecstatic feelings in man. Everything that is great and impressive in life can thus be expressed and worshipped in a god. There is no power in nature or in man which has not its deified source in the Vedic pantheon. And yet there arose a need for a general expression for the power and spirit working in all these gods. This was called *brahman,* for the name used

* An address delivered at Columbia University, October 14, 1937.

in the magic formula which brought efficacy to the ceremonies of sacrifice whenever a priest recited the *mantra* in the right way. Brahman was the inner force and life, the very background of all the gods and demons. It was that unknown and indescribable power which we mean whenever we talk about God and religion. This very secret, which is nameless, the eternal Beyond of all experience and thought, and which yet exists only in our experience and thought as the very life of it—this nameless power had now received a name—brahman. For everything wants a name—even the nameless must have one in the moment of being conceived—and thereby is changed from being a nameless to a named reality. And this again changes its character, as we can see distinctly in the case of the neutral power of the Absolute which, having been given the name brahman, soon became a personal, male god, Brahmā, who could be worshipped and represented in art, and became a hero-figure of many-colored myths.

In all the stories told of Brahmā, there is still a recollection of his origin. He is not quite a god like the others, but something peculiar; it is never forgotten that once he was more than the others. Therefore he is often called the first god, the father of gods, and the origin of them all. Brahmā is the creator of the universe, which sprang out of him as an evolution of his own powers. The myth is told in one of the Puranas. Long ago, before the world came into being, there was a struggle between the two greatest gods, Vishnu and Brahmā. Vishnu, who represents matter, and thus is the very reality of existence in every being, pretended to be more important than Brahmā, who represents the idea behind reality, and the inner power which moves reality into material existence. Brahmā disputed this claim, and in order to settle the quarrel the other gods declared that whichever one could not be found within the other should be the winner, for by this very fact he would have proved his superiority. Let us think for a moment about the meaning of this symbol; should Brahmā not be found in Vishnu, the spirit not within matter, but wholly outside of it, this would, of course, be the proof of the integrity and superiority of the spirit. On the other hand, should nothing of matter be found in the spiritual world, in the world of ideas, this would prove that matter is not subject to spirit; it is independent and superior. But nothing of the sort occurred. First, Vishnu went into Brahmā's body, and there he could see everything without exception, every possibility of the uni-

verse, and every realm of reality. There was nothing at all which was not stored and known and reflected in Brahmā's great spirit. And what was most amazing—he could even find himself within this Brahmā-world—he saw himself, the god Vishnu, and he saw his own idea about Brahmā, and even this his search in the body of Brahmā. All this could be seen in detail; all this was reflected in the world of idea; all this could be grasped by the power of thought, which is Brahmā. Vishnu came out of the body of Brahmā, and Brahmā, in his turn, went into the body of Vishnu. And he too found everything, because all that can be expressed in thought can also be materialized. There is no difference in power and extent between these two. We are reminded of the new Logistic philosophy of the Vienna School, in which physical and psychical expressions are shown to be only two aspects, two names of the same neutral reality. Thus, in our story, Brahmā could see everything in the body of Vishnu, even himself and his idea about Vishnu, and his own research in the body of his opponent. It seemed that the two gods were equal, the one being as great and as comprehensive as the other.

But now there happened something of tremendous importance. For while Brahmā was searching within Vishnu's body, Vishnu had shut all of the gates—his eyes, his nose, and his mouth—and when Brahmā had finished his exploration he could not get out again! He could not get out of the realm of matter. And this is the superiority of matter over spirit, for the Spirit can express itself in no other way but by using matter as its expression and its symbol. But Brahmā had to find another way out if he wished to regain his independence, and not be consumed by Vishnu, the all-embracing! And this is the way he found: he broke through the navel of Vishnu, thus being born of him; and ever since, Brahmā has been represented seated on a lotus which grows out of Vishnu's navel, and still connected with its birthplace by an umbilical cord of the waterlily's stem. But remember, Brahmā is not simply born, or reborn, of Vishnu; he comes out of Vishnu's navel, which connects him with Vishnu's own birth. Thus Brahmā is at the same time something of a child, and something of a mother, to Vishnu.

What is of interest in this story is the fact that the neutral principle of brahman, which in the time of the Upanishads was quite a new name for the divine power, has changed into a specialized god who is not neutral and all-embracing, but who has an antagonist in matter,

represented by Vishnu. Brahman as a principle was universal; Brahmā as a personal god has become one-sided—a representative of spiritual power which stands against other forces. The brahman-principle, so to speak, has become divided into two aspects, body and mind. How often in the history of mankind has this division occurred in the philosophical view of the world, and of human nature itself! The original feeling of oneness with every experience in life has faded away, and a separation into two aspects has taken its place. This is the origin of every science and every religion, but also of every schizothymy.

We can understand this separation of the original brahman-principle still better if we consider another ancient Indian doctrine which deals with the creation, or evolution, of the world out of the first principle. This evolution, we are told, occurred in two stages: first, the conception of the idea, which is expressed in the sounds of names of things; and second, the coming into being in matter of the things themselves. At the end of every world-cycle, when the great wheel has turned, and the universe is completely destroyd, once more the hour strikes, and the universe must come into existence again. Then Brahmā, the moving spirit of the new world-birth, first remembers the names of all the creatures which had existed in the former worlds, and then recites the Vedas, and pronounces the names of the creatures, sound by sound, exactly in the right way, and thus the plants and animals, the human race, and all parts of the universe are brought into being. The very realization of their idea, as Plato would say, calls them into existence. The name produces the shape. Here again we can see how the universe is regarded as twofold—an original plane of ideas, which might be called the pattern of the new creation, and the realization of this pattern in matter. Of course, at a time when such a dualistic feeling arose, there was no longer any place for an all-embracing divine power. Vishnu stood against Brahmā.

In the later history of Indian religion we find another attempt to find the source of all the gods of the pantheon in the avatara doctrine —that is, the idea that all the gods are only incarnations of the one supreme deity, Vishnu. The great teachers of India knew that the people need to imagine and worship special, concrete deities, with personalities and stories of their heroic performances. But at the same time, they knew also that those who have passed beyond this elemen-

tary stage will feel the necessity of worship in a higher sense, based on a knowledge of the one divine entity which gives its life and power to all the picturesque symbols of polytheism. In the concept of brahman, the power behind all the gods, there came into being a religion which was high above all special religions—a religion of non-religion—which, of course, is still a religion in spite of its conscious willing not to be so.

This paradox of a religion of non-religion is produced by the fact that the human mind cannot grasp and realize any feeling or any fact without giving it a name. Names are the miraculous key to every possibility of understanding and of remembrance. On the other hand, names are dangerous instruments because they spoil so much of the real life by fixing it to one single meaning. But the human mind has always been fond of fixations; life seems to be easier when we feel that we can be sure of its going on according to a fixed pattern. Only today we are learning again to loosen such fixations, and to give room for the full flux of life in its incommensurability and variety. For modern psychology has shown us how many illnesses of body and soul have their origin in the anxiety of fixation, which, of course, means a horror of losing what you have won. But life means change, and hence a denial of change, of passing away, and even of death, means at the same time a denial of life! Therefore, because we have realized this fact, we are much more inclined to change the names of every change-giving reality than ever before.

If we go back to the Middle Ages, or to the mentality of primitive peoples of our own day, we find a belief in the magic power of words and sounds. Even in Judaism the real name of God could not be pronounced. A person's real name is kept secret by primitives, because by using and changing and spoiling the name, the same effects can be produced on the person himself. Let the name vanish and the bearer of the name will die at the same moment! Thus, in the old witchcraft we find the ceremony of Abracadabra, which originally is an Aramaic sentence meaning, "Fade away as this word is fading." When something, or somebody, was to be destroyed the word *abracadabra* was recited thus, with the first and last letter dropped at each repetition: abracadabra, bracadabr, racadab, acada, cad, a—until nothing remained! This is black magic performed with names. We know that it can be done, for what else happens when, for instance, in polemics the

names of the enemy are changed and spoiled until, at last, the enemies begin to spoil themselves according to the false denominations? In the politics of today it often happens that a man is forced into a false identification with something despised, until, having once accepted the identification, he is driven on and on in the direction of corruption which is prescribed by his adversaries. And in the end he really does not recognize himself!

To summarize: today we feel a need of changing the names of God, and of many other religious and philosophical concepts, because the old names are worn out and meaningless—or rather, because they have changed their meaning, or the reality and our feeling toward it has changed. To retain the old, conventional names would, in fact, mean that we are not aware of the fact of moving life, and not willing to accommodate ourselves to a new reality, or a renewed world. Thus old names can become a grave danger to the very reality which they express.

Therefore, there arises today a new diffidence in pronouncing the name of God; many theologians, philosophers and poets try to express their religious feelings without making use of the word God. They think it is better to speak distinctly about such experiences without burdening, or veiling, them by a word such as God, which can only bring a great number of undesired associations. I shall try now to make a list of such new expressions, words which are especially invented to describe that reality to which each person feels himself bound. There should be no misunderstanding: we are not here seeking new gods, such as the God of Money, who was the most venerated deity of yesterday, of the God of Nationalism, who receives the highest worship today. We are only interested in the new names of the true God who stands behind all the idolatries as the one divine and eternal reality. The science of religion needs such a list of new names for its very subject, and this may serve as a first attempt, and a stimulus to further research.

To begin with, over a hundred years ago, Schleiermacher first tried to describe the central feeling of religion in quite a new way. He speaks, not of "faith," but of a "feeling of absolute dependence," which can be found in every religion. Today some theologians go much further, for they not only describe religious experience in a new way, but they objectify what has been subjective in the so-called ex-

perience-theology of the last century, calling the *object* of faith God in quite a new way. Rudolph Otto, author of *Das Heilige,* calls the object of every true religion "the entirely different," that is, that which is completely different from all other subjects of experience. This is, indeed, a new name for God. But later, Otto falls back into old expressions when he points out that the special characteristics of this entirely different being are the *tremendum* and the *fascinosum,* a peculiar mixture which today is called "dialectical."

The new names of God which are being born today are not found in the old ways of thinking. Ever since the scholastic era systematic theology has known two ways of intellectual approach to God, that is, of finding the expressions, the names, with which to talk about God. These two ways have been the *via negationis,* the Neoplatonic way of denying all qualities which the lay mind would probably attribute to God, and the *via eminentitiae,* the platonic way of placing all earthly qualities and virtues on a higher level, and thus coming at last to the absolute pinnacle of all goodness and brightness and power. Today these two ways are no longer accessible. The human consciousness of our days could not possibly accept them, because we see now that the negative way is wholly abstract, and that through it the deeper, unconscious feelings cannot be reached; and secondly, we realize that the elevating way is too intimately connected with our everyday experiences to be able to lead us to something beyond. We feel too distinctly that (to quote Karl Barth) "You do not say God if you say Man in a loud voice."

The pioneers of modern thought advance in quite other ways, which the former dogmatists could not have known. I propose to call these new-found ways the *via interponendi* and the *via limitationis.* By the *via interponendi* is meant the way of those who, according to their personal religious experiences, try to express the holy Unknown as something which always lies *between*—in the midst of our everyday experiences—and which comes out of this very reality. It is not behind it, as has been said in former times, but is in between it. As the English poet, T. S. Eliot, says:

*Between the idea and the reality,*
*Between the motive and the act,*
*Falls the shadow,*
*For Thine is the Kingdom.*

*Between the conception and the creation,*
*Between the emotion and the response,*
*Falls the shadow.*
*Life is very long.*

*Between the desire and the spasm,*
*Between the potency and the existence,*
*Between the essence and the descent,*
*Falls the shadow,*
*For Thine is the Kingdom.*[1]

One can find similar, but even more expressive, phrases in the works of one of the deepest mystics of all time, the poet, Rainer Maria Rilke. He simply never takes the old ways of feeling, and so he has no use for conventional terms and outworn names. But unfortunately these new-felt expressions cannot be translated, and the only English version of Rilke's works (that of Leishman), is of no use at all in the understanding of these most important new words—words which did not exist before. They all try to approach the secret of that which is, at the same time, recognized as the Unknowable and the Unspeakable, and yet is neither on earth nor in heaven, but lies *between* heaven and earth, and speaks to us from every point, and especially from just those very points which lie between this and that. And the Norwegian writer, Anker Larsen, also, expresses the same idea in his *Stone of Wisdom,* in the little boy sitting in the garden, who looks strangely at the tree on the wall because he suddenly realizes the tree is "standing open." It is not said that the tree is giving a new revelation of this or that—it just "stands open," and we feel that it would certainly mean less to say more. Expressions of the same symbolic power are found in the eastern Jewish mystics of the Chassidim, especially in the important translations in which Martin Buber has presented them to the western world.

This "Between," which prevails in all these new approaches to that reality which in former times was called the Beyond, is in close relation to all those new names of God which are found in the *via limitationis*—the new way of showing the borders of everything in life. I mean here the so-called dialectical theology of our day, which tries to think about God in a wholly different way. These are some of the new names which have been applied to God under this procedure.

1. T. S. Eliot, *Poems, 1909-1925* (London, 1925), p. 98.

Karl Barth, in his *Epistle to the Romans*, writes: "God, the pure limit and the pure beginning of all that we are and do. [No one would have used such terms in former ages!] . . . in infinite qualitative distinction, confronting man and all that is human, never at all identical with what we call God." This would seem to be the complete refusal of all names of God, but Karl Barth's works are, as a matter of fact, a rich source of such names. He continues thus: "God, the absolute Stop against all human unrest, and the absolute Forward against all human repose. The Yes in our No, and the No in our Yes. The First and the Last, and as such *the Unknown.*" And to quote another dialectical theologian; Gogarten, in *Faith and Revelation*, uses the following phrases, which give us new examples for our name-collection: "This God is the Incomprehensible, to our comprehension; the Immeasurable, by our measures; the Unperceivable, by our perception; the origin and the end of all our knowing and conceiving, of all our standards and experiences."

There are also some new names of God invented by those who try to avoid all names for him, especially the old and outworn ones, and yet who try to speak about God. Emil Brunner usually speaks only of "the miracle" when he is referring to God. Similarly the Jesuit theologian Przywara calls God "the mystery at any rate," and Paul Tillich uses "The Unconditioned," and "What concerns us unconditionally" in referring to him. It is superfluous to mention some well-known names which modern thinkers have substituted for the name of God, such as the *élan vital*, the Higher Level, the Creative Life, etc., because it is doubtful whether these thinkers really have the right approach to that reality with which we are concerned. Still more interesting are the historians of religion who, when speaking of special gods of special peoples, refer to "the divine power which lies behind all these special symbols." This very phrase is an attempt in the same direction. An analagous expression, used by an Indologist, is, "The neutral divine power behind all expressions of personal form, the indefinable productive center behind them all."

Finally, we must try to ascertain the principle behind all these new attempts. What is the new feeling which evokes all these expressions? It is that all these new names of God belong somehow to the Religion of Non-Religion, or at least, they are an approach to it. There is, in our own day, a new pantheism, a new mysticism—tendencies which

lead to abstraction and neutrality in all expressions—and at last, an inclination of a psychological inversion of all so-called objective realities. The change which necessarily follows upon these new feelings can best be seen by confronting the neutral character of these new names of God with the old doctrine of God as a *personality*. When this dogma was established in ancient times there was not, of course, the same difficulty in the minds of those adopting it as there is today, for the concept of personality has completely changed. Today we conceive of personality as only a matter of high development and individualization of daylight-consciousness, that is, the rational, waking state. In ancient times, however, personality embraced also what we call today the plane of the Unconscious. It included a much stronger neutral, general, social feeling which could be attributed to God. God was indeed a personality in the former meaning of the word. The psychologist Jung may well call God simply "The Unconscious," and this is not a revolutionary act, for his new name expresses exactly the same idea as the ancient doctrine of God as a personality. It is, in fact, only a correction of terms, a *translation* of an old expression, personality, into a new language. This proves that sometimes the conservative adherence to the conventional formulations means, in fact, a change of their significance, while, on the other hand, a seemingly revolutionary change of dogma can actually be an attempt to preserve the old and true religious meanings and content. Since the Western "personality" has become somehow a fortress of selfishness, it is scarcely possible to think of God as a personality.

There are other psychologists besides Jung who are fighting against all human desires for stablization. For life is a process of changing and turning, and whoever wants to establish a fixed state of being really prefers death to life. Graham Howe, in his recent book, *War-Dance*, attempts to show that it is just this wish for stabilization which must inevitably lead to war, even though it be nicely labelled "pacifism." It is indeed a curious error to believe that we can preserve the *status quo* by clinging to out-moded forms of expression which have changed their meanings during the development of human thought. We may call that the demon of preservation, that is, a *false preservation* at a time when only a re-interpretation can preserve the truth which is on the verge of being lost.

We have seen what the term *brahman* meant in ancient India, and

then we have collected many new names for God invented in the modern, Western world. It is significant to note that these new-found names are exactly the right translation for that old Indian term, *brahman,* which in former times was never properly translated, because it had no real equivalent in the religious language of the West. Thus we may consider our present project as a new chapter in Sanscrit lexicography, which has to be rewritten again and again whenever the terminology of our own religious thought changes, as it has changed during the last decade. There are many parts of the Sanscrit dictionaries which need to be rewritten in a new way. Such terms as *dharma, ṛta, avidya, siddhi, jñāna,* and many others, will have to be re-interpreted according to our new religious feelings, which are far closer to those of Indian than ever before. This constant renewal of the translations is of the utmost importance for missionary work, both that of the Christian churches in India, and that of the Indian religious groups in the West.

There is now, at last, an intellectual *rapprochement* between the two halves of the world. Brahman has conquered the West. Under these circumstances it is important to remember what Indian teachers have always taught, that there can not be any worship of brahman. If we want to have worship, to have *religion,* we must build up the so-called devatas, the personal divinities, who can be imagined in particular forms, and represented in art. The principle of brahman cannot be imagined, yet it is the very soul of the devatas, and of all the special symbols of the religious life.

# EVIL AND SUFFERING—THE REFLECTIONS OF A MINISTER

By George Stewart

The more sensitive a man the more difficulty he finds in reconciling the brutalities of nature, of society, and his own self-defeating impulses, with a personal God of love. Outwardly, it looks as if nature had little meaning, so terrible is its competition, so strange to gentler, redemptive moods which we see at their best in Jesus. After one has taken out the total field of suffering all the man-made sorrows, there still remains agonies and evils which the thoughtful are apt to lay at Heaven's gate, and there clamor loudly, and rightly, for justification of this earth's sorrows.

It is not incidental hardship occasioned by headlong and adventurous living that worries us; it is rather the torment which was upon Stevenson when he wrote: "As I go on in this life, day by day, I become more of a bewildered child, I cannot get used to this world, to procreation, to heredity, to sight, to hearing; the commonest things are a burthen. The prim, obliterated, polite surface of life, and the broad, bawdy, and orgiastic foundation form a spectacle to which no habit reconciles me." Stevenson was expressing the burden of that which lies upon all of us, when day after day we face delayed hopes, persistent irritations, unending pain, and read in the morning journals accounts of war, earthquake and flood.

Fyodor Dostoevsky has Ivan cry out in *The Brothers Karamazov:* "I must have justice, or I will destroy myself. And not justice in some remote infinite time and space, but here on earth, and that I could see myself. I have believed in it, I want to see it, and if I am dead by then, let me rise again, for if it all happens without me, it will be too unfair. Surely I haven't suffered, simply that I, my crimes and my suffering, may manure the soil of the future harmony for somebody else. I want to see with my own eyes the hind lie down with the lion and the victim rise up and embrace his murderer. I want to be there when every one suddenly understands what it has all been for." Men rightly want a just God; they desire to find His dependable, they want him to make His purposes understandable. When calamity comes, they wish to know whether it is reasonable, whether it is a justifiable portion of

the universal travail of the race, or, at least, whether or no it is a wasted agony.

Finitude, man's nature, makes it impossible for him to see the scheme of the whole as God sees it. Thus finitude in itself contributes to the difficulty of understanding two of the main aspects of the problem, namely the origin of evil and, its justification. The problem, nonexistent in long stages before life came upon earth, and in geologic aeons when animals, great and small, devoured one another, slowly came into being as man emerged as a self-conscious mind, separate from his environment, able to make his own value judgments. Thus the possibility of evil as the result of inappropriate desire, comes upon the stage amid those very conditions which make possible the ascent of man to higher levels of life through the exercise of choice. Imagination which leads man astray, also leads him to great heights of heroism and self-sacrifice.

The source of this perversion of man's talent, which leads him into evil choices, lies partly in his limitations of body, mind and spirit. Not being able to see all and to understand all, as God sees and understands, he often confuses the apparent good with the real good. The more highly developed the moral or ethical sense, the more the apparent good, which man sees, will correspond to absolute good.

How shall we account for the tendency in the human stock to confuse the apparent good with real good, how explain this wilfulness which leads to evil? Our fathers handled the matter, almost too easily, by calling it original sin. Man, as Mind, is one of many phenomena of this living universe. Mind is not only aware of itself, and of the universe, it is also able to force nature in many aspects to do its bidding. Mind also gives value and significance to all other phenomena, in addition to the value and meaning they have had for God. Says William Temple, "This whole personality in action is the will, and it is the will which is perverted. Our primary need is not to control our passions by our purpose, but to direct our purpose itself to the right end. . . .[1] We totally misconceive alike the philosophic and the practical problem of evil if we picture it as the winning of control over lawless and therefore evil passions by a righteous but insufficiently powerful reason or spirit. It is the spirit which is evil; it is reason which is perverted; it is aspiration itself which is corrupt. And yet it cannot

1. William Temple, *Nature, Man and God* (London, 1935), p. 367.

be said that the principle of selfhood is evil. To say that would be to accuse the constitution of the universe itself and therefore also God its Creator. Moreover it would be, for us at least, self-contradictory."[2]

One would hardly subscribe to the doctrine that finitude in itself is evil, or that the various goods arranged in ascending order are simply diminishing evils. Finitude is the condition precedent of selfhood. We must not be guilty of eating our philosophical cake and keeping it too by wanting the rights, powers and privileges of selfhood, and yet refusing to accept its disabilities. To identify finitude with evil would be to make virtue merely the consciousness of sin, and sin the basic *milieu* of life. Jesus made His primary appeal to the will, as have all His greatest followers. It is when stubborn, foolish, and often bestial man allows his will to be redeemed, that the disease of his finitude is cured.

With many variations two classic explanations of evil have come down to us from the past, which appear in nearly every modern treatment of the subject. The first explanation is that there is a factor in the essence of things of which we are ignorant. Our failure to accommodate ourselves to this unknown factor brings evil. The second explanation is that something is perverted in ourselves which inhibits our proper accommodation to things as they are.

In general philosophers of the East employ the first classic explanation of evil, by saying that ignorance leads us into error, and error into suffering. We are ignorant of the true nature of things as they are. Salvation lies in deliverance from ignorance. The bandages must be taken from our eyes. Appearance is not the truth. Reality screens itself behind a facade of appearance which is deceptive. When we see truth we shall no more have evil.

Western thinkers in general employ the second classic explanation, that evil, particularly moral evil, comes from corruption of character and a selfish or inappropriate use of liberty. This was Kant's idea. Men can choose a good or a bad course of action. But once a chain of cause and effect is created the result must work itself out inevitably. Salvation comes from a source outside man, which lays hold of him, reinforces him and gives him a victory he is powerless to attain by his own unaided efforts. As a matter of practical experience neither of the two explanations, ignorance of some factor in the nature of things, nor

2. *Ibid.*, p. 368.

deterioration of character, are mutually exclusive, for both are constantly found in human experience.

The view one takes of evil depends a great deal upon one's view of Creation. Was Creation a single mighty act, did God snap His fingers, bringing everything into existence in the twinkling of an eye? Or, is Creation a process? It is true that the traditional account of Creation in the Bible, and the view generally taught by Catholics and Protestants alike, is that Creation was one act or a series of acts during a brief space of time. Those who look upon Creation in this fashion are compelled to give some adequate reason for the sorrow and pain which seems to mar a perfect act of a perfect God. They should expect to find the world and all creatures therein perfect in every detail. But as they scrutinize the world and its inhabitants they do not find perfection. To account for this imperfection they must either show the evil choice of men, the weakness of God, or some powerful Antagonist who works against God and is capable of thwarting Him. The person who accounts for evil by some form of diabolism raises more questions than he can settle by this line of argument. The devilish force is made an equal, or almost an equal, to God. The universe then becomes a jousting field over which God and Satan splinter lances in eternal combat, while humanity, an innocent and comparatively helpless bystander is often trodden underfoot in the Titanic conflict.

The view that Creation is a process of immense duration still going forward, in which God acts not only continuously but also discontinuously, in which He employs alternation as well as steady progress to forward His eternal purpose, allows for growing pains in the universe which are inherent in the development of a living organism. God having shared some measure of creative power with man, we find evil inevitable through man's efforts to forward his own designs, both good and bad. These endeavors of man cause pain not only to himself, but also to others through mistake, ill-will, and the processes of trial and error.

The materialistic determinism which came as a reaction to the foolishly optimistic theology of the eighteenth century has largely been given up by philosophy and taken over by various schools of political and economic thought. Critical common sense, apart from dogmatic theory, has taught men that grave responsibilities lie upon their backs, their wills, their emotions, their minds. If they are free

to act they are responsible. Otherwise conscience, education and all spiritual teaching is a mockery, all ethical advance an illusion. Cool appraisal of man, of society and of history shows that, although we are limited and conditioned in many ways, nevertheless, for practical, moral purpose we are free enough.

Admitting the mystery which shrouds many aspects of the problem of evil and of suffering, that much pain is native to life, and, in the measure that it protects life is not true evil at all, nevertheless there is much evil that can be explained and should be. To know the cause of one's suffering, whenever possible, helps clarify the issue. For some evil we call a doctor, relying on his scientific training. For other ills we may move out of a malarial district. For evil of an inward nature we may cease thinking of our own gain, and learn to love those whom now we hate. For some situations we take shovel, hoe, scalpel, test-tube, or ballot-box, for others we make the approach upon our knees in prayer. In the face of one disaster we may change our residence, in the face of another we may better change our minds.

Man is essentially practical, even in dealing with deep philosophical enigmas. His first impulse in the face of evil is to destroy it. If it prove too much for his strength, his second impulse is to rise above it and thus achieve the victory.

Sometimes the impulse to rise above evil takes the form of escape from it. The later Greek moralists really fled savage evils to a tower of ivory, to detached contemplation, where they would be safe for a time. More resolute spirits have always faced the problems of moral evil with a program of reform and redemption. Plato brought forth his program in the *Republic*, but did little to initiate that social order. Jesus, in His concept of the Kingdom of God, taught man of a fellowship dedicated to the benign will of a loving God, and straightway began setting the feet of man on the new road starting where they were.

Let us examine some type situations wherein true evil, or pseudo-evil afflict us, or our neighbors. Suffering is inevitable in the necessary experimentation we all carry on in learning how to live. The trial and error method which is the first school of primitive man, and the last school of the most advanced research worker, has inherent in it many smashed fingers and not a few broken minds. Learning to use tools expertly, achieving skill in any game, involves many failures. Defeat

in achieving excellence in the mental and spiritual realms is quite as great. To live at all in many situations makes enormous demands upon character. The cold shock of actuality, the stubbornness of fellow men, the presence of greed and stupidity bring acute suffering. The whole process of experimentation is fraught with tension, but it is the prerequisite of inventive labor, research, spiritual insight, and fruitful living. Life is always purchased by the gift of life. This category of pain, as well as many another, is hardly an evil, but rather a teacher.

The desire for premature finality generates colossal blunders in every realm leading to much bitter disappointment. We see this operating even in the Church. The fathers of the early Church were anxious that religion should once for all be rounded out and completed. They formed creeds and issued edicts which contained magnificent accounts of Christian experience, but, because they were stated in final terms, they denied validity to the experience of later generations. Theologians of various periods have insisted that their answers were to be for all time, the "faith once delivered to the saints." When finality creeps into such statement, it is, in effect, a lack of faith in sons and daughters to wrestle as bravely with problems of tomorrow as we grapple with today's enigma, or our fathers battled with puzzles of yesteryear. These men combined a resolution to face perplexities honestly with an inability to stand the stress of waiting for answers which were slow in coming.

The constant realization that we are limited in our capacities and in our powers of enjoyment is a source of sharp pain to many. Man has, however, discovered the paradox that, although he is limited, he is not imprisoned within those limits. It is true we cannot change the color of our hair or eyes; not many of us could become great ball-players, or artists, or musicians, or poets; not many could be an Edison or a Henry James. But within our powers, our mental and physical possibilities, we are free enough to achieve an interesting, a useful, and a creative life. I may seem trivial to men, my efforts may be weak to those who march beside me, but if with the equipment God gave me, I do my best, I shall not fail, no matter how small or intangible the result may appear. Why should I cry out that I am but one of the countless host which forms the gray background, the scenery against which the great of earth perform their exploits? He who bears the arms, or holds the shield, or cooks the food for the great, may be as

great as they. We are in such haste in our few years that it is difficult to see the full significance of obscure service. Our limits are not a mark of our defeat, they are not prison bars. We may be ever moving and thinking and producing within those limits. Imperfection is not a negation of perfectness; it may be completeness manifested in a small part, "infinity revealed within bounds."

Tedium sometimes descends upon life like a London fog obliterating all sharp outlines and edges, confusing bright day with a murkiness which slows up every process of life, leaving a creeping monotony. There are no valuable occupations which do not have periods of almost unbearable monotony. The writer must "scorn delights and live laborious days." Artists finally communicate their vision of beauty because they, "while their companions slept, were toiling upward in the night." Anyone rejoices at Donatello's St. John, or Michael Angelo's marvelous alabaster of Mother and Child in the Bargello. But would the ordinary man understand the hours of seemingly unproductive chiseling and polishing required in releasing sheer spiritual beauty in those pieces of stubborn material? Any reader is ennobled by the *Paradiso*, but does he think of note-books spotted with tears and candle grease penned in lonely midnights, with as much thrown away as used?

Adversity encountered in untoward events or natural calamities is one of the more serious of man's perplexities. Any untoward event is always a text for speculation. In Jesus' day the tower of Siloam had recently fallen within the city of Jerusalem. Rubble, stones and tiles had killed eighteen people. This is the sort of problem which desert peoples love to discuss beside the camp fire. What kind of men were these who were killed? Was it that God had concentrated the eighteen most wicked of the city in that place at that hour to slay them with falling stones? Were they good and bad mixed? What was the cause of the fall of the tower? Was it the hand of God or the hand of the Devil? Was the tower badly built, or had it simply served its day, ripe for decay like an orange hung too long upon a tree? Earthquake raises no problem of evil except for those who are seeking to interpret the world in terms of a personal God interested in men as persons. If no personal values are involved then an earthquake is, on a large scale, no more mysterious than the fall of an apple.

However, these natural calamities, as understandable as they may be

upon the purely geological or meteorological side, do become acute perplexities to the mind when they threaten to wipe out man and his works, to reduce him to flotsam and jetsam. When man's natural environment assumes the aspect of a cruel and indifferent master then the problem of evil is sharp. Man does not mind swamps to drain, dikes to build or any sizeable contest with nature. He can reasonably have no relish for a combat which is comparable to a kitten engaging a raging lion. When nature assumes so overwhelming an aspect that it reveals none of the proffered aid which is part of man's unique awareness of God as a person, then man is bowed with the weight of an inscrutability he cannot fathom.

Here again the view one takes of Creation may help or hinder. Is man the only thought of God, or does God attend to all the creatures of His making? The seemingly dead, inanimate universe is intensely and excitingly alive. He attends to that also. Man overruns the earth and must be allowed to do so, if he is to be free. In the process of his habitation and his journeyings he sometimes is hurt or killed in carrying out his manhood, as this or that fragment of the earth, true to other processes, carries out its earthhood.

Mistakes and errors of judgment cause an unmeasured amount of suffering in every life, every family and every generation which the unthinking lay at heaven's gate in fierce resentment. Upon more careful scrutiny much of this can be laid to mistake, or error of judgment. Take the single greatest calamity of our day, the World War. When everything regarding population pressure, and economic determinism has been said, the fact remains that the earth was fruitful enough to support all its sons and daughters. Every major step which caused the war could have been prevented. Fundamentally, the miscalculations of negligent and incompetent statesmen on the Ballplatz in Vienna, upon the Wilhelmstrasse in Berlin, in the gloomy city of Peter the Great, on the Quai d'Orsay in Paris, and at Number 10, Downing Street, brought on the war. There was no blind necessity for it. If foresight were as good as hindsight we should have had no war. It is always thus. There is no bad peace, no good war.

A great dam is erected in the mountains of Southern California. It was supposed to stand the pressure of the waters. It did not. A dozen small towns are wiped out and half a hundred lives. Why? The soft rock on either side did not prove safe anchorage for the dam. A slight

error in laboratory analysis, exaggerated by subsequent calculations grew to an immense hazard, and finally brought calamity. In these disasters it does not make sense to raise hands to heaven in bitter revolt, to cry out with Job's wife, "Curse God, and die." They are caused by human mistake.

There is much suffering due to that slow rhythm in which plants and beasts and men rise, and finally, like leaves in autumn, go back to the soil from which they sprang. It is the way of life. In that process many are hurt and not a few untimely perish. Pain is an unavoidable and beneficial accompaniment of the daily function of the body, where it has an important office to remind and to warn. But this pseudo-evil is not necessarily malevolent. There is pain in the bearing of the young, for every creature. The horse, the cat, the cow, the rat, the woman, all experience pain, the parturition of the young from the mother. The fruit is torn from the tree. One animal feeds upon another. One cannot minimize this anguish, nor altogether resolve the problem by asking how else could animals and plants survive without some anguish.

Health itself is, in a sense, conserved by pain, for pain brings to mind our limitations, cautions us to care for our bodies. The person who administers an anodyne upon the incidence of pain loses one of health's chief allies. One of our chief needs today, when opiates and anesthetics are so widely used, is to develop some mode of teaching patients how to bear pain. There are conditions where it is better to bear the pain than to drown it with drugs, better for the doctor who can then more accurately diagnose symptoms, and often better for the patient who will not be led into favoring himself too much. Pain is inherent in life. The child has growing pains. The tree, half strangled for a decade by its own bark, bursts its encircling bands with tremendous sap pressure. It bleeds at the same moment that it achieves liberation. Pain in some degree accompanies almost every function of the body. Pain is a part of the process of life itself. It is always pain, although, in truth, it cannot be called evil pain.

Misfortune due to restricted opportunity causes much suffering. Where the desert meets the sown there are always a few miles of transition. Grass and trees straggle out. Seeds take root, display the same eagerness to fulfill their natural function as in the deep humus of the forest floor or upon the loamy plain. Plants in this zone are anemic.

Twisted and discouraged specimens grow slowly until, finally, they abandon the fight. Life gives way to barren desolations of sand. The chance was too slim, the opportunity too restricted. What the desert is for the plant, stunting its branches, beating down its efforts to fulfill its nature, the slum, the decadent country side, the backwash community is to the human soul.

A large area of misfortune creeps in through a lack of opportunity in business, by the drying up of a market, by a shift in taste, by a slight movement in population. This comes not so much through an error in business judgment as through subtle forces over which no one person or group has control.

Disciplinary suffering is an inevitable result of order or government in personal life, or within any human group. There is no home wherein some discipline is not administered. Order is the first rule of life. Does the parent enjoy reprimanding the child severely? Not unless he is a sadist. No father or mother can be happy in punishing a wilful boy. If a parent is truly loving he will suffer even more than the girl he corrects. Yet, to give no discipline when a son or daughter breaks out in selfish, unsocial and destructive raids would be the cruelest treatment possible. The child would become an egotistical savage, treading on others' rights, and purloining their property. Discipline is part of that necessary pain which is woven into the very texture of life, home, growth and intellectual and moral development. Goethe said, "*Der Schmerz ist der grosse Lehrmeister der Menschen. Unter seinem Hauche entfalten sich die Seelen.*" In the Old Testament, where so often the children of Israel are employed as the carriers-out of God's will, there are not a few occasions when God uses their enemies as His servants to rebuke pride and disobedience.

Much trouble comes from the wilful thwarting of God's will which is sin. Wickedness, or sin, from one point of view presents no problem at all. It is involved in man's freedom which is necessary if personality is to exist at all. If there is to be any spiritual value man must be free to either do, or to refuse to do God's will. The problem of sin becomes acute only when it assumes such proportions that the wicked receive, not only general mercies like rain and sunshine, but also for a long time and over wide areas of life seem to have all the good things of life, while sober, hard working and conscientious men receive only the husks. As in the case when natural calamities assume overwhelm-

ing proportions, the world appears indifferent to personal worth, the divine aid seems denied the very ones who are seeking to live up to the ethical demands of God.

There is such a thing as beauty, whether we see it or not, there is an objective standard of perfect love, whether men will live by it or not. That perfect love is found in God, and is expressed by the revelation in Jesus Christ, who made plain God's will for His children. The conscious thwarting of that loving will, is sin. The roots of malevolence are not difficult to discover. They lie in certain almost universal human patterns. They come from instincts which serve animals well, which still exist as spiritual vestigial remainders, old traits lying dormant, which are quickly aroused, attitudes, emotional sets, which date from the childhood of the race. In fact most of these instincts when undisciplined by a more social attitude give rise to full blown adult infantilism.

Ill-will roots in conscious inferiority, breeding the whole flock of the seven deadly sins, pride, covetousness, lust, anger, gluttony, envy, sloth. It is significant that the Church picked out those sins which cannot be legislated against. Only man himself, with the grace of God, can free himself from these sins. They are inward. They are rooted in the fact that every person is suffering from a sense of being unfulfilled, unrealized, to some extent unwanted.

The Cross was no ordinary suffering; it neither falls in that category of loss due to natural calamity nor was it pain which flows from poor abilities, tedium or mistake. It was in no sense disciplinary, nor could it have been the result of Jesus' own sin. The Cross was voluntary suffering for other people. In these two qualities it is unique, through these two qualities it justifies Jesus' claim to be the Savior of the World. When all else fails, the persuasion of fair logic, gifts, service, reprimand, the lowest men are eventually moved, shamed, educated, changed, saved by the power of sacrificial love poured out as if it were a careless matter.

Social sin is now recognized as evil of a grave nature. Natural causes, economic pressure, population movements and individual sin bring much suffering, but there is perhaps even more pain and loss as the result of social sin, a category which is becoming increasingly clear to civilized man. He is gradually learning that in his collective and corporate capacity he is also guilty of gross injustice. Gross waste of

the fruits of the earth and of our factories, maldistribution, greed, over-concentration of wealth, racial antagonism, lynchings, political corruption, war, class conflict, secularism, inflated nationalism are mass phenomena which involve mass guilt. There is such a thing as public opinion, there is no such thing as a public mind in the sense that an individual's brain involves a thinking, willing and feeling center. Therefore the control and initiation of mass movements for good purposes, the conduct of needed reformation is difficult. As Niebuhr so well points out, we have moral man and immoral society. This collective sin is the cause of age long suffering among the underprivileged which is only very slowly being recognized for what it is.[3] Some perplexities lie too deep for human solution. Job on his ash heap received little or no help from his friends. He could only trust that God, Who in days of prosperity had never failed him, would finally save him amid a shoal of calamities.

Bramwell Booth, after a lifetime of dealing with the darkest human problems, set down as his conclusion: "I believe that our religion does enable us to account for much that is extremely baffling in human history and in the conditions of human life. One problem there is, however, in the presence of which I always feel dumb. It is the problem of suffering children. I cannot grasp anything tangible in the Divine purpose which permits little children to suffer. I cannot doubt His love. I know that wisdom belongeth to Him. All the same, I feel not merely pain, but a sense of profound mystery when I approach the suffering of children. I hear above the voice of the crippled and starved another voice which stirs me. I am in the presence of the insoluble. I realize this in connection with those states of misery of the innocent and helpless, as I do not realize it even in experiences which might be thought more solemn, such as the presence of death or of widespread calamity." Faith in this area of mystery is not unreasonable, it is reason reinforced with valor. One can at least be sure of this —the misery of little children must shock God, must be as contrary to His wishes as it is to our own. God cannot be ethically lower than the most enlightened of the human race.

What, then, is the answer of faith to the problem of evil? Its first answer is to change all evil that can be changed. Medicine did not remain supine employing Elizabethan methods in fighting yellow

3. See E. A. Ross, *Sin and Society* (New York), 1910.

fever. The French company which attempted to build the Panama Canal was defeated, not only by financial dishonesty, but also by the pestilence that walketh in darkness. Yellow jack killed one whole shipload of French engineers before they had been on the Isthmus a month. This dread disease had scourged tropical ports for centuries. Then came Agramonte of Havana, Walter Reed and Jesse Lazear of the Army Medical Board, and at last General Gorgas, who amid the laughter of skeptics, utilized knowledge bought by the blood of his colleagues, who drained swamps, covered cisterns, sprayed water surfaces with kerosene, until he stopped the mosquito, the carrier of the pest. Then, and then only, was the Canal completed. Pasteur, Klebs, Koch and half a hundred others have measurably stopped diptheria, smallpox, and now scarlet fever and syphilis are being halted. Dr. Trudeau and his colleagues have gone many stages along the road to victory in the conquest of tuberculosis. One answer of both faith and of reason to evil is to change all of it that can be changed.

A second answer deeply rooted in Christian tradition is to bear all that cannot be changed. Much of the evil which we suffer today is something to be endured as heroically, as patiently and as beautifully as possible, endured without cynicism, without harsh accusation, without a sullen desire for vengeance. Much suffering is inherent in the creative processes of life itself. Of course one can revolt against life. But that is a silly revolt. Life is too big an antagonist. It is more sensible to make war upon a sizeable foe, disease, bad habits, ill-will, malarial swamps flooding rivers, local political conditions, the injustice that one can change.

Only a foreshortened moral view can see all the evil, all the pain of this world as deserved, as given out in due proportions to those who receive it. There are many burdens and much hardship borne by innocent people, all undeserved, and that can only be reconciled to a reasonable universe and a loving God when we look up from our Lilliputian labors to see that the totality of our little lives is swathed in the multitudinous life of the race, that over each is the hand and eye of God to give significance, to notice the stoppage of life, to complete unto Himself all of our broken efforts, our damaged work, our hopes which could never come to fruition.

A third answer is to wring from suffering any harvest possible. We are forced to admit that the cripple, the blind, the man with one hand,

women with frail health not seldom put to shame the healthy and the strong. Some strange wisdom has come to them whereby they take calamity by the throat, choke him, until he let go of life, leaving it scarred and bleeding but free to act. It would be senseless to pursue pain, to ask for defeat, to court illness. Yet there is a harvest out of pain. We do not receive what we hope and pray and work for, but we often receive something better. Suffering teaches men to erect lighthouses, create fire-departments, to organize public health services, to educate the young. The burnt child avoids the fire. Cardinal Mercier, when he assumed the proportions of a world figure in opposing German occupation, gave this word of encouragement to the children of Belgium, "Suffering, accepted and vanquished, will give you a security which may become the most exquisite fruit of your life." Valor still enables the stricken to rise above much evil and many infirmities, and to wring a harvest out of pain.

A fourth answer is to make lower motives serve higher interests. Fear may not be one of the noblest springs of action, it is oftener than not a real evil, but fear may often be used to avoid disease, to keep one's family from want, to move men to obey the law, to refrain from stealing a neighbor's wife or his ox or his ass, or his pocket book. Self-interest is certainly not a commendable trait. It brings about as much evil as any one vice, but self-interest may be used to forward a higher interest. Enlightened selfishness may keep a nation out of war, or build a dike to stay a flood, or enter into beneficient treaties, or keep peace within a family. A frivolous group seeking social advancement may start a clinic in a slum. Hypocrisy may be rooted deeply in their lives, but in the clinic blind men may receive their sight, lame children be made to walk, overworked parents may receive healing for their pale and weakened son or daughter.

A fifth answer is to face evil as a fellow-creator, as well as a fellow-creature. To the extent that God has allowed men a large measure of freedom, He has shared with us what Pascal called "the dignity of causality." Man can not only beget his kind, not only draw hidden metals from the rock; he can, with brush, with stylus, with pen and bow and chisel communicate, beyond the measure of the written page, his vision to his fellow-men. By altering the flow of rivers, by canal and tunnel, by transplanting seed and plant he can change the very face of nature. But in many of these processes, marvelous as they are, one

plant dispossesses another, one species drives out another, the new order supplants a previous order. With the greatest care man's wisest plans cause pain, temporary chaos before order, harmony, fruitfulness, beauty, emerges. The Boulder Dam, half finished, looked like the confused playhouse of a rowdy giant. Completed, every line witnesses to intelligence and order. When we view many works of God in process they appear cruel play-acting by a Titan, but when completed, they show purpose and utility. In addition to instinctive urges for food, sexual gratification, shelter, self-protection, the urge to create is strong in man, a power shared by God with his sons and daughters, and in their trial and their error they cause no little evil in the world.

There are inevitable processes, rhythms, personal and social tensions. The very house of refuge screens the sun from some tree or flower. The farmer's plough covers a thousand violets in one morning's work. Man will be aided in contemplating the problem of evil, some of which he can account for, much of which he cannot, by facing it with a measure of shared responsibility as creator, as well as creature. His mind will be enlightened as to the problems of God, by an increased understanding of his own efforts at creation.

Faith itself is the major answer to the problem of evil. As we contemplate nature, man and God, we are sharply aware of the twin mysteries good and evil. These facts must be referred to a source. As a matter of sheer reason it is less difficult to acknowledge evil in a universe controlled by a loving, and a just God, than it is to assert that an indifferent or evil universe brings forth good. Water released from the parent spring may run down hill, it never runs uphill.

Intelligence is not produced by unconscious matter, reason does not come from unreason, goodness does not originate in badness. Intelligence begets intelligence, and goodness begets goodness. Socrates, Plato, David Livingstone, Father Damien, Lincoln, Jesus of Nazareth, these stand high in honor, fidelity, bravery, insight. The last was a unique Son of God, the others, also sons of rare worth. How explain what they did, and were, save as they stemmed from a parent source of great and noble quality?

The man who believes only a little, whose faith is a tenuous thing, but who accounts for good as derived from a good source, who accounts for evil in many ways as outlined above, leaving place for much which is unknown, has the right to say, "I believe, help thou mine unbelief."

The Christian faith is incurably hopeful about an ultimate victory over evil. Jesus said, "In the world ye shall have tribulation: but be of good cheer: I have overcome the world."[4] The writer of the First General Epistle of John wrote, "This is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith."[5] The Christian faith recognizes those limitations which compose man's finitude. But we see the best men refuse to accept defeat as a permanent status, or to rest in dumb resignation. Faith does its finest work when it takes the man overwhelmed with evil, and, by the creative gift of a power not his own, enables him to break bad habits, vicious practices, and to bear heroically the scars of suffering. Having overcome the evil which lays hold on him, he has faith that God will win over the evil in the universe.

Thus the reply of religion to evil in all its malevolent and mysterious phases, is a God operating through benevolent and often mysterious processes, Who is great enough to create and sustain this universe, with Whom man can achieve contact. The incurable, the innocent sufferer, the paralytic child, do often reach a state of spiritual valor akin to the great saints when they oppose faith to the black enigmas of pain, invalidism and premature death. They oppose the mystery of good to the mystery of evil which has fallen upon them. Neither philosophy nor theology pretend ever fully to answer the world's almost intolerable vexations. They do offer as a response to sorrow, loss and pain, the bravery of a soul raised to its fullest dignity as a child of God.

In facing evil we shall learn from those who have borne triumphantly the scars of evil. Faith here is not belief through sheer willpower, it is the affirmation of the whole personality, an assertion of man's entire life to a belief in a living God, an assertion in terms other than the usual rational categories, beyond them, or above them, if you will, but not contradictory to reason at its best. Jesus' answer to God's silence in the Garden, when the Son of Man prayed, "Let this cup pass," was the answer of a believing Son. So may be our answer.

4. John 16:33.
5. I John 5:4.

# RUSSIAN NATIONALISM AND THE OLD BELIEVERS

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The great wave of nationalistic thinking in the religious sphere which created the Protestant Revolt in Western Europe in the sixteenth century left almost no direct mark upon Russia. The few isolated individuals who came under its influence had little effect upon the masses of the people, who continued to live and think in the old manner, and maintained a stubborn resistance against everything and everyone foreign. Nevertheless, there was an acceptance of non-Russian ideas at this period which drove the religious movement into an apparently opposite channel, so that the nationalistic tendencies developed as a reaction, rather than as a sign of progress. Thus it came about in the seventeenth century that the Church seemed too progressive, and the Old Believers revolted against it in the name of the old piety.

To understand the origin of this purely Russian movement we must look back at the circumstances under which Russian culture and national spirit came into being. There can be little doubt that the early rulers were largely of Scandinavian origin. Had they maintained their connections with the north, it is very likely that the country would have been drawn into the feudal system of Western Europe.[1] This was not to be, and even before the coming of the Mongols, these relations had lost most of their importance.

More valuable for the cultural life of Russia were the contacts with Constantinople, the Balkans, and the Christian nations around the Caspian Sea. Christianity was carried into Russia up the great rivers which flow down from the north, the Dnyepr, the Don, and the Volga. Church books in Old Church Slavonic, and in Old Bulgarian, were carried up to Kiev and later to Moscow. The early metropolitans of Kiev, and later of Vladimir and Moscow, were Greeks, until St. Peter of Volynia was nominated by Moscow in 1308 and sent to Constantinople for consecration. It was only in 1453, at the time of the fall of Constantinople, that St. Jonah of Ryazan

1. Cf. L. C. Lewis, "Pre-Mongolian Church Life in Russia." *Anglican Theological Review*, Vol. 1, pp. 261 ff.

was consecrated by Russian bishops, and that the close contact with the Imperial City lapsed.

But we must not believe that, during the centuries between the adoption of Christianity by St. Vladimir and the fall of Constantinople, life had remained the same. It is true that there had been almost no real theological study in Russia, especially after the Mongol invasion. Yet the language of the services had changed more or less unnoticed. There was no conscious translation of the Church books from the language of the Balkans into that of Russia, but there was a continuous process of correction and adaptation. Thus Svyatoslav Yaroslavich, "desiring greatly to reveal the secret sense in the depth of these hard books (written in Bulgarian) bade my ignorance to make changes in the words with the maintenance of the same sense,"[2] as his scribe puts it. There are many other references to this same method of procedure, and we can well understand how it might bring in, not only corrections and adaptations, but also obvious mistakes.

Likewise there developed in Russia a very different code of life and manners. The original Byzantine pattern of society was influenced by the Asiatic system of the Mongols, for we must remember that for over two centuries the various princes were dependent upon the Mongol Emperor, or the Khan of the Golden Horde, for their posts. Prostration made its way into the Church, for it was still held that a man should be as polite to God as to his social superiors. Many other Asiatic customs also were introduced, and we can be sure that life in Moscow by 1400 was very different from what it had been some centuries earlier.

Yet it was far less cultured. We do not need to postulate an advanced system of education for Kiev in the tenth and eleventh centuries, but we must compare the rulers with the Western kings and princes of the same period. If we do, we shall find that Yaroslav the Great and Vladimir Monomakh certainly compare more than favorably with such men as William the Conqueror and Richard I. The Mongols and Tatars swept the country, and Dimitry Donskoy, in 1389, was barely able to sign his name. There was not only a relative retrogression as compared with European progress, but also an actual decay as compared with the nation's own past.

Out of these elements there developed a highly formalized and

2. Quoted in A. Shchapov, *Russky Raskol Staroobryadchestva* (Kazan, 1859), p. 20.

standardized society which was ardently and fanatically devoted to the customs handed down from the fathers. It constantly sought to maintain without change everything that was old, and hence came the large number of guides of life, like that of the sixteenth century Domostroy, which forbade any innovations or novel customs. There was a haunting fear that any change, any intellectual development, was necessarily for the worse, and even the heretics of the day, such as Feodosy Kosoy, argued that it was forbidden to write books after the Seventh General Council.[3] The monastic chroniclers were accustomed to include in their works notices of even the slightest change in the established usage. The addition or omission of a single word, such as *O Gospodi* (O Lord), is considered as important as the most momentous poltical happening. Thus we can date almost every ritual change in the country, and it seems that most of these variations arose after the fall of Constantinople and the definite rise of Moscow.

These two events, almost contemporary, made a great difference to Russia. There had been hitherto a vague, but still definite, standard to which Orthodox Christians could adhere. In case of dispute between members of the hierarchy it had been possible to appeal to the Oecumenical Patriarch for a decision, because he was the leading Christian ecclesiastic of the Christian Empire. The Russians, because of their hatred of the Poles, had long despised the West, and declined to consider it as really Christian. Now the imperial city had been captured by the Sultan, the Christian Empire had been abolished, and the Patriarch had not only lost much of his wealth, but even more of the respect which he had formerly enjoyed. The Russians were profoundly stirred and shocked by a situation which brought, again and again, the once supreme Eastern Patriarchs to their country in quest of alms and aid for carrying on their very existence.

The change was the more striking because, at almost the same period, Ivan III threw off the yoke of the Golden Horde and became an independent ruler. He became the autocrat[4] of all Russia, and soon felt himself the real Christian sovereign, the real successor of the Emperor of Constantinople. Then again, by his marriage with

3. Cf. I. Porfirev, *Istoria Russkoy Slovesnosti* (Kazan, 1910), Vol. I, p. 590.

4. In the language of the day, an autocrat was a ruler who owed neither tribute nor homage to another sovereign. It did not connote our modern feeling of an absolute ruler as contrasted with one who was compelled to give heed to the rights of a democracy.

Sophia Paleolog, he brought to Moscow the eagles of Byzantium, despite the fact that she was not in any sense the legitimate heir to the crown. Ivan saw the advantages in the marriage as part of a policy to advance his own position, exactly as the Pope hoped that this union would bring Ivan closer to the Holy See.

It goes without saying that it flattered the Russians to consider themselves as the logical successors of the Empire, and Moscow as the Third Rome. Thus as early as 1512, we find the monk Filothey writing with regard to the fall of Constantinople and the Balkan kingdoms: "All Christian empires have come to their end and have met in the one empire of our sovereign, according to the prophetical books, that is the Russian Empire; for two Romes have fallen (Rome and Constantinople), the Third Rome (Moscow) stands, and there will be no fourth. . . . The Christian countries have collapsed before the unbelievers, only the empire of our one ruler, by the grace of God, still exists."[5]

The general sense of national self-satisfaction which is here manifested is no isolated phenomenon in the history of Russia. It became the dominant mood of the following century, and it culminated in the seventeenth century in the frankly boastful remark of Avvakum to the Eastern Patriarchs on the occasion of his trial in 1667. When they urged him to accept the standards of the other Orthodox Churches, he declared proudly: "Oecumenical teachers! Rome long since has fallen and lies prostrate and the Poles have perished with them, and have become the enemies of the Christians. Even your Orthodoxy has been tainted by violence [from the Turks]. Henceforth come to us to learn; we by the grace of God still are an autocracy. Till the days of Nikon the apostate, in our Russia with the noble and God-fearing princes and tsars, Orthodoxy was pure and undefiled and the Church was not rebellious."[6] Avvakum here goes beyond Filothey. The latter asserted that Moscow was the Third Rome and free. Avvakum insisted that it was the centre of everything.

During this period various Western travellers and diplomats, such as Herberstein, visited Moscow. One and all complained of the backwardness of the country and the ignorance of the people. There was

5. Quoted in *Istoria russkoy literatury do XIX vyeka, pod redaktsieyu Gruzinskago* (Moscow, 1916), pp. 273.

6. Quoted in V. Anderson, *Staroobryadchestvo i Sektantstvo* (St. Petersburg, 1900 [?]), p. 84.

much justice in their remarks, but we must also remember that in another sense the sixteenth century was a golden age for Russia. It was the century when ikonography reached its highest development in the works of Andrey Rublev and the other masters. The old wooden architecture of the *kokoshnik* churches was translated into stone, and culminated in such structures as the Church of Vasily Blazhenny in Moscow. The Russians were freely modifying, always in the name of tradition, the artistic heritage of Byzantium, and turning it into something which has never been surpassed for fantasy and imagination. The domestic architecture of the boyars showed the same tendency. In a word, Moscow in the sixteenth century, although an overgrown wooden village, possessed, as at no other period before or since, a native art, a combination of memories of both East and West, of Europe and Asia. It was an art without parallels abroad, and we can well understand why it was slighted by all those who were immersed in the spirit of the West. The establishment of a Patriarchate in 1589 sealed this native development, and the Third Rome regarded itself as its own standard of progress.

Yet during this whole period there was little distinctively theological thinking in the true sense of the word. Almost all parties and leaders agreed that there were definite errors in the Church books, and that these should be corrected, but it was impossible to outline a definite policy for doing it.

The first outstanding attempt was made in the reign of Vasily, when Maksim the Greek was invited to come from Mount Athos to undertake the task. He was a Greek-speaking Albanian who was born near the city of Arta in 1480. He was educated in Venice and Florence, and in the latter city he became a friend of Savonarola. Then in 1507 he retired to Mount Athos, and in 1518 went to Russia. His very training was enough to discredit him in the eyes of the conservatives. Here was a man who had lived for years in Italy at a time when no Russian would eat at the same table with a Roman Catholic. He knew Greek and Latin, but the one language had fallen under Moslem sway, and the other was definitely connected with the heretic, or perhaps pagan, Poles. To make matters worse he knew no Russian, and his interpreters were rather Latin-speaking than Greek, so that Maksim corrected the books by translating into Latin and having his secretary translate this Latin into Russian. It was a difficult per-

formance, and when he came to make any serious corrections his secretary objected: "You are causing great grief, O man, by your action to the reverend wonderworkers glorified in our land, for they by these holy books served God in their lifetime and after their death, they were glorified by Him with sainthood and the working of all miracles."[7] Among the points which he tried to correct was the following. The Russians had become accustomed to say in the Creed, "the Holy Ghost, the Lord, the True." This phrase seems to have come from certain Serb sources where the word True, (*Istinny*), was substituted for Lord (*Gospod*). Later the word was inserted in the text as an addition, and not as a substitution. It soon acquired a special sanctity, and strong protests were made at any attempt to eliminate it from the newer texts. Maksim was finally accused of corrupting the Church books and of multilating them, and he was imprisoned in a monastery for many years. There was probably also a political angle in the whole case, but at all events, it was the religious charge that influenced popular sentiment against Maksim.

Throughout the sixteenth century this controversy continued. Each new ecclesiastic decided to undertake the work, but he was always stopped as soon as he undertook any definite correction for fear that in this particular case he was committing sacrilege.

If we may put the question in a concrete form, the great choice before the reformers was this: Should the books be corrected on the basis of old manuscripts still in Russia, or possibly in other Slavonic countries, or should the Greek manuscripts also be consulted? Should the Russian Church maintain its isolation and insist upon the prerogatives to which the Third Rome was entitled, or should the Church admit precepts and customs which were in vogue among the subjugated Churches of the East? Would the use of Eastern models bring upon the Russians also the fate of subjugation which the Greeks had suffered? For these reasons, and for many others, there was great hesitation in undertaking the correction, and woe befall the unfortunate scholar who sought to move against the popular current.

We catch very definite reflections of this feeling in the Stoglav. This was a council held in 1551 in Moscow to consider various ecclesiastical reforms, but the history of its deliberations offers many thorny questions to the scholar, especially the part of its report entitled

7. *Istoria Gruzinskago, op. cit.*, p. 282.

"The Tsar's Questions and the Council's Answers" on various ecclesiastical acts. It will be noted here that these decrees, genuine or not, were widely accepted as genuine by the nationalist party, and probably rightly, but this council, whatever its purpose, succeeded in condemning many customs as Greek and therefore pagan,[8] and on the other hand it became outspoken against Latin heresies sometimes also mistakenly.[9]

On the other hand, there apparently developed in Novgorod at the end of the fifteenth century a considerable recognition of the value of certain practices of the Western Church. Thus we find that the Metropolitan Gennady definitely recommended that the leaders of the Judaizers be punished by the Tsar, and he recommended it on the basis of the Spanish Inquisition. Likewise, when the same Metropolitan prepared a Slavonic translation of the Bible, he found it necessary or advisable to translate several books directly from the Vulgate, especially the Apocrypha. It is perhaps also from this Western influence that there arose the tendency of the Iosiflyane (or followers of St. Joseph Volotsky) to free the Church, as far as possible, from all dependence upon the state.

Yet if these tendencies from Novgorod were to find some mercy, and perhaps in a few cases even to secure incorporation in the general body of tradition, any advances towards friendship with the West were destroyed by the Union of Brest Litovsk in 1596. By this agreement a large part of the Cossacks, and the rest of the Orthodox population in Poland, accepted the supremacy of the Pope in return for the right to maintain the Orthodox liturgy and the Slavonic Church language and customs. This Union was bitterly attacked by those of the Cossacks and Ukrainians who remained loyal to Orthodoxy, and resulted in the bitter wars of the seventeenth century which did so much to weaken Poland and prepare for the division of the country. Moscow saw in all this merely another unfortunate result of a dabbling with the West, and its spirit became more intolerant than ever.

It carried this dislike over to the Orthodox of Kiev, in which city were concentrated the best Orthodox scholars of the Russian lands. These men, living under the rule of the king of Poland, were forced

8. Cf. *Le Stoglav*, traduction par E. Duchesne (Paris, 1920), pp. 242 ff.
9. Cf. G. Florovsky, *Puti Russkoy Bogosloviya* (Paris, 1937), pp. 26 f.

to defend their faith against the Roman Catholics and the Uniats, and as a result they worked out an adaptation of the scholastic philosophy to the Orthodox Faith. Perhaps such scholars as Archbishop Peter Mogila and his associates did go a little too far in accepting Catholic definitions and systematizations of theology, but at least they were scholars, and were working on theological problems at a moment when Moscow, secure in its position as the Third Rome, gave no heed to them. As a result their influence spread among all the Orthodox Churches, and everywhere at this period we find growing marks of this Orthodox scholasticism. Yet they were more tolerant in their personal relations toward the Roman Catholics than were the Russians, and in return Moscow despised them as semi-Uniats.

Such was the general situation at the extinction of the old dynasty of Rurik and the accession of Boris Godunov in 1598. Moscow was sure of itself, and far more interested in ritual and in practical questions of the control of monastic properties, than in real theology. Already from the northwest there had come the first wave of influence of Latin ideas, but this was not consciously recognized. At the same time Ivan the Terrible had founded the foreign quarters of Moscow, and some knowledge of the West was beginning to sink in.

With the Troublous Times, and the occupation of the Kremlin in Moscow by a Polish army from 1610 to 1612, there came a new stream of Western Polish influence, but this was expressed in material things far more than in religious or intellectual ideas. Some of the nobles and boyars came to realize the superior comforts of the Polish manner of life, and slowly but surely they commenced to adopt some of the customs of the invaders. The breach in the native mode of living continued to grow until, in the reign of Peter the Great at the end of the century, the stream of influence burst all bounds, and old Russia passed officially into the discard.

Yet during this time the agitation for the reform of the Church books continued. For the most part the work was in the hands of the nationalist group. These men had succeeded in 1551 at the Stoglav Council in committing the Church to a thoroughly nationalist position. During the next century we find a steadily growing number of books sanctioning the ideas of the Third Rome, and stressing the use of the two-fingered cross, the spelling of the sacred name *Isus* instead of *Iisus*, the ecclesiastical processions moving clockwise with the sun, etc.

Some of these usages may have had a native origin. At all events, no one could quote the Greeks or the Eastern Patriarchs as supporting them, and so they fitted in well with the new nationalistic point of view, which was constantly becoming more extreme.

Yet if the nationalist elements grouped around the personality of Avvakum, all those elements who were desirous of renewing contacts outside of Moscow gravitated to the side of Nikon, who became Patriarch in 1652. Nikon may have acquired some of his ideas as to the proper position of the Patriarch from Western sources. He certainly believed ardently that Moscow should conform to the traditions of the Eastern Patriarchs, and immediately after his accession, he sent a delegation to the East to study the customs of the Eastern Patriarchs. The men on this delegation included monks from Kiev, for along with the growth of Polish influence there had come a gradual infiltration of Kievan monks and scholars. Some of them knew Latin, and nearly all of them Greek. Moscow was aghast at their entrance. They had been brought in with the circle of Rtishchev, and gradually they had become the educated group of Moscow. It was on them that the tsar and the clergy leaned whenever they really wanted to deal with education, to found schools, to do anything similar to what was being done outside of the borders of the country.

Thus there was finally organized and concentrated the two opposing points of view. On the one hand, Avvakum and the nationalists; on the other, Nikon and the liberals. The battle ground extended all over Russian life. The influence of the liberals was exerted to put an end to the old Russian Church architecture, and to restore churches built on Byzantine patterns. The nationalists opposed this. They demanded that all ikons painted under any influence of the Italian Renaissance be removed from the churches. The liberals refused. In education, art, architecture, daily life, no less than in politics, the two clashed.

As the quarrel deepened both sides became more bitter. The only bishop who had openly espoused the nationalist cause, Paul of Kolomna, died in prison where he was placed in 1653. In 1657, at the urging of the Patriarch of Antioch who was then in Russia, Nikon abolished the two-fingered cross, and then ordered the old books to be collected and burned. In all fairness this seems to have referred to the books printed under the influence of the nationalist leaders, but

undoubtedly many valuable manuscripts and ikons perished at the same time. The various actions of Nikon, and his measures against the leaders of the nationalists, had the sanction of the Tsar Alexis for a considerable while. The tsar was himself progressive, and tended to be favorable to Western culture and education, and he realized the possibilities in the movement. However, he was mindful of his own dignity, and when Nikon seemed to become too overbearing, he manoeuvered in such a way that in 1658 the Patriarch withdrew to a monastery and practically laid down his office. However, the tsar did not annul any of Nikon's reforms.

Within a decade the long stormy problem of the correction of the Church books turned into a serious conflict over the future form of Russian culture. On the one side was a group of the more educated people with some ideal of drawing Russia out of her isolation. On the other were a group of nobles, and the majority of the peasants, who were grumbling against any change in the old order, and against the constantly increasing loss of old liberties as the Empire became more united and organized. The struggle was in all fields, but it ostensibly centered around the religious problem, and when Avvakum and his friends threw into the arena the charge that Nikon was Antichrist, anything might happen and nearly everything did.

Already in the reign of Alexis, the monks of the Solovyetsky Monastery had risen in revolt, and endured a ten year siege before the tsar's *streltsy* could capture it. This was only the beginning, and the new reforms of Peter added oil to the flame, with the result that a series of bloody wars and revolts continued in the Volga valley through the days of Pugachev (who was executed in 1775) for the Old Faith and the beard.

It might have been thought that such a movement, which manifested itself in the formation of the Old Believers, and was so formidable in its extent, might have proved a positive opposition to the government. Among these people were included a large part of the wealthy merchant classes who devoted themselves to the preservation of the old manuscripts, Church books, and ikons. It is not without significance that the first exhibition of the old ikons took place with official approval only in 1913.

Nevertheless, although the Raskolniks at different times and in different places could be driven to armed revolt, they proved them-

selves unable to agree upon a definite plan of action. This really was inherent in the nature of the movement which claimed to be definitely Orthodox, and in opposition to the Nikonian Church. Unfortunately it had no bishops, and therefore it was impossible to organize fully a Church on the lines of their belief. They consoled themselves with the idea that Antichrist was reigning in the world, but to defeat him they needed spiritual fervor rather than political organization.

Intellectually the groups never agreed on a definite program after the reforms of Nikon. It was again the same problem as had existed during the fateful century. All agreed that certain changes were necessary, but they could not secure a standard. Hence there grew up a vast number of sects, each identifying Antichrist with the pet aversion of its members, and all believing that at the Last Judgment victory would be won by divine intervention. These sects were grouped into the main divisions of the Popovtsy, or Priest sects, who believed that under certain conditions Orthodox priests could be converted from their heresies and serve them; and Bezpopovtsy, or Priestless sects, who affirmed that the Orthodox Church had entirely apostatized, and that there was nothing to be done but to reconstruct the Christian life to fit the new situation.

Flight to Siberia and to Turkey, mass suicides by fire; these were some of the outlets open to the Old Believers, and many sought them. Others compromised. One and all emphasized the superiority of old Russia, and sought to preserve in full measure what they believed to be the genuine tradition.

The final outcome of the nationalist movement was sad, and destructive to the country. The government and the Church moved on, but much of the vitality and the energy remained behind, not so much as an opposition, but as a brake. Yet these people, because of their belief that they were Orthodox and Russian, never co-operated to any extent with the revolutionists and their agnostic ideas. They lived apart, almost unnoticed by literature or science, but still a very powerful minority.

There is still much that is obscure in the origin of many of the ideas of this whole movement. There are few references in modern Russian to the Third Rome, and yet that idea has been dominant throughout the land. Few writers and fewer scientists have studied this movement, but the Old Believers remained to the end of the

Empire as they had been for centuries—a loose organization of individuals or societies who would not conform to the wishes of Antichrist, and who therefore refused to bow before a sovereign whom they religiously must dislike. Few are their contributions to thought. Great are their services to art and history. Perhaps at some future time their remains, and those of the official Church, may come together in a new effort to define the proper relations between nationalism and culture.

# COMMUNICATIONS

## THE SWEDENBORG COMMEMORATION

The 250th anniversary of the birth (on January 29, 1688) of Emanuel Swedenborg, the great Swedish scientist and seer, is being celebrated in many parts of the world. His native land has honored the occasion by a special issue of stamps bearing his portrait, and many eminent Swedes, including King Gustav, the Crown Prince, Professor The Svedberg of Uppsala, Baron Erik Palmstierna, and the Hon. Wollmar C. Bostrom, Minister to the United States, are among its sponsors. In London a meeting of over 2000 persons is being held at Queen's Hall under the patronage of Prince Arthur of Connaught and Sir Campbell Rhodes. The principal American celebration was the dinner in New York City on January 26. The tribute of the world of science to Swedenborg's memory was paid by Dr. Howard W. Haggard of Yale University, and Dr. Max Mason of the California Institute of Technology, and that of the world of religion by Dr. William Adams Brown of Union Theological Seminary. A message was received from President Roosevelt in praise of one whose career "emphasizes in a striking way the triumph of the spiritual over the material."

One of the interesting features of the celebration has been a series of broadcasts from England, Switzerland, Canada, and numerous American stations. Swedenborg himself would have especially enjoyed this use of the air-waves in his honor, for radio is the closest approximation yet achieved to the conditions of the "spiritual world," as he describes them, where space and time do not exist, and all communication is immediate.

Besides these delightful, but ephemeral, phases, the commemoration is also making a permanent contribution to scholarship. In England a special edition of Swedenborg's *The New Jerusalem and Its Heavenly Doctrine* has been published, consisting of 80,000 copies in twenty languages. And, besides the valuable papers by eminent scholars read at the various meetings, a number of important articles have been published treating of various aspects of his many-sided genius. Noteworthy among these is one by Dr. John R. Swanton of the Smithsonian Institution, in *The Scientific Monthly*, and a pamphlet, *Swedenborg; A Psychological Pioneer*, Dr. Howard D. Spoerl.

## RELIC CASKET OF BUDDHA FOUND IN FRONTIER PROVINCE*

The *Times of India*, in its issue dated September 29, 1937, publishes the following account of the discovery of a Buddhist relic of the time of Menander:

"The discovery of a relic casket with inscriptions in the Kharoshthi script is reported by the Director-General of Archaeology. The provenance of the inscription is reported to be 'Shinkot' in Bajaur territory outside the North-West Frontier Province, where some tribal people when digging the foundations of a new fort chanced upon a steatite casket said to encase a silver casket. This in turn contained a gold reliquary inlaid with precious stones and some ashes with which some contemporary coins must undoubtedly have been deposited.

"The more precious parts of the find, as also the relics, are no longer traceable, but the stone casket with parts of the broken lid, both of which had inscriptions incised on them, were recovered through the efforts of Mian Afzal Shah, son of Khan Bahadur Mian Raheem Shah, C. I-E. of Ziarat Kaka Sahib in the Peshawar District.

"The relic is the oldest of its kind ever recovered in the North-West Frontier Province. The inscription records the enshrinement of the relics of Buddha by one Vijayamitra (who may have been a petty dignitary) in the time of the Maharaja Menander, the well-known Greek King of the Punjab and Afghanistan, the first of the alien rulers to adopt Buddhism, whose 'questions' are recorded in the Pali Buddhist scriptures. No Kharoshthi record of the time of any of the Indo-Greek kings has yet been recovered, although silver and copper coins, particularly of Menander, are found in plenty in the Kabul Valley, all over the Punjab and even up to Kathiawar.

"Mian Afzal Shah has presented the casket to the archaeological section of the Indian Museum at Calcutta."

* Reprinted from *The Buddha-Prabha* (October 1935), pp. 901-2.

# BOOK REVIEWS

*The Philosophy of Religion.* By Emil Brunner. Translated by A. J. D. Farrer and Bertram Lee Woolf. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937. 194 pp. $2.25. (German edition, 1926).

*The Divine Imperative.* By Emil Brunner. Translated by Olive Wyon. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937. 728 pp. $7.50. (German edition, entitled *Das Gebot und die Ordnungen,* 1932).

*God and Man.* By Emil Brunner. Translated by David Cairns. London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1936. 180 pp. $2.00. (German edition, 1930).

*Our Faith.* By Emil Brunner. Translated by John W. Rilling. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936. vii + 153 pp. $1.75. (German edition, 1935).

The demand for English translations of the works of Emil Brunner, Professor of Theology in Zürich, which has resulted in the recent publication of these four books, is largely due to the fact that he has made an earnest attempt to explain the relationship between the Theology of Crisis and categories of philosophy, ethics, psychology and historical criticism which are familiar to English and American readers. When the translation of his latest work, *Der Mensch im Widerspruch,* appears, virtually every extensive writing of this author will be available in English, except for a lengthy critique of Schleiermacher entitled *Die Mystik und das Wort.*

The purpose of this review is to state critically Brunner's views concerning the philosophy of religion and ethics; it is hoped that clarity on these two topics will be useful in interpreting his position as a whole. Lest some of the remarks which follow give rise to a contrary impression, let me say here that I regard him as the ablest Protestant theologian in Europe today.

## I. REVELATION AND PHILOSOPHY

The most distinctive characteristic of contemporary continental theology is the reassertion of an opposition between revelation and reason. Unlike Karl Barth, Brunner has refused to go so far as to deny entirely the validity of general revelation and natural theology; he assigns to them, however, a merely propaedeutic function, strictly subordinate to faith. (Cf. *The Mediator* and *Natur und Gnade*).

At the outset of his book on the philosophy of religion, Brunner defines the only meaning which this discipline can have for Protestantism. Instead of seeking to fit the claims of religious faith into a general philosophical world-view, it must take revelation as the starting point for interpreting all life, thus including "reason" as one of the activities which fall within its purview. God's self-disclosure (as contrasted with all human activity) is distinct, not only from reason, but also from the irrational (i.e., intuition and feeling) and from religion as a cultural phenomenon.

The question naturally arises as to why, if it is possible in any sense to have knowledge of God's self-disclosure, this knowledge may not be called "rational." Brunner replies by setting a radical distinction between "reason" as a natural human capacity, and "faith" as a gift of God. The one deals with ideas and universal truths; the other alone can acknowledge God's self-disclosure in an act in history, that is, in the unique fact of Jesus Christ. To accept the one as an ultimate criterion is to reject the other; revelation is either self-authenticating or it never occurs. On these terms, the Scholastic *via media* is an attempt to affirm simultaneously the validity of two irreconcilable presuppositions.

Of course Brunner's position, like that of the Protestant reformers, must seem sheerly perverse unless it be rememberd that "faith" does not mean, for him, merely a certain human attitude. It is wholly dependent upon God's two-fold action in revelation; that is to say, it holds the "objective" Word, Jesus Christ, to which Scripture attests, and the "inward" Word of the Holy Spirit, in a paradoxical unity; in so doing it establishes a relationship between the unique event of the Incarnation and the present moment of the believer's existence.

The remainder of the book is given over to a critique of four points of view, each of which destroys this paradoxical unity of faith. They are: rationalism, subjectivism (pietistic and romantic), historicism, and orthodoxy (i.e., "fundamentalism").

The attitude typical of rationalism is one which finds no opposition between revelation and reason because the former is identified with a natural capacity for knowing God as the immanent ground of the human spirit. Religion, on such terms, is concerned with universal truths; the historically concrete, at best, can have only the subordinate value of symbolizing these truths.

In reacting against this view, however, Brunner does not go to the opposite extreme of regarding reason and revelation as mutually exclusive; this would result in a double standard of truth. Rather, he maintains that from the standpoint of faith both the rightful claims and the proper limits of reason can be understood. In general it may be said that he sees the defects of rationalism as arising from false claims—false confidence in a human capacity; but because of original sin all employment of reason by the natural man is fraught with this vice.

The details of Brunner's critique of rationalism can only be hinted at here. "Realism," which begins with concrete things, can never consistently go beyond them and arrive at the ultimate ground of reality; while "idealism," which begins with the absolute idea as ground, can never successfully bring it into connection with the concrete, in which an irreducibly irrational factor inheres. Neither can do more than produce a speculative thought of God, which differs from the God of faith as a merely ideal or abstract truth differs from personal address. "Critical philosophy" has the merit of stating clearly the limits within which reason is confined, but it quite rightly does nothing to transcend them.

All philosophical attempts to know God are futile because philosophy is by nature theoretical and deals only with "objective" realities (things or truths); whereas God, being personal, is not a reality who can be theoretically known. Indeed, the method of philosophy necessarily involves an emancipation from God—a subjecting of Him to conditions laid down by us—which is sinful. Because the men who employ reason are alienated from God, their efforts to find Him through philosophy end in the insurmountable opposition between realism and idealism just discussed.[1]

Only through faith, the essence of which is not "thought" but "trust," can the dilemma be resolved; yet even it provides no *theoretical* solution. It results in belief in *creatio ex nihilo*, but the oneness of the personal God, as both the cause and ground of the world, demands a combination which no rational category can hold together. Even the coalescence of the real and the ideal which we find in human personal-

1. Five lines from the bottom of page 81 in *The Philosophy of Religion* is reproduced what I take to be a mistake in the German edition (page 39, line 37). "The opposition between idealism and rationalism," should read: "The opposition between idealism and realism."

ity breaks down as an analogy at the crucial point of *creatio ex nihilo*.

It is disconcerting to find the author thus holding that true belief involves the cessation of thinking. His reason for doing so is that sinful men can "know" what true creation is like only by a revealed word of promise, and that means not "seeing" it at all. Because the true creation is wholly different from this fallen world (though not unrelated to it), we can fully "know" it only when it is reinstated (i.e., in the Kingdom of God), together with the *imago Dei*.[2]

Here Brunner is following out consistently his contention that revelation is opposed only to the reason of "fallen" man, not to that of "redeemed" man. He further recognizes that even the so-called Christian is at once a believer and an unbeliever. This lands him in a dilemma as old as Epimenides of Crete; for his own statements, in so far as they are true, imply a constitutive knowledge of that which, on his own terms, remains hidden until the end of history. Brunner is not unaware of this; indeed he says quite explicitly that faith is distinguished from all other types of "knowledge," including mysticism, by the fact that it "knows" of the solution (i.e., redemption, the restoration of the *imago Dei*) without possessing it except by promise. Yet this does not really meet the case; for unless the "paradoxical knowledge" of faith is in some sense constitutive, it does not go beyond that regulative knowledge (knowing that God is strictly incomprehensible) which reason itself affords in critical philosophy. Once this is admitted, the claim of any theological statement to be true involves the presupposition that the theologian himself is one of the "elect"; and it is then but a step to making intellectual assent to certain doctrines practically synonymous with faith.

Moreover when Brunner admits (p. 74) that natural reason can eliminate what is false, but cannot of itself lead to what is true in theology, the first half of the statement implies that revelation and reason are at least compatible in what they reject; and if this is the

2. This employment of the notion of a "fallen creation" is indefensible. Biblical references to a new heaven and a new earth do nothing whatever to explain how the transition is made from (1) a "Fall" which is rightly conceived as confined to the sphere of human freedom, instead of including temporality and finitude as parts of its meaning, to (2) "the whole creation spoiled by sin." One can understand why Brunner speaks of man's *knowledge* of creation as distorted by sin; but that is quite different from saying that creation itself—apart from man—is "fallen." Again, once it be remembered that "history" and "personal decision" are correlative notions in Brunner's writings (cf. *infra*), one can see why it follows that all history is affected by the Fall; but, on these terms, creation apart from man is, so to speak, sub-historical.

case, it is difficult to see how the affirmations of faith can be contradictory to natural reason, although of course they might remain wholly or partially ultra-rational.

Despite his great intellectual powers, the earnestness of his Christian convictions, and the sanity of his position as compared with Barth, Brunner still leaves the reader dissatisfied on the points just mentioned. We may be grateful to him and his colleagues for recalling theology to its proper task of witnessing to what God reveals Himself to be, instead of remaining enmeshed in the closed circle of "the religious consciousness" and speculative arguments. Yet there remains something discreditable about identifying one's own position with "faith" and then attempting to silence criticism by saying that it is a manifestation of unbelief and "the pride of reason." If, as Barth has said, you cannot say "God" by shouting "man" in a loud voice, it should follow that you cannot say "God's truth" by shouting "Dialectical Theology" in a loud voice.

To take a specific example—when Brunner tells us that in faith man is *wholly* passive, and yet that faith demands active decision on his part, no one is helped a whit by being told that his puzzlement is due to lack of faith. What is lacking here is intelligibility. As we have seen, the author tries to capitalize on the fact that philosophical systems contradict each other in a manner which no synthesis can resolve; yet at times his own practices afford scant justification for regarding contradictoriness as a defect. His aversion to Schleiermacher should have taught him the disadvantages of trying to "take both sides of every question."

If theology cannot be founded upon speculative philosophy, can it not be based upon ethics? The difficulty with the Kantian solution, according to Brunner, is that a rational ethic, to be universally binding, must remain purely formal; it can furnish an idea of the good will, but it can never make the transition to concrete action on the part of individual men amidst varying circumstances. These remarks would be trite were it not for Brunner's novel employment of them. He claims that the Kantian, like all philosophical conceptions of theology, ends in "aporias" of reason, and that it becomes gratuitously speculative in seeking to transcend them. This neglects Kant's careful distinction between a theory which can be proved, and a rational conviction or postulate. Nevertheless there is considerable force in Brun-

ner's polemic as it proceeds; Kant sunders the actual man into an empirical self which is completely determined, and an intelligible self which is autonomous and of which the moral law is a product. Kant then substitutes this "unfallen," intelligible ego—capable of self-redemption because it can do what it ought—for actual man. At the same time he acknowledges evil as radical and positive. Yet the intelligible ego cannot be at once responsible (therefore the source of evil) and morally self-legislating. Either the moral law is God's, in which case we are not autonomous, or it is posited by our own intelligible ego, in which case evil is unreal and there is no need for a redeeming God. Because Brunner chooses the former alternative, he holds that God cannot be known by reflecting on man's moral consciousness; for so long as man is sinful his morality conflicts with the divine will. The *impasse* in Kantianism betokens the fact that the moral "idea" is no more "God" than is the absolute "idea" of speculation. Both "ideas" are empty because rational reflection can never get beyond monologue. Especially is this apparent when we consider guilt; deliverance from it cannot arise from any "idea," but only from divine forgiveness made actual in history.

At this point where God really meets man, in the cross of Christ, self-knowledge and knowledge of God coincide; for here, and nowhere else, man is revealed as he actually is (as sinful) and God is revealed as forgiving and justifying. When he writes affirmatively in this way, Brunner is frequently eloquent. Once it be understood why he refuses to speak about revelation or knowledge of sin apart from reconciliation, it is easy to go along with him in protesting against the sort of speculation which is forever seeking the solution of intellectual puzzles without giving thought to man's need for salvation. His protests against "moral autonomy" and "the emancipation of reason from God" as sinful, are also made more intelligible when it is remembered that for him the essence of human self-hood and responsibility lies in the fact that man can be addressed by the Word of God. Any world-view or intellectual attitude which ignores this personal relationship as the starting point for theology is therefore incompatible with faith. All this can be said, however, without bordering on obscurantism as Brunner, for all his efforts to the contrary, sometimes does.

Anyone who has correctly grasped Brunner's conception of faith

can follow the remainder of *The Philosophy of Religion* without much difficulty. The basic error of mystical subjectivism, he contends, is that it ignores the "otherness" of the Word, and presupposes a point of ontological identity between God and man; it thus makes sin and reconciliation meaningless, regards the historical as well-nigh irrelevant to religion, and ends in a sub-personal conception of God. As a philosophy of religion it is self-defeating, because in seeking to interpret all religions in terms of a universal essence it must deny the claims of every actual religion to be based on something historically concrete. The Mediator, Jesus Christ, alone can supply that relationship to God which the mystic blunderingly seeks.[3] In general the religious consciousness attests to man's need for salvation; but when this need is regarded as met by man's piety instead of by God's action, then religion becomes an evasion of real surrender to Him. The revealer of God's righteousness was crucified by religious men.

Brunner lumps a great many different considerations together under the topic of "historicism." He seeks to show that historical relativism (Troeltsch), like all relativism, is self-contradictory because as a theory it purports to be "absolutely" true. He then goes on to argue that the meaning of history can only be understood from a point of view which transcends the historical. The truly historical is not to be found in man's "individuality," since that is a category applicable to nature, but in his "personality," his responsibility to answer God's call. This fact escapes all schemes which seek to make meaning immanent in the course of history. The meaning of history is to be found only in the middle point—the revelation of God in Christ—which relates this world to its "beginning" (the Creation and the Fall) and its "end" (Redemption and the Kingdom). Therefore Christianity cannot be inserted into a general history of religion, even as its climax; for revelation comes from the ultra-historical sphere. Students of history and psychology can interpret the phenomena of religion; but, as such, they cannot understand the ultra-historical reference of faith; they can merely ignore it, or beg the question by eliminating anything which does not fit into their method of research.

This is powerful and cogent reasoning, and Brunner rightly contends that faith does not purport to answer historical positivism with

3. Blunderingly, because the mystic conceives of this relationship as immediate. This is fully elaborated in *The Mediator* and *Die Mystik und das Wort.*

a "proof" that Jesus was not merely a great religious genius. That would be to accept the presuppositions of historicism and repudiate its own. When he goes on to interpret the contrast between revelation and certain world religions, however, his argument, as it touches data which students of the history of religion *can* rightly deal with, sounds at times like special pleading.

At the end of the chapter on historicism, the author refers briefly to the bearing of his conception of history upon Christology. Because he holds that the revelation of God in Christ was a judgment on all history and all "religion," he apparently feels constrained to say that Jesus, as an historical event, was not a revelation of God. His historical appearance was the *incognito*. This is the central point of Brunner's criticism of Ritschl: that the latter took an historical personality—a phenomenon in history—to be the revelation of God. His objections have considerable force where he shows that, according to Ritschl, God is to be known in terms of what measures up to *our* moral judgments, instead of as announcing what we could not otherwise know. But something remains to be said in favor of one emphasis of Ritschlianism. An affirmation of the historicity of Jesus is indispensable to Brunner's own Christology, otherwise the Incarnation would not be conceived as really establishing a relationship between God and men who dwell in history. Because of this Brunner is really caught in the same difficulty which he flings in Ritschl's face: the human Jesus cannot be fenced off from the relativity of historical phenomena as such.

This question leads us over into the chapter on "orthodoxy," where Brunner tries hard to escape the foregoing dilemma. He regards the basic error of orthodoxy as consisting in its unqualified identification of the words of the Bible with the Word of God. This neglects the fact that revelation is not a "thing," or a fixed set of oracles, but an event —personal address of God to the believer. Scripture is revelation, and receives unity, in so far as it witnesses to Jesus Christ who is this event, this Word. Faith enables a man to distinguish between the human and the divine side of Scripture. The "fundamentalist" wrongly identifies the human record with revelation, just as Ritschl wrongly identified the human Jesus with revelation. On the other hand, Biblical criticism, because it deals with what is human and historical, can never get beyond mere probability. But because faith is not dependent upon *any*

assertion about history, it is able to pass absolute judgments on the same material.

We therefore have before us two mutually exclusive propositions: faith relates to God's entrance into history; faith is not dependent upon anything historical. The argument by which Brunner tries to wriggle out of the situation is one of the weakest to be found anywhere in his writings; for he claims that the "historical element"—e.g., the earthly career of Jesus—is not the same for the believer as for the unbeliever. Even if this were true, it would fail utterly to meet the point, inasmuch as what the author really wishes to say is that the attitudes of the believer and the unbeliever are different as regards what is *ultra-historical.*

Moreover, when Brunner employs the doctrine of the *incognito* in order to speak of revelation as though it were a sort of aura "concealed" by the earthly career of Jesus, he loses sight of the direct affinity between Deity and perfect manhood which is the central meaning of the Incarnation.[4] Surely this is too high a price to pay even for the luxury of having a theological position which remains unaffected by the vicissitudes of Biblical scholarship.

### II. REVELATION AND ETHICS

Let us now turn to the main principles underlying Brunner's lengthy work on ethics, *The Divine Imperative.* It has done more than any other book to correct the false impression that the Theology of Crisis is so "other wordly" as to have no concern with problems of mundane conduct. The volume is divided into three "books"; the first sets the problem of the relationship between the Christian message and ethics; the second and third deal respectively with the two parts of the solution: the Divine Command and "the Orders." Under this last topic the author enters into a detailed discussion of specific ethical problems, which we shall have to ignore. Much valuable material is contained in the copious notes and appendices. The whole argument unfolds in a leisurely and thorough manner to which no brief survey can possibly do justice.

As one might expect, the author's first important concern is to set revelation in contrast to all philosophical attempts to solve the problem

4. The great defect of Brunner's work on Christology is that he regards this affinity as radically "indirect."

of ethics; he denotes three such attempts: the naturalistic, the idealistic, and the pantheistic. The first always ends in eudaemonism, and therefore can never do justice to a sense of obligation which may go counter to what is convenient or pleasant. The second, starting with the moral ideal, remains purely formal because it can never make the transition to the sphere of actual existence. The third has never succeeded in formulating an independent ethic.[5]

Brunner then resorts to his favorite device of taking the conflict between philosophical schools to indicate that no rational solution of the problem is possible. This time, for good measure, he makes a pretense of trying to develop "the most hopeful" ethical system—that of Kant—as far as possible. Really he is manufacturing an excuse for presenting an admittedly telling criticism of Kant which he has in stock. Even so, to repeat that Kant's ethic is purely formal—which, as Dr. Broad would say, we all learned at our mother's knee—is hardly to prove that no possible rational ethic can give content to "duty." One must admit this, even though he agrees with Brunner's main purpose.

We have already mentioned the gist of his refutation of Kant's "ethical theism." It may suffice to say here that Brunner accepts the notion that obedience to the moral law at any given moment is alone good; therefore its content is unknowable in advance; but to give it this content, he argues, we must go on to say—as Kant did not—that "good" is obedience to God's command as manifest to us amidst changing circumstances. Only belief in God as Creator can thus link the "ought" with the "is." Every other attempt to give material content to "ought" dilutes morality with eudaemonism. Only faith in revelation can make clear the opposition between good and evil without sundering human nature into two metaphysical halves, the spiritual and the physical.[6] The contradiction inhering in all human attempts to solve the problem of ethics can only be removed by an act of God. This means that the Christian message concerning ethical conduct cannot be worked into any general, speculative scheme.

5. Space does not permit me to justify the comment, but it is apparent throughout Brunner's discussion of secular ethics that he might have profited by greater familiarity with the painstaking work which British and American writers have devoted in recent years to defining the problems and notions of ethics. This is especially true where he refers to the conception of "intrinsic value."

6. Brunner comes perilously near doing something similar in his dialectical employment of the fact that every believer, so long as history lasts, is also an unbeliever.

The positive message of the Christian ethic, then, is that the good has its basis and its existence solely in the will of God. God wills "community"—a fellowship of love; therefore faith in Him means placing oneself inside this activity of God; the Cross, which is the place where God comes to man, also means reconciliation and forgiveness, and so makes it possible for men to love in return. Because God wills "community," obedience to His will means service to mankind, means turning *towards* the world (as God does), not away from it. The "form" of the good will is "obedience to the will of God"; the "content" is not a program which can be codified in advance, but love for one's neighbor amidst particular circumstances.

Therefore the Christian ethic is "this-wordly," but in a manner entirely different from theories which assume the natural goodness of man. In faith, man knows that the divine image in which he was created has been corrupted. Man's sin prompts him to try to make himself and his conduct independent of God; hence the nearer he approximates the truth concerning righteousness (e.g., in Jewish legalism), the more acute becomes his sense of failure. Apart from faith, man can only choose between bondage to legalism and a superficial eudaemonism which, by regarding life as good-in-itself, quickly eradicates a sense of responsibility, and with it what distinguishes men from animals. The Christian ethic resolves this antinomy, not by a theoretical principle, but by an act of decision whereby the individual is apprehended and justified by God.

The doctrine of justification is the core of Brunner's ethical teaching. He holds that every natural ethic is anthropocentric, and its ultimate motive is self-regard; whereas the Christian ethic proclaims that all men have sinned, because its standard is the will of God, absolute love. A natural ethic admits that some external actions may fall short, while protesting that the inward intention is good; the Christian ethic proclaims that, though outwardly man may perform particular "good acts," the inmost heart is sinful and selfish. Natural morality can never understand that the locus of moral failure is in the will, the person, not in external acts;—that the root of evil is precisely the Pharisaic confidence that man can move towards perfection, act by act, through his own efforts. This is the curse of legalism, that it leaves man in that self-righteousness which is the furthest alienation from God, and prompts him to deal with his neighbor, not in terms of individual

need, but in terms of how the neighbor falls as a "case" under the rubric of some abstract principle. Obligation, instead of implying that I can do right, implies that I cannot; for good—that is, loving action —is spontaneous. Yet so long as man seeks a false moral autonomy, the legal relationship to God is the only one possible. The good can be restored only by removing this autonomy, and with it, the curse of the law.

The Cross retores us to true freedom and a right relationship with God by grace, apart from our "good works"; it reveals the true nature of sin, and at the same time overcomes it. In other words, by faith man receives as a gift that righteousness which no efforts of his own can achieve. This liberates him from self-regarding aims, for service to others.

But does this "justified" man really exist? Brunner answers "Yes, in so far as a man has faith"; but he acknowledges that, so long as history endures, every believer is also an unbeliever, a sinner. Therefore, in this world, Christians live not only by the Divine Indicative —the promise of redemption—but also, because we remain sinners, under the Divine Imperative. Yet because of justification the law is no longer one which condemns, but one which instructs.

The chief danger of Brunner's teaching, of course, arises from his refusal to put forth general principles in the name of the Christian ethic. Yet in his own mind this refusal is clearly not equivalent to a sort of individualistic intuitionism, despite his association with the Oxford Group Movement. He reasons that because the will of God is not capricious, neither is human obedience to it. God wills community; therefore obedience to Him cannot be carried on in individualistic isolation.[7] Furthermore, the passages in which the author protests against the method of Roman Catholic casuistry, whereby moral decision is evaded by subsuming particular cases under general principles, are among the most forceful in the book. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that this side of Brunner's thought leaves the way open to rampant fanaticism; whether he really succeeds in safeguarding his teaching against this charge is a question to which we shall return presently. Here we merely note that in taking the will of God as the sole norm of the good, Brunner states quite explicitly that no one can

7. Cf. *God and Man*, Chapter III, where Brunner relates this concept of "community" to his doctrine of the Church.

know it in advance, no one can know what is right for another, and as he himself hears the Command, an individual can merely be sure that it is "love," even though he is unable to understand it. We must obey because God wills an action, not because we see it to be right!

It is the "paradoxical unity of faith," once again, which determines Brunner's position. Scripture without the Holy Spirit produces legalism; the Spirit without Scripture produces antinomianism. Because faith unites the Word spoken "once for all" with the Word speaking now, it falls into neither pitfall.

We must now enquire how faith is related to the Divine Command. Faith and obedience to the Command always go together; but the former has to do with what has or will come into being through the action of God; the latter refers to something not yet realized because I remain a sinner; it refers to my life as it ought to express itself in action because of God's gift.

Obedience to the Command does not end in fanaticism and antinomianism, Brunner holds, because what God wills is consistent with His activity as Creator and Redeemer (which can be known only in faith, through that moment of reconciliation which unites the beginning and the end of history). In the first instance we must reverence what is, because God has created it; we must range ourselves within its order. This is the "conservative" side of the Christian ethic. At the same time, we know that the creation has been spoiled by sin, and that therefore the will of God is not directly expressed in things as they now are. The most sympathetic reader can hardly fail to be troubled by this notion that, although there is nothing in creation which God does not will, yet in so far as it is sinful, He does not will it. Brunner is not interested, however, in theoretical solutions to the problem of evil. He passes directly to the "revolutionary" side of the Christian ethic, which demands that we combat sin and affirm God's will to perfect the world.

Creation sets the sphere in which we have to act; redemption gives conduct its motive and direction. Love alone can unite these two factors; it means accepting a man as he is, and yet serving God's will to redeem him from sin. To ignore divinely ordained distinctions of class and "calling" is utopian; to acquiesce in what is unjust in the situation is lazy cynicism. Right adjustment to and protest against the world require sacrificial love as revealed in Christ.

Here the reader is torn between the realization that Brunner writes from the depths of an earnest and appealing personal faith, and the sense that his dialetic is merely a device for "taking both sides of the question." The stuffiest reactionary and the ruddiest radical can alike find support in his writings by concentrating on one side to the exclusion of the other. The practical problem of discriminating, amidst the welter of "what is," between that which must be accepted as willed by God and that which must be negated as due to sin, is thus left unsolved. Perhaps it is insoluble, because so long as men are sinful the desire to conform our wills to God's is always mixed with the desire to substantiate our own opinions by claiming divine sanction for them. Some will think Brunner guilty of the latter when he says that class distinctions are divinely ordained—even going to the length of saying that fellowship, in which we need each other, would be impossible apart from "rank" and "inequality" (p. 213).

The remainder of the second book of *The Divine Imperative* merely applies the foregoing scheme to particular questions. In a brilliantly conceived chapter (XIV), the author shows how faith both removes the curse of the law by promising its ultimate abrogation, and indicates its continuing relevance to the life of the "justified" man so long as he remains in this world. In a section dealing with "The New Man," he puts forward the anthropology which has already been indicated in earlier references to "original sin" and "false autonomy." Here we need do no more than note that this section provides an opportunity for showing how Christian faith transforms the meaning of notions familiar to secular ethics: conscience, virtue, self-affirmation and self-denial, perfection. The contrast, in every case, arises from the fact that a secular ethic talks about certain human principles, acts and qualities; while the Christian ethic talks about something which God gives and demands—a new person, life "in Christ."

The third section of the second book discusses our conduct toward others ("The Neighbour"). The individualistic tendencies in the preceding are now set in their proper context: Full humanity consists in the capacity for being addressed by the Word; but the Word discloses God's will for community; therefore full individual humanity cannot be attained apart from love for others, the true solidarity of the race, which the Kingdom will fully establish. Yet it is only by justification that we, as sinners, can enter into this life of service now. The doctrine

of the "calling" teaches us that we are to serve God and His Kingdom in the situation in which He places us, circumscribed though it is by sinfulness.

This necessity for adjusting to things as they are, which—as we have seen repeatedly—characterizes one side of Brunner's thought, is grounded in his conception of the "Orders." In general it may be said that these are of two sorts: those of creation and those of conservation. The first are part of God's original plan—marriage, for example. The second are necessary to prevent a sinful world from driving itself into chaos; the State is one of these divine expedients for meeting the conditions caused by sin. As they work out in history, however, all of the orders reflect human sinfulness, and are frequently used as instruments of tyranny and egotism. Because of their utility they are easily made into absolutes and employed to justify conditions contrary to God's will for redemption.

The conception of orders also has an important connection with Brunner's acceptance of the limited validity of natural theology. Only through faith can one know the true meaning of the orders, but from this standpoint we can see that God's will is in a sense made known in them even to the natural man. The Christian and the unbeliever have at least this in common—that they must both obey the orders; hence an element of truth is contained in the Roman Catholic conception of natural law. For the preservation of these orders is not due to faith, but to reason.

In other words, because of sin love must work within limits and against obstacles; to give up either factor is to end either in utopianism or cynicism. This, in itself, is undeniable. Yet many will stand aghast at the manner in which Brunner goes on to justify harsh and coercive conduct, under certain circumstances, as done for the sake of saving the world from chaos. And almost everyone will be dismayed when this writer who has utterly renounced casuistry tells us that each individual must decide, in the particular moment, between the respective claims of love and an order which conflicts with it. Finally, when he writes: "Wherever we are concerned with an immediate practical challenge, however, we must never forget . . . that a system which does actually maintain order is the best, so long as the 'better' cannot be immediately realized without any break in continuity" (p. 230), one is painfully reminded of how almost every injustice in history has been

defended on the ground that it was "necessary" because any feasible alternative would mean something much worse.

The last section of the second book ("The Works of Love") takes up problems connected with how love can be made effective in external action. Brunner's interpretation of the Incarnation, as revealing God's will to redeem *this* world, means that from the standpoint of faith we can rightly understand the "general revelation" which history contains by virtue of being the scene of divine action. Because God uses this world, despite its sinfulness, therefore human action which conforms to His will cannot be "other-worldly"; asceticism is denied us.

As Brunner traces the specific limitations which natural conditions and the orders of society place upon the spontaneous operation of love, he nearly forgets the "dialectical tension" of his starting point; he seems to vacillate between excusing "unloving" conduct on the ground that it is necessary, and denying that it is really "unloving" because it is the best possible under the circumstances. But in the end he redeems himself by saying that the harshness and inhumanity of our social order, which the natural man tends to accept as inevitable, makes plain to the Christian the meaning of sin. The very fact that he is hemmed in by evil forces, which make him unable to fulfill the demands of love perfectly, engenders in the Christian that repentance which is itself the most dynamic source of the will for reformation.

Despite its defects, on which I have dwelt too exclusively, *The Divine Imperative* is a magnificent piece of sustained argument; the author is quite right in suggesting that it ventures into a territory hardly explored by theology since the Reformation. When it is put alongside his other full length works, one can have nothing but admiration and respect for the lucidity, the versatility, and the encyclopaedic character of Brunner's contribution to modern theology.

*God and Man* and *Our Faith* are valuable as popular statements of the ideas contained in more technical works. The former volume includes an excellent introduction to Brunner's thought by the translator, David Cairns. The first essay ("The Philosopher's Idea of God and the Creator God of Faith") deals with a theme which receives full treatment in *The Philosophy of Religion.* A corresponding relationship obtains between the second and third essays ("Faith in Justification and the Problem of Ethics" and "Church and Revelation") and material contained in *The Divine Imperative;* while the last

("Biblical Psychology") provides a brief introduction to the doctrine of man which is fully worked out in *Der Mensch im Widerspruch.*

*Our Faith* is an intimate personal statement, addressed to the layman; in thirty-five brief sections Brunner gives the gist of his position on all the important theological topics; yet because of its utter simplicity and its wealth of illustration, this little volume is more like a devotional tract than a doctrinal hand-book. It reminds us that "Barthianism" is trying to remain a theology to be preached to ordinary mortals, despite the fact that it seems to be degenerating into a battle of books, waged from professor's chairs, with technical jargon for ammunition.

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*The Church and Its Teaching Today.* By The Most Rev. William Temple. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936. ix + 49 pp. $1.00.

*Basic Convictions.* By The Most Rev. William Temple. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1936. viii + 81 pp. 75¢.

*The Centrality of Christ.* By The Most Rev. William Temple. New York: Morehouse Publishing Co., 1936. 115 pp. $1.00.

*Christianity in Thought and Practice.* By The Most Rev. William Temple. New York: Morehouse Publishing Co., 1936. 112 pp. $1.50.

These four small volumes are not only literary evidences of Archbishop Temple's American visit; they are also simple, straightforward, winsomely put statements of the theology of his profounder volumes, *Mens Creatrix* (1917), *Christus Veritas* (1924), and *Nature, Man and God* (1934). American theology which heeds the advice of Dr. W. M. Horton and turns toward British Christian thought for leadership might well begin with these volumes by one of Christendom's central figures. They will furnish an excellent introduction to, and framework for, a study of the mind of one who has been classified as occupying "the Anglican center" in theology.

No note recurs more frequently in the recent addresses than that of Christianity's emphasis on revelation, and on itself as a unique revelation. "I am persuaded that the central problem of religion today is the problem of divine revelation. Has God acted with the deliberate

purpose of making Himself known to those whose minds and spirits were ready to receive His manifestations?"[1] For Dr. Temple, the Christian answer is clear. God "is at all times active in making those delicate adjustments to varying circumstances, wherein the life of living personalities consists; in other words, we must challenge the scientific thinking of the world at its foundation and roundly deny its totally baseless dogma of uniformity."[2] That which science reads as uniformity in physical nature is the regularity of moment by moment activity of God whose adaptations to specific needs are sometimes imperceptible and sometimes apparent in great irregularities which reveal the personal, purposeful quality immanent in the regularities. "Miracles, if they occur, are as much the manifestations of God immanent as are the regular processes of Nature."[3] Revelation, however, is not to be conceived as "the dictation or suggestion of infallible oracles to the minds of individuals."[4] Its essence is the intercourse of persons with God through the medium of historic events. Revelation is the coincidence of divinely guided events with human minds divinely inspired to interpret them. The mark of Revelation is a union of holiness and power which commands human reverence, authenticates itself by development to a focal point which fulfills past revelations, and illuminates every department of life and being with its meanings.[5] God, who is best described as Personal, is fully revealed only in a person, Jesus of Nazareth. In Him God discloses Himself and the meaning of the the whole natural and historic process.

For Christianity, then, the Christological decision is the essential decision, the foremost of *Basic Convictions* is the *Centrality of Christ*. Christ is central because God is in Him "actually and factually. . . . Not only must His coming be actual, but it must be actually He who comes."[6] This fact is that described in the orthodox doctrine of Christ's two natures, a modern explication of which Dr. Temple has given us in *Christus Veritas*.[7] Despite the involvement of language and what many would regard as obsolete historical criticism, this discussion remains, I believe, one of the best contemporary interpretations of the doctrine

1. *The Church and Its Teaching Today*, pp. 43-44.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
3. *Nature, Man and God*, p. 295.
4. *Ibid.*, p. xxiv.
5. *Ibid.*, Lecture XII.
6. *The Centrality of Christ*, p. 39.
7. The American edition is entitled *Christ the Truth*.

of the Incarnation. The approach there is from the human side with a carefully guarded but cleanly put statement. "If we imagine the divine Word withdrawn from Jesus of Nazareth, as the Gnostics believed to have occurred before the Passion, I think there would be left, not nothing at all, but a man."[8] In human experience men become great characters as their persons become inclusive of all human qualities. The development of great men, therefore, approaches an absolute point at which *Mankind,* a concrete real universal,[9] is uniquely and inclusively focussed in one man. By hypothesis, a realization of this point would issue in a perfect man,—that is, in one complete in humanity. But perfect man is not *eo ipso* God. "Nothing that happens to a creature could possibly turn him into his own Creator. At that point the gulf between God and Man is plainly impassable."[10] That this gulf was closed in Christ is exactly the Christian contention. Thus, on the one hand, Christ may be understood to possess a human personality of which there may be predicated moral progress by perfect obedience to the Will of God. The human will is neither lost nor destroyed, but at one with the Divine Will. Yet, on the other hand, this human personality must not be understood to "exist side by side with the divine personality; it is subsumed in it."[11] The Christian Confession is that of the Deity of Christ.

Throughout all of his discussions of the doctrine of the Incarnation, Dr. Temple is concerned to permit of no separation of the dogma about Christ from spiritual fellowship with Christ. The "center of Christian faith is not an intellectual proposition but a person, and the value of all the intellectual propositions . . . is that they give us guidance . . . by which we may enter into that same relationship to Christ which . . . multitudes of Christians have already enjoyed."[12]

The Incarnation occurred, not only within the cosmic pattern whose meaning it illuminates, but also within the less extensive and more intensive context of the Hebrew religious tradition which it transformed into the Christian Church. For purposes of emphasis, the Archbishop is able to say that there are only two Biblical doctrines, one of God and the other of the Church. The two meet in Christ

8. *Christ the Truth,* p. 180.
9. Cf. *Mens Creatrix,* pp. 7-23, and *Christ the Truth,* pp. 180-183.
10. *Christ the Truth,* p. 176, n.
11. *Ibid.,* p. 179.
12. *Centrality of Christ,* p. 42.

where God Incarnate stands alone among men as the true Church, and creates about Himself a fellowship of disciples which He leaves on earth at His Ascension. This fellowship is bound to its risen Lord by the Spirit who permeates it. "The true Church is the Body of Christ, and consists of men *so far as* they are members of that Body."[13] This true Church transcends historic existence in that its Head is no longer among us but "it is coming slowly into historic existence."[14]

The American lectures are concerned, not only with the Church's teaching about Revelation, the Incarnation and the nature of the Church itself, but also with the very practical problems of Christian Ethics and Moral Theology which arise out of the Christian insistence that relationship with God must issue in ethical action. It is here that the Archbishop's thought is freshest, and it is at this point that his American lectures most obviously add to his former writings. Especially in the first, third and fourth of the books under review, there is presented a steady and illuminating attack on the problems raised by divorce, remarriage, class conflict, nationalism, war, and state-totalitarianism. The third chapter of *The Centrality of Christ* sketches briefly the more elaborate discussion of sin in *Nature, Man and God*, Lecture XIV. Finite, natural man inevitably sees Good as his own good and therefore corrupts all of Good, rebelling against God as the center of the universe and tending to place himself and his own values in God's place. Christians accept ethical obligations which come to them with absolute demand and lie beyond the range of natural man's capacity. The Christian ethic reveals man's need of redemption and of the supernatural assistance essential to Christian conduct. The only way to the practice of Christian ethics is through faith and worship.[15] On the other hand, the content of specific moral conventions and actions derive from experience and "ethical obligations are always subject to modification by the group relationship into which the person concerned has entered."[16] Christian action presupposes, then, not only faith and worship but well-informed minds and vocational conscious-

13. *Christ the Truth*, p. 200. See also, *The Church and Its Teachings*, pp. 2-13.
14. *Christ the Truth*, p. 200. But this statement is qualified later. "There is no reason, I think, to suppose that there are more people now making an earnest effort to conform to the will of God than there have been in previous generations." *Centrality of Christ*, p. 44.
15. *Christianity in Thought and Practice*, p. 86.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

nesses. From such a point of view, critical ethical issues are discussed in such concise ways as to forbid further condensation in a review.

American Christianity was stimulated by the Archbishop's visit and will miss a great opportunity if it does not follow the lead given by his lectures here and seek out the roots of his thinking in his larger works. There are comparatively few theologians whose works may be so fruitfully studied.

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*Personal Realism.* By James Bissett Pratt. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937. x + 387 pp. $3.00.

In this book Professor Pratt aims "to make clear one consistent and tentative point of view concerning some of the ultimate problems of knowledge and reality" (p. viii). He is concerned to defend an empirical approach to philosophy against a rationalistic approach which can deal only with essences, and never with existences. A primary concern is to show the necessity of making a place in any consistent world-view for active substantial selves. Epistemological dualism is presented as the most probable solution of the knowledge problem. Belief in a real physical world is involved in this solution, and also a dualism of process within the cosmos. Professor Pratt wants his book to be a challenge to the "easy and dogmatic assertions of a highly overestimated Naturalism" (p. ix), and to all views which deny the reality of substantial selves. He thinks that the only trustworthy defense of a metaphysically grounded individualism must be based on a realistic epistemology, and that the atomistic and naturalistic consequences drawn from such a view are not justified.

The book contains twenty-three chapters. The first compares the rationalistic and empirical approaches to philosophy and defends the latter as dealing with the total universe, whereas the former deals only with its logical structure. The rest of the book has three main divisions: Chapters II to X deal with the major problems presupposed in any thorough discussion of realistic epistemology; XI to XV, with epistemology in its explicit and technical forms, XVI to XXIII, with the metaphysical consequences which seem to follow naturally from the position set forth in the first two-thirds of the book.

Chapter Two, on "Meaning," is a key to much that is said in the

rest of the book. Especially is it important for an understanding of the epistemological section. Pratt says that the first thesis of dualistic realism is "the insistence upon an existential difference between the content of the mind and its objects" (p. 192). It is by the conscious activity known as 'meaning' that it is possible for us to know things always existentially cut off from any experience. To mean something is to point to something. A symbol can have meaning by pointing to something, if there is someone aware of the symbol and its meaning. A person can mean something by direct mental reference to an object. According to this definition only *symbols* can *have* meaning. The source of all meaning which symbols possess is experience. "The only coin of the realm of meaning is experience" (p. 16). But "every case of meaning involves transcendence" of experience. Sometimes we transcend only present experience, as when we think of some past experience. "But most commonly . . . the thing we intend, the thing we will to 'mean,' is some object external to our experience as a whole and not to be existentially identified with any part of it" (p. 20). We can mean things never experienced by anyone. We can do this because of the power of activity of the self. "The imagination can make new combinations of experienced qualities and attribute them to some being or to some region of space or time which no man has ever experienced" (pp. 20, 21). We know what 'otherness' and 'externality' mean from experience, so there is no reason why we can not make meaningful assertions about what transcends all experience (p. 25). He who denies transcendence denies the possibility of common objects, and so of all meaningful discource. Indeed he writes himself down a solipsist. Associationist or structuralist psychologies can give no account of how objects external to our experience can be known or even referred to, because neither has any place for an active substantial self (pp. 19, 21).

Two questions seem to me to be pertinent in regard to the above. First, in our experiences of 'otherness' do we ever have an experience of anything being *other than experience?* If not, how can the experience of 'otherness' enable us to think of objects independent of experience? Second, granted that we have active imaginations by which we can conceive of all kinds of independently existing objects, must there not be some immediate knowledge before we can ever know whether our imaginations tell us anything about an independently existing

world? Professor Pratt gives answers to these questions which some readers may find satisfactory, but surely some others will not. The history of philosophy shows that when experience is cut off from reality the result is agnosticism or idealism. Pratt seems to recognize this difficulty. On page 92 he says, "Careful analysis of immediate knowledge . . . forces one to the conclusion that it must always involve and contain knowledge of the immediate or intuitive sort: for unless it does this it is a mere sequence of ideas or experience, but not knowledge. All knowledge is immediate in the sense of being a direct apprehension of truth." But how can we trust such "direct apprehensions of truth" unless there is intuition of reality? Pratt holds to a correspondence theory of what truth is, but says coherence is "perhaps the most important test of truth" (p. 78). No other criterion of truth is favorably considered in this chapter on truth and knowledge. Later we are told it is a meaningless and inappropriate question to ask whether perception is direct or indirect, because in perception a thought element is always involved, and so the question as to whether perception is direct or not is the same as to ask whether thought is direct (p. 208). On the same page it is stated that, if the critic asks the dualist how he knows his percepts are veridical, an entirely appropriate response to the question is a *tu quoque*. "How does anyone distinguish the veridical from the illusory? The dualist, I suppose, does it in the same way as other people." However, in summing up reasons for believing in the realistic hypothesis Pratt mentions, in addition to the coherence test of truth, the pragmatic test of workability, coherence with other people's experiences, agreement with man's inborn tendency to believe his senses, and the adequacy of the hypothesis to explain the endless coincidences between other people's experiences and one's own.

Let us return to the first third of the book, where Professor Pratt gives a realistic interpretation to many of the most important concepts of philosophy. Terms are real as well as relations. Terms have inherent as well as relational characters, and relations are both external and internal. Universals are real only as definable natures. Universals, propositions, concepts, laws, essences—none of these exist (p. 51). "Logic tells us only negative things: for the positive facts about the universe we must go to experience" (p. 46). Some place must be given to *a priori* knowledge: the necessities of thought give us a kind of framework for the real world. But the validity, or at least the validation, of

several of the metaphysical and epistemological categories to which the author holds will depend, of course, upon whether he has succeeded in making good his case for *knowledge of independent reality*. Realism stands in little need of vindication, it is claimed. The realm of existence is undeniable. "Not even the solipsist or the extreme skeptic can successfully deny existence, for at least his doubt exists. It is not merely a definable nature but an actual experience; if it be not, his skepticism is not actual and he has nothing to talk about" (pp. 51, 52). But existence is known only through experience; the thorough-going rationalist, self-limited as he is to the realm of essence, can know nothing about it (p. 58). Causation belongs to the realm of existence and is not a relation of identity as for the rationalist. Our own activity gives us the best clue to the meaning of causality (pp. 119-123).

Little more need be said regarding the epistemological section of the book. Professor Pratt holds to the realistic view because he thinks it best explains our experiences, especially the experiences of communication, the coincidence of events in the experiences of two or more persons, and unexpected experiences which cannot be explained psychologically or logically. The realistic view includes belief in a real and common space-time, in physical and psycho-physical things which are dynamically and causally related to one another, and in the symbolic knowing by the psycho-physical things of each other and the physical things. Knowledge is always indirect. Aristotle's explanation of mediate knowledge in the case of memory is taken as "a complete answer to all of Locke's difficulties" and the "outline of a sound and defensible epistemology" (p. 194). Our best knowledge about physical things consists of "highly probable opinions concerning their texture and the sequence of events within or among them" (p. 206). Realisms without dualism are rejected because they have no place for mediate knowledge, cannot account for error, have no place for a substantial self, cannot adequately deal with the problem of perspective, and do not take into account the fact that independent objects are separated by time and intervening processes from the immediate objects of the mind. It seems to the reviewer that, in between the extreme positions of a complete dualism and a realism without any mental content, there is a mediating position which would recognize the possibility of both mediate and immediate knowledge. Professor Pratt nowhere considers this possibility. He thinks that Panpsychism, Berkeleyanism, and Ab-

solute Idealism are possible explanations of experience, but are less natural and probable than Realism.

The first three chapters in the third division of the book have to do with the mind-body problem. The view set forth here does not differ from that found in the author's earlier book, *Mind and Matter*. Interaction is, in his opinion, the only possible answer to the problem. The interaction of mind and body is a *sui generis* relation, known best by introspection. The chapter on "Knowledge and Self" is devoted to an interest which receives much attention throughout the book—the concern, namely, to show that the facts of experience point to a subject which is a substantial and active self. The relation of mind and body, and the facts of human consciousness and thought are inexplicable, it is maintained, unless we recognize the reality of a continuing self. "All experience contains the implications of a subject" (p. 314).

We have considerable knowledge about the self through what it does, and a certain immediate realization of it. It makes itself most plain in the free act of the will. Freedom is self-determination. Our willed acts are determined by biological heredity, environment, and character. If character is changed at all, "that change is due to my deeds of yesterday . . . and so on back to my cradle and to my mother's womb" (p. 333). If moral responsibility and guilt mean that I could have avoided, at least to some extent, the wrong things which I deliberately did, then Professor Pratt's view of freedom involves a negation of moral responsibility. He does, however, make the confessedly not fully satisfactory concession that "quite possibly" there is "a real lack of determination in those of our decisions which lie outside of the field of things concerning which our characters are definite" (p. 334).

Professor Pratt's last chapter is a very interesting bringing together of the implications of his position into a unified world-view. The reader with a religious interest will find it especially valuable. The world-view presented is called "Spiritual Pantheism." Emergent Evolution cannot be explained mechanistically. Efficient purpose in the organic world presupposes purpose in the inorganic. The one place where we are sure of the efficient causality of purpose is in our own willed acts. Since this is so, it seems most reasonable to suppose that there is a World Soul working immanently throughout the cosmos. Religious

experience, which Pratt thinks has knowledge value, substantiates this view. He thinks it would be difficult to defend a religious world-view if it were not for religious experience through which men claim to know God.

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*Thoughts on Death and Life.* By WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937. x + 260 pp. $2.00.

These informal meditations on the meaning of life and of death, which combine Professor Hocking's Ingersoll Lecture on Immortality at Harvard and his Hiram W. Thomas Lecture at the University of Chicago, are gracefully and eloquently rendered. The book, while not in the Dialogue form, has much of the Dialogue conversational tone and ease of manner. Dr. Hocking's reasoning is restrained and temperate. And he suggests rather than proclaims the same mild theory of conditional immortality which he set forth many years ago in "The Meaning of God in Human Experience."

Starting with the firm and, to my mind, irrefutable statement that "the meaning of life and the meaning of death are inseparable," Professor Hocking develops his idea of a possible immortality by a brief refutation of the naturalistic psychology, by the idealistic notion of two selves on different levels of existence, and by the moral argument that survival beyond death *ought* to be. These are familiar theses. But the author discusses them with such freshness and insight that, much as I happen to disagree with him, I found myself constantly admiring his skill and constantly rewarded by new and original turns of thought.

In the second part of his book Professor Hocking, while giving due philosophical credit to immediate enjoyment, to the worth of mundane love and to the value of serving high causes, concludes that such characteristic human activities are insufficient, either separately or combined, to give to life the meaning it needs and deserves. As he has already told us in his opening pages, death, if it implies annihilation, casts its shadow back over all human enterprise, cuts the nerve of ethical endeavor, and infects the whole of life with meaninglessness. The continuance of the race as distinct from the individual does not help very much, since human life is fated to ultimate extinction. Thus, like so many other defenders of immortality, the author makes the

idea of humanity's eventual doom an indispensable link in his reasoning. This pessimistic proposition I refuse so readily to accept, since I am convinced that if men ever learn to stop cutting one another's throats, there is a fair chance that world-wide scientific co-operation will find a way to preserve the species indefinitely.

I am glad that Professor Hocking insists that "duration is a dimension of value." "The intense experiences," he writes, "may be brief, but they are long looked forward to and long remembered. Like a noble building, they demand an adequate vista; and consciousness labors to provide it by amplifying the time of its undisturbed contemplation. . . . For our finite minds, if that which is noble is to be known, its apprehension must be built through a history of lesser things, and must be remembered and related to them all." I agree. And I have always thought that to turn Santayana's unexcelled epigram, "The length of things is vanity, only their height of joy," into a serious philosophy constitutes a sort of literary pose and a very thin, psychological compensation for the lack of immortality.

When Professor Hocking goes on to claim, however, that value ceases to be value unless its duration is as long as eternal life after death, he is on much less firm ground. To say that a certain amount of lastingness is a necessary dimension of value is one thing; but to say that the amount required is *ever*-lastingness is quite another. A life-span of seventy or eighty years is surely sufficient to provide "an adequate vista" for value experiences. Indeed, far shorter lives can attain the sort of vision the author means, the ability to see things *sub specie eternitatis*. And I need only refer to Jesus and Joan of Arc, to Keats and Shelley. Then, too, some appreciation of history and the culture of the past can do much to make up for lack of years in achieving the adequate vista.

The psychological observations which Dr. Hocking uses to support his argument here are not, it seems to me, entirely sound. Thus he states: "To be able to give oneself whole-heartedly to the present one must be persistently aware that it is *not all*. One must rather be able to treat the present moment as if it were engaged in the business allotted to it by that total life which stretches indefinitely beyond." By "indefinitely beyond" he means immortality. Now I do not think for an instant that the normal man under normal circumstances goes around only half-heartedly enjoying himself because he knows that

some day he must die, and also happens to disbelieve in any post-mortem existence. When death takes someone close to him, or if he lives in a city that is being daily bombarded by invading airplanes, he may become temporarily morbid. And if he himself is definitely doomed by an incurable disease like cancer, he may become permanently so. Or such a mood may be purposely, though artificially, engendered in him by certain religious over-emphases. But otherwise the thought of death is not constantly weighing him down, whether he has faith in an after-life or not. And I believe that those who are professionally concerned with the subject of death, which includes people like Professor Hocking and the reviewer, who write books about it, must be careful not to read their own pre-occupations into the minds and hearts of other men.

Professor Hocking's suggestion that "survival may be a matter of the *degree of reality* which the self attains" bases immortality more than ever on primarily moral considerations. Most thinkers on the subject, whether affirmative or negative in their conclusions, would probably regard this concept of "immortability" as a good deal less logical than the more traditional views of a future existence. They would argue that the laws pertaining to survival, like those pertaining to dying itself, must apply impartially, regardless of individual moral considerations, to all human beings; and that therefore if a future life exists at all, it is the possession of all men. I am not so sure that they are right. For when you once start using ethical arguments, as almost all defenders of immortality do, to set aside the ordinary course of nature, one position is perhaps just as logical as another. And Professor Hocking, having employed the ethical argument to establish the possibility of immortality in the first place, is probably perfectly consistent in taking a further step and applying a variation of the same argument to limit immortality to those who possess certain moral qualifications. What bothers me most about the author's theory of conditional immortality is that throughout the volume he remains so exceedingly vague about it, and does not even raise some of the more simple and fundamental questions about the mechanics of such an after-existence.

Turning to metaphysical considerations, it is difficult to find warrant for the author's statement that "philosophy is committed to the view that the universe has a meaning—which it is out to find; and that

human life, by inclusion, has a meaning also." This definition of philosophy assumes within it a particular metaphysics. As for human life, regardless of whether it is meaningless without immortality, I think it would be more fruitful to search for *meanings* in it rather than one or *the* meaning which necessarily satisfies everyone. What is one man's meaning may be another man's poison. Furthermore, a man's attitude towards life is probably more intelligible in terms of a *set* of meanings than of one great meaning-in-general. And, as among the total set of meanings that anyone may adopt, I would say that the meanings in reference to the sphere of economics, which Professor Hocking along with most other philosophers tends to overlook, are fully as important as those in the sphere of philosophy.

Finally, I seriously question Professor Hocking's acceptance of the traditional notion which envisions the problem of death as a secondary, or last chapter, or appendix of some system of metaphysics. As I have suggested elsewhere, the question of immortality has been a more important factor in determining systems of metaphysical supernaturalism than is generally recognized; it has been a real, though often concealed or tacitly assumed, *first* chapter, with whole philosophies and religions spun out to bolster up the affirmative answer. Now undeniably the problem of immortality has far-reaching implications for metaphysics. And this is one of the very good reasons why philosophers have the obligation to approach the matter empirically rather than through the method of religious faith or hopeful emotional fervor.

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*God and Man's Destiny: Inquiries into the Metaphysical Foundations of Faith.* By Hartley Burr Alexander. New York: Oxford University Press, ix + 235 pp. $2.50.

When students of philosophy get over their prepossession with formal logic and become interested again in metaphysical problems, they may well find the revival of Platonism the most significant movement of our own day.[1] This may be partly due to the Platonic trend

1. In an article entitled "Theology and Science in Contemporary Platonic Idealism" in the January number of this review, Professor Herbert W. Schneider points to the shift of idealism from the Hegelian to the Platonic tradition in American thought, and reviews J. E. Boodin's two volumes, *Three Interpretations of the Universe* and *God* and Karl Schmidt's *The Creative I and the Divine* as evidence of this shift. Among other notable American philosophers who show such tendency may be mentioned J. A. Leighton, R. A. Tsanoff, R. L. Calhoun, and W. P. Montague.

of the new physics, or at any rate of some of the physicists. But the deeper reason is to be found in the fact that Platonism furnishes a more adequate background for the moral struggle of our day than materialism (disguised as naturalism), or the German type of idealism.

A profound and brilliant interpretation of this struggle, with its implied metaphysical dualism and pluralism, is found in H. B. Alexander's *God and Man's Destiny*. There are variations of emphasis in these new Platonists, but they all agree with Plutarch that "the search for truth is a striving after divinity." They also agree with Alexander that "the greater understanding, to which we are vaguely awakening is that the world cannot be less in complexity than is the height of its creations, that the end and not the beginning of an evolution gives its measure" (p. 45). Naturalism has inverted the true order of procedure in its attempt to explain the higher in terms of the lower. We must, according to Alexander, ascend from the cinematograph of the sense world and natural science to the biograph of living time, and rise to the sum of meaning in the eternal. The eternal, however, is not the timeless, but that which gives meaning to time. Nature must be understood as drama and it is a tragic drama. "Nature is not, like a bad tragedy, episodic . . . but nature is like a good tragedy, composed of the episodes that depict her meaning. . . . No event or time can be understood when taken apart from the entirety of the revealed drama" (pp. 48, 49). At the heart of this drama is the struggle of good against evil. Deeper than the thought that God geometrizes—a thought attributed to Plato—is the thought of the Good at the core of creation.

In Alexander's philosophy the contrasts stand out more sharply than in the other Platonists. In this respect he is perhaps more Platonic. This contrast shows itself in the attitude to science. Boodin, Schmidt, Robert L. Calhoun (*God and the Common Life*, 1935) are impressed with the changed attitude of the new physics, with its emphasis upon energy and structure, and feel the kinship of the search of science with the search of the mind in other domains such as religion. While Alexander is fully alive to the new developments in science, he emphasizes—perhaps because of the facile way in which popularizers of science have passed from science to God—the abstract character of science. It gives us but a "shell" or a "husk." Instead of living, enduring, creative energy, science gives us an "autopsy." While for Schmidt the physical world of sense experience is a "domain" of reality and for Boodin a "level" of reality—though not to be separated from the genius of the

whole—for Alexander the world of sense experience is a phatasmagoria (as with Bergson), a world of shadows (as in Plato's *Republic*). The difference may be due to Alexander's poetic metaphors, but one feels that Boodin and Schmidt are more realistic in their view of nature, though in either case the meaning can be grasped only by the mind. Alexander seems more personalistic in his attitude. "Human personality itself is the essential ground of any reality that we men can know" (p. 157). He points out truly that the human body is the basis of our physical measures of nature and that human personality is the measure of its values. But he hastens to make clear that he does not mean to assert that nothing can exist apart from ourselves, but that all that we affirm of order and beauty in nature "we descry through the glass of our own endowment" (p. 158). With that statement the reviewer would agree. When Alexander speaks of personality as the measure, he has in mind "the greatnesses of the fulfilled person" and this, as with Milton, may transcend man's life. As "we should come to recognize the *person* living and acting as our one key to the wisdom of life" (p. 181), it must also be the key, however inadequate, to the divine life. "God is the power for good in the same sense that a high-minded man may be a power for good, only in magnitude differing; he is spiritually good and he is striving, as a strong spirit must strive, to bring to expression his spiritual life in nature and in history and in the lives of his comrade spirits. And his honour which is his inmost self is pledged unto this" (p. 99).

Mere logical discourse is inadequate to bring us to a realization of God or of any ultimate reality. The ultimate way is the mystic way, "direct and intuitive knowledge." This is not irrational. "It is by intuition and by a mystic sense that reason works." It is an intuition "suffused with feeling. . . . But it is not beyond knowledge. In regard to this the mystic is strongest in his assertion. For oneself, and within one's own life, the heart is vital with understanding; it possesses its own intuitions; it speaks with a reason of its own, and it discovers its own clear wisdom" (p. 199). Such wisdom can be "captured only by the use of all our powers in unison," it is a new power for attaining "wholeness of action" (p. 200). It is "a faith in the deep-seated orientation of our lives towards the good" (p. 204). The mystic faith need not be monistic. The world which the mystic seeks "is *reality*, not *the* reality; and it does not require that the good, even though it be the

person of God himself, must needs be the all" (p. 205). It thus leaves room for the author's dualism. But "truth" which is purely personal can lead to no common standards, no common program of action. Here Alexander deserts Plato and has recourse to Plotinus. For Plato the form of the good is the highest category of explanation, in cosmology and in society. It is a program upon which legislators must fix their mental eye.

But it is historical mysticism rather than personal which strikes one as basic in Alexander's philosophy of Christianity. According to Alexander "there are two Christianities, a Christianity of the logical mind and of the natural reason, centering its thought upon God and his world, itself a problem of speculation; and Christianity interpretative of the drama of history and of life and of our deep-set faith that human nobility may become incarnate" (p. 121). These philosophies rest upon different logics of experience and are in essential conflict, though they may find lodgment in the same mind and in the same church. According to the theological metaphysics, God is one though a trinity, he is omnipotent, omniscient and all-just. Creation mirrors his thought. Everything is ordained and foreordained. "And his peace is a white flame in which all is realized and all consumed" (p. 121). The doctrine of the Incarnation, which is the vital part of historic Christianity, cannot be made to fit into the theological picture even with all the elaborate casuistries that the theologians have used. Christian worshippers have not been moved by "such mere bauble of dialectical thought as is yielded both by the theologians of another age and by the mathematicians and astrophysicists of our own. Rather the true Christian world is one of movement and striving, of wills and imperatives, of sufferings and consolations and exaltations, of trust and hope and love" (p. 123).

For Alexander "there is a genuine and metaphysical tragedy in the world itself . . . salvation can come only from the united front which Man and God together advance against the blackness—and many sink cloudily in a strife whose end is foretold of none. . . . This is the metaphysical world of Good and Evil, the old dualism of man's life and heart, and it is this which is the truth of the living Christianity" (p. 123). The theologians whom Alexander criticizes will no doubt object that he has in fact advanced a theology—and a theology which they long ago rejected. Some sort of theology, which we call myth-

ology when we reject it, always goes with religion. The question is, does the theology fit in with the vital meaning of religion? Alexander feels that the orthodox theology has made a travesty of the real import of Christianity, but he is bound to explain what he feels that import to be, and that is his theology. It is centered in the tragic struggle against evil in the world. It requires a heroic God as well as heroic men. "The world is fundamentally such that God can maintain his own beauty and purity only in a terrible struggle against a harshly enveloping cloud of raw hatreds, as abysmal as his own love, which exact from him heroic strife and unflinching suffering so that he uprears over the stricken field eternally the anguished banner of the cross, of which also the physical and animal world are impress and seal" (p. 97). Alexander does not think that spirit will fail. He thinks "that the world in which we share is headed toward a summit, that we are in some sense *mounting*" (p. 100). But the labor is desperate. "Each age is like a stricken field where many are fallen and the waste is heavy, and there is no utter assurance for any, nor for God himself, that a triumphant quiet will be the end" (p. 100). We are heartened in the struggle by the faith that "God meets love with love and with troth keeps troth" (p. 101). The deepest faith is in the honor of God who will not desert us in the struggle. It is easy to see where the Incarnation, more especially as manifest in the drama of the life of Jesus, fits into this picture. "It answers the age old requisition which human nature makes upon nature that somewhere . . . shall be found the breaking into embodiment . . . the Pattern man who shall fulfill the meaning of man" (p. 123).

In his review of the above named authors, Professor Schneider was reminded of Emerson. Carlyle said that Emerson had no sense of sin. That certainly cannot be said of Alexander. In his conception of the moral struggle as a tragic cosmic struggle, Alexander suggests Plato's *Laws,* while Boodin suggests the *Timaeus*. In Boodin's view evil is not metaphysical, but is due to a certain inertia that all energy presents to a change of direction, or to a recreation into a higher level. This is true, not only at the lowest level of creation, but at any level. There is a tendency for everything to remain in its *status quo*. We, like Plato, feel it especially when we try to raise society to a new moral level. Such a condition is indeed fraught with tragedy as we all know, but it is not the dark tragedy that Plato feels in the *Laws* and that Alexander expresses in his book. Here evil is postulated as present in the very nature of the universe where there is "an immortal struggle" between

good and evil. For Plato and for Alexander there is the assurance not only that God, being good, is our helper, but that in the nature of things "good prospers men and evil destroys them." It remains, however, that evil, as well as good, exists in the very nature of things, though we must not forget that the Good *exists*. The Good is a real power for redeeming the world. The view of Boodin and the *Timaeus* that evil has its basis in cosmic laziness seems less tragic. We can then hope, as Plato hoped, that education, physical, intellectual and moral, especially moral, may set the world right or more nearly right, though looking at the world as it presents itself it is easy to believe in the innate cussedness of part of the world. On either view, it remains true that history is a tragic drama which calls for heroism. But Alexander's statement, with its tragic sense of sin, makes a striking setting for the Christian drama of redemption.

Alexander closes his book with a picture of the proper spiritual home for the soul. As an architectural adviser on many important projects of public importance, he here turns his attention to church architecture. "In every community we should build first a cathedral of the spirit, thence to discover its structural house; and in every community we should make of this the fullest expression of the meaning of divinity of which we are capable. . . . This means that we also are to labour, even as from the beginning, beside the Divine Architect, and that our works shall build into and aid to sustain his" (p. 233).

J. E. Boodin

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*Beyond Tragedy*. By Reinhold Niebuhr. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937. xi + 306 pp. $2.00.

The value of Dr. Niebuhr's new book lies, not only in his choice of a most adequate medium to express his thought, but also in the fact that these essays show a deeper religious discernment than anything he has previously written. He describes the fifteen chapters as "sermonic essays," sermons, that is, which have been rewritten as theological essays. One might be tempted to refer to them as "prophetic homilies." They are, indeed, tracts for the times, and reveal Dr. Niebuhr's penetrating mind at its best. In interpreting the sweep of historical movements, in analyzing the modern crisis in religion and society, and in searching out the hidden secrets of the human heart, Dr. Niebuhr has few equals. He writes with penetration and true

discernment. His essays are packed with a wealth of apt illustration. This is particularly true of the sermons on the Tower of Babel and on Christianity and Tragedy. In the former he ransacks history to show "the tragic self-destruction of civilizations and cultures," and "how in every civilization its most impressive period seems to precede death by only a moment. . . . Thus man claims immortality for his spiritual achievements just when their mortal fate becomes apparent." His contemporary illustrations are especially keen. Like the prophet of old he well understands his own era, as, for instance, in the pictures of the completion of the Empire State building "just as the great depression came upon us," and of the finishing of the League of Nations building in Geneva, "just in time to hear the Emperor of Abyssinia's vain plea for justice from the League." In the essay on Christianity and Tragedy he illustrates the difference between Greek and Christian Tragedy by reference to Aeschylus, and to the saying of Jesus in Luke 23:27-9, which forms the text of his sermon. He points out that the tragedy of life is never finally resolved in Greek drama. Greek tragedy is essentially tragic. In Christianity, on the other hand, tragedy is transcended, "Tears, with death, are swallowed up in victory." The Saviour is defeated in history, "but in the very defeat proves that he cannot be ultimately defeated. That is, he reveals that it is God's nature to swallow up evil in Himself and destroy it" (p. 168).

Niebuhr is not a systematic thinker, and for that very reason the form of his new book is so successful. If he lacks the calm detachment of the scholar and the philosopher, it is because he has higher gifts and a different mission. The dynamic quality of his preaching is carried over into these homilies. He writes with vigor and a tremendous sense of prophetic urgency. If at times his writing is torrential, it is because he has so much of vital importance to say.

The two theological essays which demand especial consideration are the first and the last in the book, and a full appreciation of them can only be gained after one has read his chapter in *The Nature of Religious Experience* (Harpers, 1937), on "The Truth in Myths" (pp. 117-35). Here he outlines more fully than was possible in a volume of sermons the meaning he attaches to the term "myth," which figures so frequently in his writing. Myth, he contends, is essential to all religion, in order to portray "aspects of reality which are supra-scientific rather than pre-scientific" (p. 119). The criticism of the pre-scientific

element in myth does not and cannot destroy the religious truth of a myth, precisely because this religious truth, this "quality of existence," is a depth of life which cannot be gauged or comprehended in terms of rationality. A myth must not be interpreted as literally true, rather is it a symbol. At the heart of Christianity stands the Cross, whose meaning is not primarily the historical act of a human character, Jesus of Nazareth. Rather does "the Cross justify itself to human faith because it symbolises an ideal which establishes points of relevance with the deepest experiences and insights of human life" (p. 134). In the same way "parental affection is a symbol of the love of God" (as he cites, in Matthew 7:11).

With this basic idea of myth as a symbolic presentation of "supra-rational" truth, Niebuhr attempts to interpret four of the great Christian doctrines in his first sermon "As Deceivers Yet True" (*Beyond Tragedy*, pp. 3-24). The text is taken from II Corinthians 6:8, and though Paul is merely contrasting the slander of critics with his own confidence in the Gospel, it is certainly a happy phrase to express Niebuhr's leading theme. He points out that theology, like art, has to distort the picture of truth in order to give it depth and perspective. The deception in art arises from "the necessity of picturing things as they seem, rather than as they are, in order to record on one dimension what they are in two dimensions" (p. 5), and the analogy carries over into religion.

We are deceivers, yet true, he claims, when we say that God created the world. The idea of creation out of nothing is "profoundly ultra-rational." According to the categories of reason it does not make sense. Nevertheless, it avoids the error of naturalism, which cannot explain the "emergence of novelty in each new event." But the myth cannot be taken literally, for science clearly shows that man was no more actually formed from a lump of clay than creation took six actual days of the week. Again, we are deceivers, yet true, when we say that man fell into evil. Only naïve Biblicism holds the story of the garden of Eden as historical. But "the fall is not historical. It does not take place in any concrete human act. It is the presupposition of such acts." It is a symbolic expression of the deep human awareness of sin. The fall "can only be known in introspection. The consciousness of sin and the consciousness of God are inextricably involved with each other."

In the same manner he interprets the two doctrines of the In-

carnation and the Advent. In the latter he holds that the belief "that Christ will come again at the last judgment" is not concerned with the apocalyptic dreams of Chiliasts. Rather is it an affirmation in symbolic terms, of the ultimate meaning of historical existence and of society. The symbol of the resurrection of the body is preferable to that of immortality, because it expresses a social rather than an individualistic idea. (This is a theme worked out more fully in the last sermon, pp. 289-306). Because the end of history is not a point in history, the advent is not a moment in time. It is a myth which contains the truth that history is neither its own meaning, nor a denial of meaning (as in Neoplatonism). Rather is history related to an ultimate and eternal meaning, which is beyond history. "In Christ we have the revelation of the significance of human history and the ground of its meaning which transcends history" (p. 24).

The doctrine of the Incarnation does not involve belief in the virgin birth as a "pure historical fact." Rather is the Incarnation an expression of a profounder truth. Culminating in the Cross, it discloses the relation of God to the world. "It asserts that God's word is relevant to human life. It declares that an event in history can be of such a character as to reveal the character of history itself; that without such a revelation the character of history cannot be known" (p. 14). "Most profoundly the atonement of Christ is a revelation of what life actually is. . . . And without this revelation, that which is beyond tragedy in life could not be apprehended" (p. 20).

It is precisely here that many Christian theologians will take grave issue with Niebuhr. The use of myth as the structure of Christian theology breaks down when one is confronted with the historical element in the Christian creed. One feels that Niebuhr has an intellectualistic theology. By this is not meant that it is "rationalistic." No one has been more vigorous in his denunciation of the errors of a rationalistic approach to religion. Niebuhr is not always clear in his use of the terms "reason" and "rational,"[1] but he generally seems to imply that the meaning of life as love cannot be gained from the mere use of natural reason. It has to be revealed. This, Niebuhr contends, is the

1. One might offer the suggestion that he use the adjective "rationalistic" rather than "rational" to imply this. All human cognition is relevant to the categories of "reason" and "rational," even though some truths are revealed, while others are derived from the exercise of natural reason.

supreme work of Jesus Christ. "The Cross," he says in *The Nature of Religious Experience* (p. 135), "in Christian faith is the myth of the truth of the ideal of love." But if Christianity is conceived merely as the revelation of a universal truth about life, and the Cross "symbolises an ideal which establishes points of relevance with the deepest experiences and insights of human life" (p. 134), it has really become an intellectualistic religion, in which Revelation rather than Redemption is central. This is the danger implicit in every statement of the religious problem in terms of meaning. For Niebuhr, the reconciliation of man with God in history is the knowledge of man's predicament, and the awareness that he falls under the judgment of God. In his repentance he turns to God and lives in the hope that he *will be* redeemed at the end of history. But there is nothing in the actual event of the Cross whereby the triumph over sin takes place in history. "The defeat of the suffering servant," he writes, is but "the symbol of an ultimate victory" (*Beyond Tragedy*, p. 192). The Cross is only the myth of the supra-historical reality that "the contradictions of human existence, which man cannot surmount, are swallowed up in the life of God Himself" (p. 19). Interestingly enough, Niebuhr couches this belief in the form of a *hope*, rather than in the affirmation that this actually and historically occurred in the Cross. One lacks in Niebuhr any adequate "realized eschatology" (to use Dodd's learned phrase to express what used to be more simply known as "the present kingdom"). All that is "realized" in human history is the intellectual awareness that redemption will come at the end of history. The Church is the place where this knowledge is known. It is not the arena in human history where God actually triumphs over human sin—a triumph which, because of its completion in the work of Our Lord, is now going on and will reach its fulfilment at the Advent. One is suspicious that Niebuhr follows the Alexandrines in their emphasis upon *Gnosis*.[2] It is *light* more than *power* which is the essence of the work of Christ. Christ is the bearer of a universal truth, rather than of the "power of God unto salvation."

2. Interesting in this connection is Niebuhr's sharp separation of the realms of nature and spirit, which an intellectualistic type of religion always necessitates. In one place (*Beyond Tragedy*, p. 294), he says "The root of sin is in spirit and not in nature." One misses the deeper discernment of St. Paul, that "the whole creation groaneth and travaileth," awaiting redemption (Romans 8:22).

What bears out this interpretation of Niebuhr's theology is the complete absence of two factors that have been central in the Christian Tradition. In a book entitled *Beyond Tragedy* there is not a single reference to the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, nor to the Church and the sacrament. (One is suspicious that Niebuhr, with the Asiatics, would keep his Easter on the 14th of Nisan). The Apostles of the primitive Church regarded themselves as "witnesses to His Resurrection," and this triumphant faith was uniquely expressed in the Eucharist, which repeated the drama of salvation, where God in Christ had taken *action* in human history. Not only did He reveal the meaning of life, but He *actually conquered sin,* and through His presence in the Church this conquest of sin was even now taking place and would be fulfilled at His Advent at the end of history, which was *both* a point in time and beyond it. The triumphant victory of Jesus Christ over sin and death is the pulsing message of all early Christian literature. The Incarnation and the Cross have no meaning apart from it, for it is that moment in time where time becomes eternity, and death is *actually* swallowed up in victory. The Cross is not just a revelation "of the truth of the ideal of love," but it is the actual moment of history when the Son of God suffers for the sin of the world, as the Resurrection is that moment of history when He rises triumphant over sin and death and ascends into glory. The sublime submission of Christ to the tragedy of life is *not* itself the victory, though it is the way to the victory. Christ dies for man, and God vindicates Him in raising Him from the dead. Were it not for the Resurrection as an act in time, and for the continued presence of Christ in the Church, we could never know that it was the Incarnate Son of God who suffered. Faith would be a blind leap into the dark, it would be *fides in Christum sepultum.* But the Church, from the days of St. Paul to the present, affirms and affirms again, that Christ rose from the dead, and is over present with the believer. The whole task of the Christian ministry and of Christian theology begins and ends with this: that we are witnesses to His Resurrection.

The same weakness is apparent in the lack of the Church and the sacrament in Niebuhr's theology. Myth-Christianity is the last effort of Protestant intellectualism. Not a little of it is perhaps due to an over-emphasis upon preaching, and upon the rational element involved in all speech. It is not without cause that the presence of the Risen

Christ in the Church has been uniquely (though not inseparably) connected with the sacrament. Here the Church re-enacts her faith in what Christ *did,* as well as in what He revealed, believing that the revelation has no sense apart from the action. The Son of God is not a symbol, but *actually* God in history, reconciling man unto Himself. The sacraments, in Hooker's language, are "the powerful instruments of God unto eternal life." They are historical acts of worship. Their exterior forms symbolize, but their inner reality actually *is,* the mediation of the grace of God to man.

It seems to this reviewer that the doctrines of the Incarnation, Atonement, and Resurrection of Jesus Christ are essentially different from those of Creation, the Fall, and the Advent. It may be readily granted that Niebuhr's statement of the latter dogmas is both penetrating and enlightening. Few writers have understood so profoundly the tragic predicament in which man stands, or have appreciated so deeply the truth of the resurrection of the body as the affirmation of the ultimate meaning of history and of social existence. But it is possible and necessary to state these doctrines in the terms of myth, precisely because they fall *outside* the realm of history, and are its presuppositions. Creation and the Fall belong, as Niebuhr so clearly points out, to *Urgeschichte,*[3] while the Advent belongs to the supra-historical.[4] Thus, to give up the pre-scientific element in Biblical myths is not to lose their supra-historical meaning. Just because they fall outside history they have to be couched in historical terms that are metaphorical and symbolic. They cannot be taken literally.

But it is entirely different with the Incarnation, Atonement, and Resurrection of Jesus Christ. Here we are dealing, not only with the presuppositions of history, but with the very stuff of history itself. Here, and here alone, the Church asserts, are God and man made one and reconciled. It is in the arena of history itself that the tragic conflict of sin and God is waged, and issues in the victorious triumph of the Resurrection. It is true that the meaning of the historical conflict is not exhausted in history and has reference to the supra-historical.

3. Niebuhr well points out that Creation and the Fall are not identical. Their relation is accidental and not intrinsic. This he explains by reference to the Biblical myth, where the Fall comes after Creation (*The Nature of Religious Experience,* p. 127).

4. The human mind tends to conceive of *Urgeschichte* and Supra-history as pre-history and post-history. This must be regarded as symbolic and not literal, since creation and time are inseparable. Creation as Augustine says, is *cum tempore.*

The Original Sin of *Urgeschichte* is swallowed up in the victory of Supra-history. But none the less, the conflict and the triumph are historical, although they transcend it. It is Christ, the Son of God, who, in the human-divine life in Palestine, battles against principalities and powers and sinful flesh, and who, in a moment of time, is crucified and in an act of history rises from the dead. If this is denied and the whole conflict is regarded as taking place in the realm of supra-history, so that the Incarnation is but the symbolic representation of the truth of supra-history, the meaning of history is ultimately denied. Reconciliation with God comes at the end of history and not *in* history. God and man are never related. The Holiness of the divine has never really entered history. The stumbling block of Christianity is ever the affirmation, which no intellectual myth can comprehend or symbolize, that the Son of God died on the Cross to save sinners, and that *there*, in an act of history, God was reconciling the world unto Himself. The New Creation is in history, as well as above and beyond it, although its fulfillment is only reached at the Advent.

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*The Resources of Religion.* By GEORGIA HARKNESS. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1936. vii + 218 pp. $2.00.

*The Recovery of Ideals.* By GEORGIA HARKNESS. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937. xiii + 237 pp. $2.00.

These two books are remarkable for the frank discussion of practically every modern issue in religion, and for a constructive restatement of basic religious convictions, concretely applied so as to make plain their necessity and significance.

For this task of analysis and of positive treatment Dr. Harkness is unusually qualified. She is alert to the changes that are taking place in thought and in society, is a successful teacher sympathetic with youth, is well-grounded in philosophy, and her knowledge of religion in its actual bearing on life is first-hand and genuine. In addition, she has the ability to discuss profound subjects in an interesting, vivid, at times pungent manner.

The content of the first of these two books is excellently indicated by the title, *The Resources of Religion.* The present state of religion is candidly called "sick." It is suffering from three major ailments:

"Neglect of worship in obsession with activity, wide-spread distrust of the efficacy of the ideals of Jesus, quiescent spiritual self-culture as an escape from the radical action implicit in the Christian message." But the prescription for recovery is not an invalid's diet or a prolonged rest-cure. While religion has much to offer for the enrichment of life, it releases energy and restores to health by what it demands.

A stimulating chapter discusses what the Christian religion demands in belief, in morals, in worship, in personality. This is followed by a realistic examination of the ends and means to be sought in fulfilling the requirement of creating a truly Christian society. In the presence of these demands, the weakness of the Church and the inadequacy of "our enlightened paganism" are skilfully analyzed.

The difference between the religious ideal and a mere utopia is that religion has resources sufficient for actual achievement. And that these resources should be clearly known and confidently used is the main theme of the book. They are found in a worthy knowledge of God, in the personal relationship which men may have with Him, and in the co-operative fellowship among men which is thus engendered. The critical tracing of the exact steps by which this knowledge can be gained—through a correct understanding of revelation, its meaning and media, through the exercise of reason, through worship private and corporate, through the struggle for a re-ordered society, and through "the way of the cross"—make this concluding section of the book, not a pious exhortation, but a valuable summary of the resources of religion, replete with practical suggestion.

In the preface to *The Recovery of Ideals,* Dr. Harkness writes, "The purpose of this book is to suggest an empirical approach to a social philosophy and to a philosophy of religion. Its starting point is human thinking and living as we find it in the contemporary scene." Thus the title selected does not so well characterize the content as does that of the first book, for the aim of the author is not simply the recovery of ideals that were formerly held. Her principal concern is "with the discovery of true grounds on which one may believe in and live by moral and spiritual ideals," and these grounds are discovered in religion.

The subjects discussed in the opening chapters are, "The Dissolution of Ideals, Causes and Remedies," "The Place of Ideals in Human Nature," "The Reality of the Ideal," and "Levels of Idealism."

From personal observation and by citation from others, the conclusion is reached that the present generation has lost belief in ideals, though in small groups there are notable exceptions. While many illustrations and ample statistics may be given in support, it is debatable as to whether this indictment can be made justly. The spectacle of ideals professed but ignored in action has caused disillusionment. There are huge difficulties which make devotion to ideals a severe strain upon one's faith and determination. But it may be held that the widespread discontent among youth with things as they are, especially the reluctance to engage in war, and the strong desire for peace, are impressive evidence that ideal strivings have not ceased—that they are waiting only for a fresh infusion of energy to make them effective. However, it must not be supposed that Dr. Harkness is not fully cognizant of these elements. Her book, in fact, supplies the infusion which is needed.

A few headings taken from the remaining chapters indicate the constructive measures to meet the present situation and to establish the supremacy of ideals: "An Approach to Triumphant Religion," "An Approach to Problems of Knowledge," "Synoptic Supernaturalism," "The Existence of God," "What God Is Not," "What God Is." These chapters and others are so packed with close reasoning and incisive comment that, in the brief space of a review, the one recommendation is that they be carefully read. If objections should be raised to certain statements, the author would not claim that complete solutions are offered. But the positive note is always struck, and the way of advance is clearly pointed out.

Concise summaries of the author's position in regard to various subjects facilitate understanding and also clarify the central argument of the book. At the end, Dr. Harkness gives her own *Credo* which she significantly calls "A Continuing Creed." A list of books suggested for further reading is added.

*The Resources of Religion*, and *The Recovery of Ideals* are outstanding contributions in the field of religious literature, strikingly relevant to the main problems of living.

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Columbia University

*The Exploration of the Inner World.* By ANTON T. BOISEN. New York and Chicago: Willett Clark and Co., 1936. xi + 316 pp. $3.50.

One of the most distinctive contributions to the psychology of religion since William James, this book will doubtless stir a great deal of interest and discussion. James cast a new light on religious experience when he examined it from the viewpoint of psychopathology; Boisen attempts to illuminate not only religious experience from the point of view of the abnormal but, conversely, the abnormal experience as seen in its religious implications. Admirably equipped, by reason of his very wide training as a specialist in the psychology of religion, the author brings to his task something really distinctive because it is his own personal experience as a mental patient. Though diagnosed as a catatonic schizophrenic, he emerged from the pall of his delusions to work, not only effectively, but also creatively, in the field of religious psychiatry. His insights spring from the problems involved in his own case and, particularly, from his resolutions of them. He regards himself, in a sense, as the best proof of the pertinency of his intuitions.

The essence of his theory is that certain types of religious experience, like certain types of functional mental disorder, are attempts of nature to heal internal disorganization of the personality. If that attempt is successful the experience is looked upon as a religious one, where success is lacking the person is designated as 'insane.' The 'crisis experience,' according to Boisen, is that breaking point when the personality marshals all its vital forces to break through the wall of isolation with which it has surrounded itself. The wall itself is a consequence of escape from the sense of failure which the life situation has bred. The intolerable loss of self-respect, which accompanies the intense conviction of personal failure, so paralyzes the personality that only an explosive crisis can resolve it. Mental hospitals, according to the author, are full of those indivduals who have failed in the attempt at reorganization, religious history is replete with the names of those who have emerged from the struggle more complete and more harmonious personalities. John Bunyan, George Fox and Paul of Tarsus are cited as examples, and the author draws on his own experience as further illustration.

The mentally disordered individual, or, more specifically the schizophrenic, is, according to Boisen, one who having accepted the standards

imposed upon him in childhood and youth, finds himself unable to live up to them and develops a strong sense of personal failure. The incipient psychotic proceeds then to deal in one of three ways with this mortifying situation: (1) He may resolve the problems by simply drifting and withdrawing into an inner world where no comparison with others disturbs his complacency; this is the picture in simple and hebephrenic schizophrenia. (2) He may re-act by resorting to a distortion of belief, delusionally misinterpreting the whole situation in order to cover up his own sense of failure and perhaps guilt; the paranoid schizophrenic is like this. Or, (3) he may go into a panic. This results only in profound despair and a feeling of utter helplessness; in this condition he withdraws entirely from the external world and becomes catatonic.

The transformation of character in the schizophrenic is then in the direction of some sort of escape from an unbearable life-situation. The personality reorganizes itself at some more primitive and regressed level and thus abolishes the intolerable conflict. Where, however, the transformation of character following the 'crisis experience' makes for inner unification rather than disorganization the experience is regarded as religious. All the bound-up impulsive energy is then unfettered in the cause of a higher synthesis, focalized about some 'aim in life,' and a George Fox or Paul of Tarsus results, his whole life organized about a new set of meanings, a new *Weltanschauung*.

In centering his problem about the important role that a philosophy of life plays in determining mental health Boisen allies himself with the Jungian emphasis on the *Weltanschauung* as the synthesizing factor in harmonious psychic development. This in spite of the fact that he pays frequent tribute to psychoanalytic contributions, and even makes the psychoanalytically pregnant admission that his own personal "difficulty was rooted wholly in a severe inner struggle arising from a precocious sexual sensitivity dating from [his] fourth year."

On the whole, Boisen's point of view is in consonance with the implications of the Meyerian psychobiological approach to schizophrenia which sees in attitudes, habits and beliefs, factors at least as potent in determining the psychosis as the organic concomitants. In fact, in viewing the schizophrenic breakdown as an unsuccessful attempt at reorganization of the personality, Boisen seems, in a sense, but to be affirming what has been said already by others (Meyer, Jelliffe,

White), though he does cast into bolder relief the inner dynamics of the struggle for mental balance. When, however, he sees in the character transforming experiences of the many religious a reflection of the same struggle which agitates the potential schizophrenic he is contributing something fundamentally new to our understanding of a certain class of religious phenomena. We see the bizarre neuroticism of many religious zealots in a new light, for them religion is truly salvation, and Boisen's conception of the character transformation as a fight against mental alienation is indeed an illuminating one. His apt analysis of the significant experiences of George Fox and Paul of Tarsus give substantial credence to his thesis, while descriptions of his own personality change leave no doubt that his own past behavior is used as the paradigm for his many fruitful reflections.

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*The Great Chain of Being. A Study of the History of an Idea.* By ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936. ix + 382 pp. $4.00.

In his fertile and suggestive William James lectures, Professor Lovejoy combines at least three major themes. As the first, he states the program for a specific kind of investigation, to be called "the history of ideas," and illustrates that program in terms of the idea indicated by the title, the Chain of Being. As the second, he traces in detail, particularly in modern thought, the ramifications of that idea, and of some of the unintended but curiously happy scientific and philosophical consequences to which it there led. And as the third, in acute and devastating fashion he criticises the main strains of Platonistic metaphysical theology dominant for two millennia in Western religious thought. To perform this last operation Mr. Lovejoy takes up the scalpel of Hume and Kant, and with an analysis as precise and cutting as theirs, and a wealth of historical illustration they could not command, he once more riddles the claim of traditional Christian theology to intellectual and metaphysical consistency.

It is with this theological criticism that the student of religion will be primarily concerned, especially in view of the marked revival of natural or rational theology in our day, with the attendant perplexities involved in the logic of creation. For since the Neoplatonists—per-

haps since the *Timaeus*—the idea of the Great Chain of Being has been the chief philosophic support of faith in the absolute rationality of the cosmos, and of humanistic trust in the values to be found in man's natural life and experience. It has been the source of that strain of exuberant this-worldliness which, kept alive throughout the Christian tradition, finally came into its own in the evolutionary theology of the Romanticists and their cult of diversity and creativity. In its terms have been phrased the major attempts to make the religious doctrine of creation metaphysically intelligible, and in rational theodicies to justify the ways of God to man.

Mr. Lovejoy makes two basic contentions: first, that the optimistic this-worldliness implied in the conception of the Author of the Great Chain of Being is so radically incompatible with the self-sufficient Absolute, that self-contained Perfection and Eternal Introvert which forms an equally fundamental strain in the Platonistic tradition, that Platonists and Christians must be said to have had two Gods, and not one, and two utterly disparate conceptions of goodness. Secondly, the rationale and theodicy involved in the first of these notions, the Chain of Being, has worked itself out to negative conclusions: its history has been that of a failure; the absolute optimism and cosmic determination to which it logically leads, as in Spinoza and Leibniz, is quite unbelievable; and it is hopelessly wrecked by the fact of temporality and the self-contradiction inherent in its utter denial of arbitrariness and contingency.

These conclusions are summarized: "The two Gods of Plato and Plotinus cannot both be believed in; and the two schemes of values associated with these theological conceptions cannot be reconciled, either in theory or in practice. The other-worldly Idea of the Good must be the idea of a spurious good, if the existence of this world of temporal and imperfect creatures be assumed to be itself a genuine good; and an Absolute which is self-sufficient and forever perfect and complete cannot be identified with a God related to and manifested in a world of temporal becoming and alteration and creative advance." On the other hand, the acceptance of this latter immanent God of cosmic progress "tacitly denies the essential logicality of the world's history in the sense in which it had so long been supposed to possess that attribute. Its getting started only a certain number of centuries or of millions of millennia ago, and the direction which its march was as-

sumed to have taken, were by implication chance-happenings. . . . The world *is*, in short, a contingent world; its magnitude, its pattern, its habits, which we call laws, have something arbitrary and idiosyncratic about them. . . . If we may employ the traditional anthropomorphic language of the theologians, we may say that in it Will is prior to Intellect." In emphasizing the primacy of the non-rational, Duns Scotus and Ockham—and Whitehead—have been right. Rational theology having thus completely broken down, our most holy religion, as Hume put it, is founded on faith; at least Mr. Lovejoy sees no support for it in logic.

Behind this negative analysis there stands a very definite interpretation of the history of Christian theology. "The most important and distinctive circumstance in the history of religious and moral philosophy in the Occident is the fact that both later Platonism and the accepted philosophy of the Church combined other-worldliness with a virtual, if not usually a literal or unqualified, optimism. Both were equally committed to the two contradictory theses that 'this' world is an essentially evil thing to be escaped from, and that its existence, with precisely the attributes it has, is a good so great that in the production of it the divinest of all the attributes of deity was manifested." Most of the religious thought of the West has thus been profoundly at variance with itself. Christians have believed philosophically in two Gods, and practically in two opposed sets of values, other-worldly and this-worldly; the God of Aristotle had almost nothing in common with the God of the Sermon on the Mount. "Perhaps the most extraordinary triumph of self-contradiction, among many such triumphs in the history of human thought, was the fusion of this conception of a self-absorbed and self-contained Perfection at once with the Jewish conception of a temporal Creator and busy interposing Power making for righteousness through the hurly-burly of history, and with primitive Christianity's conception of a God whose essence is forthgoing love and who shares in all the griefs of his creatures."

The roots of this "fruitful inconsistency" in Christian thought Mr. Lovejoy finds not merely in the Hebraic opposition to Neoplatonism, but even more basically in that metaphysical thought itself. Indeed, the primary contribution of his study to religious history, as distinct from theological criticism, is just his ample illustration that the Platonistic tradition has been permeated by this dualism, and that it has again

and again reinforced the optimistic and naturalistic opposition to the ascetic and other-worldly gospel it is usually taken to have fostered. Platonism—Mr. Lovejoy, after much argument and with some caution would say, Plato himself—is the main historic source of the indigenous strain of other-worldliness in Occidental philosophy and religion. Its Absolute, the Idea of the Good, possesses in itself the most complete self-sufficiency and adequacy, needing nothing else for its own perfect Being—characteristics revealed in their clarity in Aristotle's theology. Such a view logically leads, as in Hindu thought, to condemning all actual experience as illusory—an outcome which, "though it is a kind of poetry which has a very potent metaphysical pathos, is, philosophically considered, plainly the extremest kind of nonsense." Hindu other-worldliness has thus had as its natural correlate a thoroughgoing pessimism about human life in its natural conditions; it has consistently either dismissed the world as mere illusion, or maintained that its creation was a sheer disaster, or devoted itself to the way of escape from its evils.

Western religious thought, however, though in the Gnostic heresies and in Manichaeism it dallied for a time with the second of these positions, has always managed to escape the pessimism inherent in its ideal of the transcendence of the Good. With the Alexandrian Fathers, Plotinus, and St. Augustine, it has found in Platonism itself the source of an opposing radical this-worldly optimism. In its doctrine of creation or emanationism it has seen in the absolute and transcendent Good the logical ground for all finite existence and value. The not-so-good, not to say the bad, has been taken as derivative from the Idea of the Good, and as involved in the essence of its Perfection. The very God who was the goal of all desire has been likewise the source of the creatures that desire it. Perplexed by the question, Why is there any world of becoming at all, and why is it just as it is? Platonists have adopted and elaborated the creation myth of the *Timaeus:* "Being devoid of envy, God desired that everything should be so far as possible like himself." Self-Sufficing Perfection was thus transformed into Self-Transcending Fecundity; good ceased to be essentially self-contained, and became essentially *diffusivum sui.* It thus created a universe embracing of necessity all possible kinds of imperfect beings. In that creation, by what Mr. Lovejoy happily calls the principle of plenitude, all conceivable eternal essences have a temporal counterpart, arranged in a

continuous scale from highest to lowest. The logical outcome of pursuing this dialectical principle to the bitter end is the absolute cosmic determinism and optimism which attained its final systematic formulation and practical application in Spinoza's *Ethics*.

Corresponding to these two antithetical Gods there followed naturally two irreconcilable conceptions of the good: since the final goal of man was the imitation of the divine nature, these divine attributes became the basis of all ultimate value. Man was to find his fulfilment in a God who was not one but two, not only the Idea of the Good, but also the Idea of Goodness. "The one was the apotheosis of unity, self-sufficiency, and quietude, the other of diversity, self-transcendence, and fecundity." Christian thought was thus involved in a discrepancy between two practical ideals, two incompatible notions of value impossible to reconcile in human conduct. "There was no way in which the flight from the Many to the One, the quest of a perfection defined wholly in terms of contrast with the created world, could be effectually harmonized with the imitation of a Goodness that delights in diversity and manifests itself in the emanation of the Many out of the One." The one program demanded the ecstatic contemplation of the Divine Essence; the other placed the active life above the contemplative, and found in the activity of the creative artist that human life most like the divine.

For a millennium Christian thought held both concepts and both ideals in solution, though the first, the Idea of the Good, dominated its ethical teaching. From Augustine to the Reformers, theologians pushed the principle of plenitude as a theodicy, but drew back from its full consequences. Abelard saw that it led to a necessitarian optimism; Peter Lombard, fearful lest the creature be made equal to the Creator, insisted, "God could have made other things and better things than he has made." Thomas as usual wriggled and squirmed and drew distinctions. There were indeed but two possible consistent views—that of Duns Scotus, and that of Bruno and Spinoza: the denial of the intelligibility of the cosmos, or the acceptance of its full implications. It was not till the late seventeenth century that the latter finally won the upper hand; and in the deterministic optimism of the Enlightenment—that optimism which, in maintaining the Conservation of Evil, seems the most radical of pessimisms—gave full rein to the principle of plenitude.

But this very triumph made its implications intolerable—Mr. Lovejoy is more concerned with the dialectic of the position than with the complex historical factors that emphasized that dialectic. The optimist's proof of the rationality of the general constitution of things turned out to be a proof of its essential immorality. In their revolt men proceeded to temporalize the Chain of Being: they reinterpreted the *plenum formarum* not as the inventory of an existing nature, but as the program of a nature to be. "The conception of the destiny of man as an unending progress thus emerges as a consequence of reflection upon the principles of plenitude and continuity." In Henry More, in Addison, in Edmund Law, in Leibniz himself, Mr. Lovejoy traces the emergence of a radically new conception of value, destined to complete expression in Lessing, Goethe, and the Romanticists—no finality, no ultimate perfection, no arrest of the outreach of the will. God has for ages been perfecting the universe through creating more and more different kinds of excellence; man too must strive to imitate such a deity by becoming himself creative, original, and productive of as much diversity as possible. Diversity and creativity are of the essence of excellence. There have been few changes in standards of value more profound and more momentous.

The final stage was reached when God was himself temporalized into an evolving deity and identified with the very process of creative evolution: Schelling and Oken laid the foundations for Bergson. Jacobi might castigate this view as blasphemous in deriving the superior from the inferior, and even as a contradiction of the laws of logic; Schelling's crushing reply, completing the earlier criticisms of Voltaire and Samuel Johnson, demolished the logic of creation by emanation. For perfection to create imperfection could have no reason or ground; being complete in itself, Perfection could thereby produce only a lower degree of value. Such creation contradicts the facts of observation; it makes evil wholly unintelligible. For it "derives the not-good from the Good, and makes God, not the source and potentiality of the Good, but the source and potentiality of the not-good." An eternally complete God, ready-made once and for all, is a dead God, and not the God that lives and strives in nature and in man. In thus introducing a radical evolutionism into metaphysics and theology, Schelling signalized the emergence of a new mood and temper of religious feeling.

All natural theologians and rational metaphysicians would do well

to take to heart Mr. Lovejoy's record of this century-long "experiment in thought," and still more his dialectical analysis of the implications of the assumptions they are tempted to make. These are especially to be pondered by those modern physicists who are, according to the author, "perhaps the boldest speculative minds of our time." His contention that the hypothesis of the absolute rationality of the cosmos is unbelievable, that—as Aristotle pointed out long ago—any creation of the universe in time is quite unintelligible, that any eternal creation of the lower by the higher must likewise be accepted as a brute and inexplicable fact, and that an eternal process of evolution must be irrelevant to the achievement of human values—in a word, that the world is radically contingent, and that its structure and values must be taken empirically for what they are, with no possible explanation for their character as a whole,—all this seems as irrefutable as any dialectic of human thought.

Yet, penetrating as is Mr. Lovejoy's criticism, it does not answer all the questions it suggests; and some of them are fundamental in philosophic reflection upon religion. Mr. Lovejoy's intellectualistic rejection of rationalism is justly scornful of the theological doctrine of the coincidence of opposites in God, "what Dean Inge has delicately termed 'the fluidity and interpenetration of concepts in the spiritual world,' or in plainer language, the permissibility and even necessity of contradicting oneself when one speaks of God." Yet this familiar doctrine takes on an altered meaning when one examines, as Mr. Lovejoy has not, the underlying assumption of the whole Platonistic tradition, of which the Chain of Being is but a single albeit an important strand. This is the assumption of the identity of metaphysics with theology, of those basic and permeating traits of the universe in terms of which man renders it intelligible to himself with the objects of the religious life, its celebrations and its consecrations. It is of the essence of Platonism that the objects of aspiration and the objects of knowledge are one, that the structure of the world is to be understood in terms of the ends of human living.

There is a sense in which this moral insight is true: if it be taken naturalistically and pluralistically, then the goals of human conduct do determine those traits of existence we single out for intellectual examination and attention, especially if those goals be generous enough to include the vision of the cosmic sweep of things and the delight of

the mind in nature's intricate devices for producing her infinite variety. The science our culture has constructed is indeed derived from the fundamental ends we have forced upon ourselves. Those ends and that science are not the ends and the science of Platonism; why they are not seems to elude Mr. Lovejoy's explication of the latter's dialectic, and to be grounded in other factors in the world of concrete existence.

But taken supernaturally and wholesale, as Platonism has ever taken them, the objects of knowledge are not one with the objects of aspiration, and the structure of things gives no evidence of having been generated by the ideals man discerns in imagination. There can be no understanding of the visible world if it be taken as the pale and imperfect copy of an unseen and eternal intelligible realm which alone satisfies the mind and stills the heart's desire. Platonism, in the conventional sense in which it has served to rationalize the Christian symbols and myths, though revived again and again by poets intoxicated with words, by mathematicians drunk with dialectic, and by rational theologians aflame with the vision of a divine intelligibility, has again and again crumbled at the first touch of serious criticism. Mr. Lovejoy is not the first to make clear how, taken as a serious metaphysics, as an analytic discrimination of the traits of being, it is its own refutation. I strongly suspect, despite Mr. Lovejoy's denial, that the first was Plato himself; for I cannot forget the opening of the *Parmenides*.

But if the Platonistic identification of metaphysics with theology breaks down, then neither can theology be one with metaphysics, nor need it be bound by the limitations nor judged by the standards of that sober discipline. What else theology may be is at times suggested by Mr. Lovejoy himself. In commenting on the self-sufficient Idea of the Good, he remarks, "This element in the Platonic tradition, no doubt, has owed its persistence to the fact that it corresponds to one of the natural varieties of religious experience. There is plainly one type or mood of religious imagination and feeling, and a concomitant kind of theological dialectic, which can be satisfied with nothing less than an assurance of the utter isolation of the supreme object of contemplation from the natural world, and its sublime indifference even to its worshippers." This way of thinking has indeed a perennial vitality: its "theological dialectic" is heard in the cry of Job, "Though he slay me yet will I worship him," and its expression, whether in the stern accents of Barth or in the mitigated tones of a Tillich or a Niebuhr, is an im-

aginative rendering of a mood and temper of religious feeling at least as "modern" as the melioristic evolutionary theology of Schelling. Mr. Lovejoy admits that this is "a kind of poetry that has a very potent metaphysical pathos." That the view of nineteenth century liberal religion that reality is struggling towards a rational goal, the enrichment of the total excellence of existence, and has already in an appreciable degree moved toward it—that the destiny of man is an unending progress—that this view is likewise a typical mood of religious imagination and feeling, a variety of poetry whose appeal is primarily to the emotions, he does not so clearly state. Indeed, partly because of the accident of his breaking off the story with Schelling, and partly because of his justification, that in that Romantic figure the Chain of Being reached its logical conclusion, Mr. Lovejoy gives a certain impression that he believes an evolutionary conception of reality to be in itself a satisfactory theology.

It is suggested, then, that theology is really not metaphysics at all, but rather a poetic and imaginative expression of religious feeling. But though as such the transcendence of God has a perennial vitality, the author goes on to say, "philosophically considered it is plainly the extremest kind of nonsense." Why he subscribes to the rather extraordinary view that the poetic expression of the religious imagination should be, "philosophically considered," nonsense, is illuminated by an incidental remark about the Platonic myths. If those myths be not construed as intimating the metaphysical existence of a transcendent realm of pure noumena, then they can be but "mere flights of poetic fancy, little more than irrelevant rhetorical embellishments." Such a dichotomy is rather surprising in one so erudite in the various forms of human discourse and expression. That myth cannot be "taken seriously" save as a statement of metaphysical theses about the cosmos, seems a curious blindness, not only to the quality of Plato's genius, but to the function of philosophy in general and of theology in particular. That Plato's myths might possess a metaphorical propriety of their own, that they might be the imaginative expression of the human experiences of knowing and aspiring, of the way men feel in the presence of those perfectings of imperfect existence the mind so lucidly discerns and the heart so yearningly cherishes, he seems never to have considered. That ideas of God and theological elaborations in general might fulfill a similar function seems likewise not to have occurred to

him. He remains caught in the Platonistic identification of theology with metaphysics.

If theology, however, be not the statement of any metaphysical truth, but rather an art and technique of religious practice and expression, then surely there is no need to judge it by the principle of contradiction. It will possess a "theological dialectic" of its own, devoted to the clarified rendering of those varied and manifold moods of feeling which make up the religious life. The structure of the universe, as Mr. Lovejoy rather confidently assumes, may well be strictly bound by the principle of contradiction that governs human discourse; if its various parts be contingent, arbitrary, and idiosyncratic, at least they need not be logically incompatible with each other. But notoriously the religious life is not dialectically consistent and neatly harmonized, nor are its moods and practices even psychologically capable of coexistence. That in unifying the focus of this fluid and turbulent feeling theology has attributed logically incompatible attributes to the divine nature, is but testimony to the fidelity of its rendering of man's experience. There is in fact no more inherent reason why any man or any religion should have a single conception of the God employed in worship and in organizing the religious life, than why the earthly lover should entertain a single and logically consistent idea of his beloved. The logic of theology is far closer, after all, to the logic of the lover's discourse than to the logic of rational metaphysics. As an expression of the complexity and the pluralism of the religious life, polytheism is much nearer its insistent immediacies than is the sophisticated monotheism bred of a distorting intellectual and metaphysical impulse, as the history of the Trinity, and still more the persisting practice of the faithful, make abundantly clear.

This pluralism Mr. Lovejoy seems half-prepared to admit for historic Christianity: neither Christianity nor its notion of God is one of his selected unit-ideas. But he does seem to insist on a monism of value: Christianity has been vitiated by its two irreconcilable conceptions of the good, and it is impossible to combine in human practice logically incompatible notions of value. On the contrary, in reality nothing is easier, more natural, or more universal; while history teaches that the opposing attempt to force into one narrow mold the radically diverse goods and ends that men are on occasion called upon to pursue, has bred only intolerance, fanaticism, and blind hatred. Not only have a

multitude of Christians, like the great mystics, found it quite possible to imitate both Self-Sufficient Good and Self-Transcending Fecundity; it can be plausibly argued that the very comprehensive diversity of the schemes of value to which Christianity has given birth has been the source of its enduring power. There has been something, not only for every man and every age, but still more, something for the diverse and shifting needs of each single life. "The world of concrete existence," Mr. Lovejoy concludes his study, "is no impartial transcript of the realm of essence"; and surely the moral life is as shot through with contingencies and arbitrariness and pluralism as the cosmos itself. The history of Western religious thought has indeed been the history of inconsistencies. But it has also been, in the author's own words, a "fruitful and happy inconsistency"; so much so that when one or another of its elements has been singled out for pursuit with logical clarity, the religious and moral life of that time has been, as during the reign of modern liberal religion, denuded and impoverished.

In his long tale it is somewhat surprising that Mr. Lovejoy has not paid more attention to Aristotle, if only as the foil to his Platonic Chain of Being. For there he might have found the combination he was seeking, of a logically consistent metaphysics with the values appropriate to each of his major religious moods. The transcendent Ideal Good of Aristotle makes no concession to the faulty logic of creation and emanation. Yet it remains a pure good to be served with selfless devotion; and the Platonic myth in which Book Lambda culminates shows how well it can be treated in poetic and imaginative terms. At the same time it remains wholly compatible with devotion to those natural human values to which the men of the Enlightenment and the Romantic era have inescapably committed our allegiance. The medieval Platonists brought their distorting and unsuccessful metaphysics to bear upon Aristotle, to the confusion of logic though to the enduring enrichment of the religious imagination. Now that we have with Mr. Lovejoy achieved metaphysical clarity, perhaps the Aristotelian framework can be made to serve once again as the grammar for the poetic expression of our own tumultuous and multifarious religious life. But the last thing we need today, in our attempts to practice such a religious technique, is a logically consistent unit-idea of God.

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*Bishop Butler and the Age of Reason: A Study in the History of Thought.* Ernest C. Mossner. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936. xv + 271 pp. $2.50.

Before entering into a review of this book, I would like to suggest that the title may be misleading, for where it promises to be a study of the thought of Bishop Butler, it is really an essay on English Rationalism instanced in the Deistic Controversy of the eighteenth century, in which Butler is regarded as a focus through which the trend of religious rationalism hastens towards its decline. The positive thought of Butler is neglected, or subordinated to the polemical aspect of Butler's writings, which aspect the author considers, erroneously, I believe, to be Butler's central importance. The importance of Bishop Butler lies not so much in the fact that he took part in a controversy that was purely topical and of its time, but rather that he expressed, what is of importance for us today, the deeper meanings of conscience in its attitude towards man and reality. A more thorough reading of Butler's writings would have made this clear. To view Butler solely in his polemical aspect is to ignore this contribution of positive value. As a contribution to the history of Deism, Mr. Mossner's book is important; as an estimation of Butler's completer views, the book fails to do justice.

As a contribution to the history of English thought of the eighteenth century, *Bishop Butler and the Age of Reason,* emphasizes Rationalism as its dominant intellectual vein. In the thought of Bishop Butler, particularly, it purports to discover the main index of the rationalistic movement. Among many things, the book deserves the merit of defining reason concretely and historically, holding fast to the central conception that reason is a self-constituted claim to discover infallible, certain, and universal truths about reality. In studying reason concretely, the work examines its expression in the various ways in which the concept is used and believed in by the writers of that time. In viewing reason historically the fortunes and success of its claims are studied from its a priori character in Cudworth and Clarke to its final decline in the rise of the empirical method and the sceptical onslaughts of Hume. In this way, the author believes its adequacies are historically measured and found to be wanting.

The stronghold of reason is shown to lie in the field of religious beliefs, where untouched by the empiricism of science, it claimed the

possibility of ascertaining with unquestionable certainty akin to the mathematical, the nature of man, God, and the scheme of moral relationships subsisting between them. In such a character, reason touches intimately the sensibilities of those in the established Anglican Church, who hold firmly to the truths of revealed religion. In entering upon this controversy, the author shows how, within the ranks of theological issues, reason is forced to abandon its claims to supremacy, not without affecting though, the status of religious insight that revealed religion had maintained for itself. The claims of Deism prove to be reason's own undoing. From its initial assertion of supremacy, we witness its reluctant confessions of weakness and impotency, that lead insensibly to a denial of its own competence to construct even a natural religion. In its last stand, Deism is seen as a captious contestant against the claims of religion to prove anything at all from the nature of reason, by pointing out the absurdity of miracles and prophecies. Reason by this time has become bankrupt; and religion, forced to abandon both its naturalistic and revelatory claims, is constrained to enter into the historical stream of empirical science, to study itself genetically and comparatively, or to attend upon the facts of science for its own strengthening.

Butler's importance, according to Mr. Mossner, lies in his being merely an index to the religious expression of rationalism. In Butler's thought is seen distilled the significance of the controversy, as well as the paths leading to the subsequent decline of reason. Standing with the defendants of revealed religion, Butler seeks to preserve its contents by first arguing negatively that the difficulties of its tenets are no more insuperable than those of natural religion. It admits the truths of natural religion to which it contributes additional ones of its own. For this reason we should be hesitant about rejecting the doctrines of revealed religion and the claims that it imposes upon us. Its acceptance as true, Butler admits, requires more for its support than the argument that there is nothing improbable about its contents. It further requires that there be positive evidence in its favour. To secure this positive evidence for its acceptance, Butler shows that from the course and constitution of nature, the truths of revealed religion are substantiated by a logic of probability. In furnishing this type of proof, however, Butler unwittingly undermines the pretensions of reason in the field of natural religion to arrive at any certainty, such as the rationalist had claimed.

In stating that probability is the guide to life, he has damaged, according to the author, any rational basis for the support of his own position. Butler appears in the role of a man who, in sawing his enemy off the limb of the tree, fails to observe that he himself is on the wrong side of the saw.

The far-reaching results of Butler's *Analogy* then proves to be reason's own undoing, for driven out of the field of natural religion, reason is at the same time proved to be incompetent to uphold the assertions of revealed religion. With this conclusion, the claims of reason are debased, and the victory, according to the author, rests neither with the Deists, nor the apologists, but with the sceptic, who in the person of Hume shows that reason divorced from actual fact is powerless to produce anything, and even in alliance with the empirical fact produces but uncertain, contingent results and probable conclusions. Now according to Mr. Mossner, Butler then reveals himself to be a figure whose religious views are historically dated, and whose only value lies in the fact that he represents the high point of the deistic controversy in which the fortunes of rationalism spend themselves and decline.

Butler was an ethicist as well, and in his doctrine of conscience, he claims to have discovered the central fact of man's moral nature. But not so for Mr. Mossner. He chances upon the phrase in which Butler speaks of conscience as the voice of God, and immediately subordinates all of Butler's ethics to his religion. Since the claims of religion are doubtful, so must be the claims of ethics. If conscience through the light of criticism can not be regarded as the voice of God, its truer aspect must, for the author be regarded as fundamentally intuitive, capable of development through habit and education, but forfeiting in its exercise and expression any pretensions to infallibility. Since the author does not relate the principle of conscience to self-love, benevolence, and the particular affections, he fails to grasp the essential meaning of conscience that Butler had in mind when he speaks of it as the voice of God.

If it be his thesis that Butler be viewed solely as an index to the intellectual climate of his times, assisting unwittingly the demise of reason, as well as the interment of the *Analogy* itself with it, the author may be accused of taking too narrow a view of Butler's philosophy. While it is true that Butler's position is outstandingly polemical,

yet there is discernible in his writings viewed as a whole, an underlying and consistent view of man in the world order. Therefore Butler's value is not to be fully explained by viewing him only in regard to his historical setting, for the view which he advocates on the basis of probability presents a metaphysics in alignment with the empirical philosophy of Locke—and one to be estimated by principles other than those of historical judgment. But this is just what the author denies by maintaining that "throughout, Butler shows himself extremely hesitant of expression on final metaphysical questions, his concern being primarily with practical consequences" (p. 89). As a polemicist, Butler does argue vigorously against what he believes to be false, but only because indirectly he maintains a view of the nature of things which he regards as true. In justice to his thought, this implicit metaphysics should be recognized, and examined on its own grounds for whatever value it might contain, and until this is done, we can not accept as incontestible any judgment of valuation as complete.

As a student of man's moral nature, Butler fathomed the meaning of consciousness more fully than Locke, for he saw that the exercise of reason in its pursuit of truth was but one aspect of man's wider demand for moral and religious values. What the world is and what man's place in it is to be, is more fully known only when a progressive exercise of an enlightened and morally awakened consciousness is satisfied. Admitting, as he does, that an evaluating reason must be the judge of everything, including even revelation itself, he sees that it must take its stand with teleology and regard reality in terms of ascending purpose and meaning. But in the neglect to see that Butler's theory of conscience carries these wider implications, the author has vitiated the force of his argument by viewing Butler mainly from the standpoint of the *Analogy,* and then only from its polemical aspect. And as regarding conscience: it can not be narrowly viewed as an intuitive insight into the nature of God as a moral lawgiver, but rather an the means whereby a spiritual reality is increasingly made manifest to man. If a systematic study of Butler's writing justifies this contention, then surely we must disallow to the historian of thought the last word to regard Butler as a mere fact of the past.

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*Jüdischer Glaube in dieser Zeit: Prolegomena zur Grundlegung einer systematischen Theologie des Judentums.* By Hans Joachim Schoeps. Berlin: Vortrupp-Verlag, 1934. vi + 90 pp. RM 2.80.

*Geschichte der jüdischen Religionsphilosophie in der Neuzeit.* By Hans Joachim Schoeps. Vol. 1. Berlin: Vortrupp-Verlag, 1935. iv + 132 pp. RM 3.90.

*Jüdisch-christliches Religionsgespräch in 19 Jahrhunderten: Geschichte einer theologischen Auseinandersetzung.* By Hans Joachim Schoeps. Berlin: Vortrupp-Verlag, 1937. 159 pp. RM 3.90.

These three works form a well-knit entity in the author's attempt to point the way toward a thorough reorientation of Jewish religious thought. He starts from the premise that for him as a Jew "the problem of the absolute in the history of religion has found its solution, viz., that the Jew can find God's word exclusively in his *Tenach* [the Old Testament] and that this divine revelation requires no further implementing, heightening or completing" (*Religionsgespräch*, p. 10). This enables him, he feels, to discard even the modicum of historical relativity maintained by the schools of Troeltsch and Dilthey. Even a recognition of the simultaneous truth of both the Jewish and the Christian dogma need not, in his opinion, depend on such relativity, because it is "the very same unalterable God who has revealed his truth in a different way. The truth is but *one* truth, whereas the partaking of that truth is different. It is absolutely binding for both Israel and Christendom in accordance with *that* side of God which He disclosed to Israel in Sinai and to the world on the Golgotha" (*ibid.*, p. 11). From this "absolute" point of view he demands a reorientation and revitalization of the Jewish religion such as was brought about in Protestantism by Karl Barth's "dialectical theology."

While contending that a reformulation of Judaism, thus conceived, would transcend the lines of both Orthodoxy and Reform, the author, nevertheless, professes close affinity, in outlook and method, with the theological thinking of Ignaz Maybaum, one of the leaders of German-Jewish liberalism. He speaks with great admiration of Franz Rosenzweig, whose posthumously published volume of *Letters* he regards as one of the greatest works of the twentieth century. He refuses, however, to analyze Rosenzweig's religious doctrines, as embodied in

the latter's comprehensive *Stern der Erlösung*, and merely presents in short outline the main points of a modern Judeo-Christian controversy in the War letters exchanged from the trenches between Rosenzweig and Eugen Rosenstock. This reticence is motivated by the author's firm conviction that in Rosenzweig's "life, work, thought and death the Jewish faith has become a reality [*realpräsent*] in our day" (*Jüdischer Glaube*, Preface). His profoundest spiritual indebtedness, however, he traces back to Solomon Ludwig Steinheim (1789-1866), "the first Jewish theologian of the modern period," to whom he dedicates his *Jüdischer Glaube;* to whose theories he wishes to devote the entire second volume (hitherto unpublished) of his *Geschichte*, and a sample of whose voluminous works he publishes under the title *Vom Bleibenden und Vergänglichen im Judentum* with his own introduction.

In the *Prolegomena* we find a brief presentation of the contemporary crisis in the Jewish religion, followed by an analysis of the transformations in the basic approach of the Protestant Old Testament scholarship in the course of the last century. This emphasis upon Protestant scholarship is explained by both the possibility of its extensive application to Jewish religious problems and the paucity of Jewish contributions in this field. Another brief chapter is devoted to a general outline of the evolution of Jewish systematic theology in the nineteenth century, in which Steinheim's immunity against Enlightenment is glorified against the dark background of the prevalent rationalist trends from Mendelssohn to Kohler and the early work of Baeck. Finally an equally sketchy attempt is made to lay foundations for a new systematic theology of Judaism "out of our present-day consciousness."

The *Geschichte* pursues the theme of the evolution of Jewish religious philosophy in the modern era in greater detail. For this work, Dr. Schoeps claims, in contrast to many other of his own writings, credit for the application of strict scholarly standards in a difficult pioneering achievement. While such claim may have been more justified in 1931, when the manuscript was largely completed, it seems to the present reviewer that it ought to have been toned down considerably in the Preface written in December 1934. The intervening year 1933 was marked by the publication of both M. Wiener's *Jüdische Religion im Zeitalter der Emanzipation* and Julius Guttmann's *Die Philosophie*

*des Judentums*, the last chapters of which give a brief, but penetrating analysis of the religious thought of Mendelssohn, the post-Mendelssohnian circle, Solomon Formstecher and Samuel Hirsch, all of which is also the main subject of Dr. Schoeps' inquiry. Of course, we shall find here a wholly different approach and many astute observations in detail, which, whether or not accepted in full by the reader, make the work a welcome contribution to the history of modern Judaism in Germany.

The maturest work of the three is the *Religionsgespräch*, a brief sketch of the religious controversy between Judaism and Christianity since the beginning of the Christian era. Stressing the Jewish side it may serve as a counterpart to A. L. Williams's *Adversus Judaeos: A Bird's-Eye View of Christian Apologiae until the Renaissance*, which, although published in 1935, evidently remained unknown to the author. More clearly than his two earlier works, which were largely completed before Hitler's rise to power, this history reflects the anti-Christian as well as anti-Jewish atmosphere of Nazi Germany. Now that the Church, like the Synagogue, is in "Exile," is but a "guest" in a surrounding hostile world, the author expects a much closer rapprochement between them than was hitherto possible (pp. 154 ff.). In any case, he hopes that a better and more widespread understanding of the main issues in the bimillennial controversy would show that many a modern objection and many a contemporary debate have long ago been definitely disposed of. For that purpose he first analyzes the problems of the messiahship of Jesus, the selection of Israel, the destruction of the Temple, and the relation between Law and Faith, in which were focalized the controversies during the first Christian centuries. He then illustrates the medieval disputations, oral as well as written, chiefly on the basis of the anti-Christian polemics of Saadia, Yehudah Halevi and Isaac Troki. This selection out of a large body of literature (partly listed, p. 63 n. 1) seems rather unfortunate, since Saadia and Halevi are more typically representative of Judaism under Islam than under medieval Christendom, and Isaac Troki was, after all, a Karaite. The modern controversy, led on the Jewish side by Mendelssohn, Formstecher and Steinheim reaches here its climax in the aforementioned debate between Rosenzweig and Rosenstock and another between Martin Buber and Karl Ludwig Schmidt.

One of the major weaknesses of Dr. Schoeps' work is his exclusively German-Jewish orientation with an almost complete neglect of the substantial contributions of East-European, Franco-Italian and Anglo-American Jewry to modern Jewish thought. The author's evident unfamiliarity with modern Hebrew (there are some curious mistranliterations) and Yiddish letters has shut him out from two main streams of Jewish intellectual evolution. One also regrets a frequent lack of lucidity and plausibility in the author's fundamental arguments. None the less every interested reader will find here much new and interesting information, and discover that he has been stimulated toward a rethinking of his own position in the religious crisis of our day.

SALO W. BARON

Columbia University

*The Meaning of God in Modern Jewish Religion.* By MORDECAI M. KAPLAN. New York: Behrman's Jewish Book House, 1937. xii + 368 pp. $2.75.

Much of the basis of reform in Jewish theological thought has been of a ritualistic nature. Relaxation of the prescribed duties of the Jew has been accepted as modernization of the Jewish religion. In theory, only such doctrines in the traditional theology as were in step with current thought were retained; in actuality, most of the doctrines of Judaism were so retained, being revised only by a gentle nod in the direction of what reform leaders accepted as current thought. Most of the changes concerned the outlawing of so-called 'barbaric customs.'

While this has been acceptable to a great many Jewish leaders, many more have believed that it was a makeshift and temporizing reform, which, instead of revivifying Judaism, would further hasten its degeneration. Most people, these theologians maintain, have little conception of the doctrinal character of their religion, and tend to associate that little with specific ceremonial observances rather than with a total philosophy. In eliminating, or in altering beyond recognition, the ritual observances of the Jewish religion, it is claimed that the essential pattern of Judaism has been made indistinguishable from that of other ethical religions.

The work of Dr. Kaplan, in connection with the establishment of the Society for the Advancement of Judaism in New York, has been to carry further this attitude of objection to ritual change, while

carrying on a progressive revision of the doctrinal bases of Judaism. In an earlier and highly significant work, *Judaism as A Civilization* (1934), Dr. Kaplan presented the outline of his plans for 'reconstruction' of the Jewish Religion. In this present work, he makes the specific application of his approach to the reconstruction of the idea of God in the Jewish religion. To the extent that this revision is completely and satisfactorily carried out it represents a break with both modernism and traditionalism. Dr. Kaplan is not, however, oppressed by the thought of such a break. He says, in a passage which may well be noted as the keynote of his approach:

> Tradition is indispensable to the life of the social organism. Were it not for tradition each generation would have to repeat the experiences of the past, and would not be able to avail itself of the useful habits accumulated through the ages, or to transmit the benefits of its own experience to posterity. But when tradition becomes so clamorous as to refuse to recognize change or to admit the need of innovation to meet changed conditions, it can only stifle and frustrate the life of society. It then becomes sin. A holy iconoclasm must be invoked to destroy such unholy idolatry (pp. 171-172).

The mechanism used by Dr. Kaplan in reconstructing the concept of God consists in an analysis of the philosophic basis of the holy days of the Jewish religion, to determine the central theme of each, and a presentation of God as the power working toward the accomplishment of the ideals represented in these themes. Thus God is a complex of definitions expressed in terms of powers. But Dr. Kaplan is not content simply to accept the central theme of each holy day without clarification. For example, he analyzes the Sabbath as the memorial of salvation, and therefrom deduces God as the Power working for salvation. This salvation, however, he does not conceive in terms of an other-wordly salvation:

> . . . the conduct of people today is motivated not by the desire to win for themselves a "share in the world to come," which would reward all their earthly efforts and compensate all their earthly suffering, but by the desire to win for themselves a share of life in this world, to win success, honor, love, and everything that contributes to human well-being and self-fulfillment on earth (p. 44).

Self-fulfillment on earth, in its turn, is defined in terms of both individual and social ends; in terms of the integration of personality and of the co-operation of society. Thus God emerges as the force

that makes for integration of personality and for social co-operation. It is important to remember, however, that while the terms 'force' and 'power' are being used to define God, Dr. Kaplan retains a firm belief in the personal character of God. Ultimate reality conceived in terms of energy, force, or power is irrelevant to the quest of salvation and negates human ideals. Thus "it violates completely our sense of the sacredness of life" (p. 88). Modernism in religion has its limits; it cannot cope with a completely de-personalized Deity.

Without entering into details of analysis, it is sufficient to point out that God, according to Dr. Kaplan, is defined in terms of salvation, social regeneration, the regeneration of human nature, co-operation, righteousness, and freedom. Each of these attributes is associated with a holy day; each is interpreted in the liberal tradition.

These attributes fall into two groups, ethical and political; God is the power making for both individual and social development. Here we have the outcroppings of Dr. Kaplan's dual character; he is not merely the philosopher of Modern Jewish Religion; he is also a Rabbi, and a teacher of homiletics. Particularly in his social philosophy is this evident; for, after presenting a picture of society suffering under the yoke of a capitalistic autocracy, and offering a socialistic economy as the solution towards which the God-idea in man is working, Dr. Kaplan insists that the revolution—and it is to be a revolution—can be accomplished only through ethical training. Thus reason is left behind and only the preacher remains.

Other indications of the conflct between preacher and philosopher are too numerous to mention; let it suffice to show how, as preacher, Dr. Kaplan is guilty of wishful thinking when he accepts an evolutionary hypothesis, not in its own terms, but in terms of an ethical evolution which he cannot prove, and states this as fact:

> We know now that man has attained to such spiritual powers and graces as he possesses by a long and arduous ascent from the beast. The social instincts which are mainly responsible for man's success in maintaining his life on this planet came into play only in the later stages of his evolution, and have still to contend with atavistic passions that are an inheritance from his prehuman past. . . . The evils that exist in human nature are therefore not to be looked upon as evidences of the fall of man. The fact that they are recognized as evil and that man aspires to their removal may be taken as evidence of the probable eventual rise of man to heights that today seem unattainable (pp. 135-136).

It would be extremely comforting if we were justified in assuming that every characteristic of man which we do not like is on its way out by a natural process of ethical evolution, while every characteristic of which we approve is waxing ever stronger by the same process.

*The Meaning of God in Modern Jewish Religion* is, however, valuable because of the philosopher in its author and not because of the preacher, and fairness dictates that one or two excellent points made by its author be applauded. Dr. Kaplan, in a very interesting section, reverses completely the traditional and classic approach to the problem of divine sovereignty. The classic approach is to accommodate temporal sovereignty to a world-scheme in which an absolute and arbitrary account of divine sovereignty, fixed, unchanging, and immutable, sets the keynote of all sovereignty. Dr. Kaplan shows how the concept of divine sovereignty is a function of the changing concepts of temporal sovereignty, and is thus enabled to define divine sovereignty in terms of the form of temporal sovereignty most acceptable to him—liberalism.

Finally, it must be pointed out that Dr. Kaplan permits his philosophy to lead him dangerously close to denial of the absolute reality of God. Belief in God is, he says, the affirmation of the inherent value of life:

> Nothing less than the deliberate refusal to be satisfied with the negation of life's inherent worth is likely to keep our minds in a receptive mood for the belief in God (p. 30).

This is an honest, but perilous position; it approaches the statement that nothing less than a deliberate refusal not to believe in God can make us believe in Him.

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# BOOK NOTES

*Brahma-Sutras.* With Text, Word for Word Translation, English Rendering, Comments and Index. By SWAMI VIRESWARANANDA. Maiavati, Almora, Himalayas: Advaita Ashrama, 1936. lxiii + 542 pp. Rs 3.

This book is of interest to the students of the English Bible because it is written by a Hindu Fundamentalist for Hindu Fundamentalists. Vireswarananda is a member of the Ramakrishna Order, which bases its doctrines, not on reason, but on the authority of scripture. To them scripture includes not only the four Vedas, but the Brahmanas, Aranyakas, Upanishads, the two epics, Mahābhārata andRāmāyanā, and the various Vedanta Sutras. The present work is devoted to a portion of the Vedanta, the Sutras elucidating the doctrine of Brahman, which are attributed to Bādarāyana. The Sutras are written in a cryptic, condensed form—mere catch-words—designed to suggest to a student what an expounder had said. The real meaning must to a large degree be divined. The publication before us gives accordingly two renderings of each Sutra and a commentary. The first rendering gives a literal translation of the actual Sanskrit words; the second, a translation interspersed with enough parenthetic insertions by the translator to make sense. The sense obtained by this process is, of course, that which the translator supposed the original should convey. His suppositions may be right, but often another set of suppositions would give a different sense. The Commentary, by a process of scripture citations, analogous in every way to the use of scripture citations employed by Fundamentalist Evangelicals, draws on the whole range of Hindu scriptures, Upanishads, Aranyakas, Mahābhārata, especially the Gītā, various Sutras little known in the West, and occasionally on one of the four Vedas, to prove that the passage that is being elucidated teaches the doctrine that the commentator regards as orthodox. The method affords a complete parallel to the way in which Christian theologians used to mingle proof texts from Genesis and Revelation, or Leviticus and the Gospel of John, or Chronicles and Romans, or any or all the Books of the Bible, to prove a point considered vital.

The commentator is a monist. Brahman is the only reality; the world, souls, and all phenomena, are but manifestations of him. The Sutras on which he comments are arranged in four chapters and each chapter contains four sections. In the first portion the commentator, to his own satisfaction, shows that the unanimous teaching of the Veda is that Brahman is all. To this end many texts, which are often taken to refer to other matters, are held to refer to Brahman. Sāṁkhya and other non-monistic theories are refuted by citations of scripture. Once, when this has been done, a section is added which reinforces scripture by reason. Then Brahman is shown to be the sole object of profitable meditation. The relation of the world to him is treated, and much space is given to the relation of the soul to Brahman.

Here great refinement of ingenuity is employed to explain the exact function of Karma, why and how reincarnation occurs, whether at final consummation the soul loses in Brahman its complete identity, the path by which the consummation may be attained, and the final realization of the Supreme Brahman by those who thus attain. These doctrines, in the theology of the Ramakrishna order, take the place held in Christian theology by the doctrines of God, man, sin, redemption, righteousness, and heaven.

The student of modern Hinduism will find the book a welcome addition to his apparatus; to the Christian it is, by analogy, self-revealing.

GEORGE A. BARTON

*La Pensée Religieuse de Montaigne.* By MATURIN DRÉANO. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne et ses Fils, 1936. 501 pp. Fr. 55.

M. Dréano's book is an elaborate analysis of the religious influences, comments and opinions which entered into the life and character of Montaigne, and which may be discovered both in the *Essays* and in the literature of his time.

As M. Dréano indicates in his Introduction, opinion has varied as to the precise degree of Montaigne's religious sentiments, and especially as to the extent of his acceptance of the Catholic position in faith and morals. One view, and the most widely current, is that while he formally gave assent to the *credo* and the observances of the Church, religion occupied only a minor portion of his thought, which is otherwise primarily pagan. The Catholic *sentiment* never really penetrated him. A second view, advocated by critics such as M. Armaingaud, holds that Montaigne's acts and writings were in clear opposition to the Christian religion, and that he was covertly an enemy of the Church. A much less frequently defended interpretation find Montaigne genuinely in heart and conscience a Christian. His most pagan utterances arise out of the frailty of human opinion and the following of fashion, but his internal life was thoroughly within the faith. M. Dréano defends this third view and gives vastly more evidence than has hitherto even been hinted at. Although this reviewer regards the interpretation as fundamentally unsound, in presenting it M. Dréano has contributed most admirably to our knowledge of Montaigne's literary relations in his own age.

The latter portion of the book displays in great detail the estimates of Montaigne's Catholicism which were formed during the century following the publication of the *Essays*. M. Dréano demonstrates that up to 1650 the Catholic comentators who were nearest to him in time failed to see Montaigne as an enemy of the Church and raised little question as to his essential orthodoxy. After 1650, and following his adoption by the libertines, Montaigne was abandoned by the Catholic apologists and most severely censured by the members of Port-Royal and the Oratory. It was only after Pascal, Nicole and Arnauld had added their influence

to an unfavorable estimate of the *Essays* that, in 1676, they were placed on the *Index*, where they still remain.

While M. Dréano gives a full account of the thoughts of religious men about Montaigne, he does not succeed, this reviewer thinks, in showing that Montaigne's thought was really religious. The question as to whether Montaigne was a Christian cannot be settled by an appeal to a selection of passages, nor to the opinions of this or that casual reader among his near contemporaries, but only by a full consideration of the total effect and the spirit of his writing. If by Christianity is meant the reigning set of beliefs and attitudes of the theologians at a given time, Montaigne was clearly non-Christian. If we merely mean, however, the common customs and practices of a "Christian" country, Montaigne was not only a Christian but a loyal Catholic. He observed the feasts and fasts of the Church, and died, not "amongst wenches and good companions" (as he recommended), but quietly, with a priest at his bedside administering the sacrament. His adherence to the religious practices of his day was not so much a matter of faith and morals as of opportunity and manners. In its spirit and direction Montaigne's morality is eminently pagan.

Jesse V. Mauzey

*William Tyndale.* By J. F. Mozley. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937. ix + 364 pp. $4.00.

Of the readiest justifications for a new book on Tyndale—new facts, a new point of view, a suitable occasion—Mr. Mozley's seems to be the last. Tyndale died, as Foxe tells us, "strangled first by the hangman and afterwards with fire consumed" in 1536. In 1937 Mr. Mozley celebrated and improved this martyrdom. Later in 1937 on its front page *The Times Literary Supplement* celebrated and improved Mr. Mozley's book. *The Times* also rises to an occasion.

The occasion is clear enough, but Mr. Mozley claims new facts, new documents, and fresh conclusions. A comparison of his facts and conclusions with those of Robert Demaus, Tyndale's earlier biographer, reveals little that is new. Mr. Mozley's conclusions about Tyndale's value to the Reformation, his originality, and his relationship with Luther are substantially those of Demaus. In his use of the State Papers, except for a few recently discovered items, Mr. Mozley also follows his author. But he has been able to add some details and speculations (enough to justify an article in a learned journal) about Tyndale's youth, his family, his ordination, and his residence in Hamburg and Wittenberg. He found, for example, from a study of the Wittenberg register that Guillelmus Daltici had been enrolled in the university. Daltici is clearly an almost perfect anagram for Tindali. The dependence of his case on this spelling of the name is unfortunate, however, since Mr. Mozley insists upon spelling it with a y in defiance of the "purists" who hold out for i, of Tindale's own later preference, of the

*Cambridge History of English Literature*, and of the rotunda of the British Museum.

Mr. Mozley's defiance of the purists is not his most important service to Tindale scholarship. He appears to have incorporated some of the recent bibliographical conclusions; and his printing of all the letters, documents, prefaces, and other original materials, though he had been preceded in most instances by Demaus, is of great convenience. The absence of clear indication of source and of a bibliography make Mr. Mozley's documents less useful, however, than they might have been, and make the completeness of his survey of recent scholarship a matter of doubt. His habit of referring to the errors of certain unnamed "second and third-rate" scholars, and to the agreement of "first-class scholars," may be the mark of a tactful or cautious man, but not of a first-rate scholar. And Mr. Mozley's Protestant bias, which makes him incapable of handling the Tindale-More controversy with detachment, is not the mark of the first-rate historian.

Bias, which, though it impaired his vision, might have been expected to improve Mr. Mozley's style, his artistic economy, and his tone, or at least to relieve his tedium, had none of these effects. His tone is enthusiastic, his style diffuse and elevated only by shifts from the past to the present tense, by rhetorical questions, by exclamations in the familiar manner (such as "Alas! poor William. It will go hard with you now"), and by the use of "Nay," a device peculiar in recent times to the heroes of D. H. Lawrence. As a sample of Mr. Mozley's style, I quote from his judgment on Sir Thomas More, which from a writer other than Mr. Mozley might be taken as a consciously ironic reference to his own work: "This becomes tiresome to the reader; nay, worse than tiresome, it adds insult to injury. What! he says to himself: have I ploughed through so many weary pages, only to discover that the contest is a puppet show, that the dice are loaded?"

WILLIAM TINDALL

*The Life and Letters of Charles Inglis: His Ministry in America and Consecration as First Colonial Bishop, from 1759-1787.* By JOHN WOLFE LYDEKKER. London: S.P.C.K.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936. xv + 272 pp. $3.75.

Mr. Lydekker has made splendid use of his opportunities as Archivist to the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, to write what should be regarded as an authoritative biography of Charles Inglis, "the Venerable Society's" most brilliant leader and ardent defender. As a descendant of one of the leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church during the same period, the author has had other documents at his disposal which shed interesting sidelights upon the character of the leading figure. The result has been that the correspondence of Charles Inglis alone practically tells the story of his work. Mr. Lydekker has added only such supplementary notes as were necessary to link the letters together. All in all, the book must appeal to all lovers of biography; to churchmen particularly interested in the work of the Society

for the Propagation of the Gospel in this country and in the struggle for an American episcopacy; to historians, for Inglis's outspoken attitude toward the American Revolution, Tory, but not altogether unfair; and to educators of whom the founder of King's College, Windsor, was one.

Probably, readers of biography, *per se*, will most appreciate the earlier part of Inglis's life when, shaken by fever and ague, he continued to minister to his wide parish in the wilderness of Delaware to the fullest of his ability. It is in this period, fully as much as at the height of his reputation, that Inglis's real nobility stands out against the tragic circumstances which permanently impaired his health and left him an early widower. And yet, this fortitude is but a foreshadowing of that which he shows in his last years when he leaves the comforts of civilization for his post as first colonial Bishop, in charge of the souls who had fled from the terror of Revolution to the drear and frost-bitten life of Nova Scotia.

The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel has been severely criticized by many American church historians for the attitude it maintained toward the colonies. Its failure to provide a colonial bishop rendered the colonies dependent for its ministry upon missionaries sent from England, since only a few colonists could afford to make the trip to England for their ordination, and still fewer were able to survive the hazardous journey. Actually, the responsibility for this situation deserves to be shared by the colonists as well, for the episcopacy was both feared for the temporal power it might exert, and avoided for the extra expense it might lay upon the members of the church. Inglis was a strong advocate for the establishment of the episcopacy in this country, but he favored no compromise that meant the watering down of the bishop's spiritual authority. His own plan was feasible, but too few of those about him were able to distinguish between temporal and spiritual authority, and to see that the latter did not imply the former. The leaders of "the Venerable Society" were really at a loss to know what the colonies actually wanted and settled the matter by doing nothing. Only after the American colonies had been lost, did the Society act by having Inglis consecrated.

During the Revolution, Inglis found himself subject to the suspicion which attached itself to all members of the Church of England. Many of these, both clerical and lay, found themselves in a quandary as to the choice they should make. Not a few, especially about Philadelphia and Boston, threw themselves on the side of the colonists. Others fled the country to preserve their loyalty to the King. It is safe to say that Inglis never doubted as to his own course. His oath of loyalty to the King, taken at the time of his ordination was strongly reinforced by his sympathies and inclinations. As Rector of Trinity Parish in New York City, which remained fairly consistently under the British fleet's protection, he moved in a circle of men who were quite out of sympathy with the aims of the revolutionary party. The pamphlets of Tom Paine were carefully dissected and refuted by pamphlets written with equal heat, products of the pens of Inglis and his

fellow Tory, the testy Samuel Seabury, later to be consecrated at the hands of the non-juring bishops of Scotland as first bishop of the American church.

Inglis's reports on the progress of the Revolution are fascinating reading. They are written with deepest scorn for the rebel leaders and their armies, and with an indomitable enthusiasm for the prowess of the British. Nevertheless, his bitter comment upon the conduct of the mobs and their wanton disregard even for the charitable organizations supported by the Church of England, the outrages which they perpetrated upon individuals cannot be set aside as due merely to his own prejudice.

American readers and scholars owe much to Mr. Lydekker for the painstaking research and careful preparation of material which have gone into the writing of this book. He has saved others countless hours of sifting documents, and by his own extensive combing of sources, brought within the covers of this book material which would otherwise be out of reach of the great majority of his readers. He deserves our gratitude for introducing us to a little appreciated person, at least in this country, who with all of his failings, cannot be described as less than a truly great and good man.

GEORGE E. RATH

*Religion of Reason: Hermann Cohen's System of Religious Philosophy.* By TRUDE WEISS ROSMARIN. New York: Bloch Publishing Company, 1936. xi + 195 pp. $2.50.

Hermann Cohen, founder of the Marburg School of neo-Kantianism which enjoyed a considerable ascendency in German philosophy for several decades before the war, was one of the proudest intellectualists of his time. He professed to trace "the historic continuity of the power of reason" through a jealously guarded patrimony of very diverse parts. Like a higher species of Talmudist he reviewed the sources of Hebraism, Platonism, Kantianism, modern mathematics and law to spin out the essential ideas of a universal ethical culture. And in his own time he saw socialism, Judaism, and Germanism as conjoined in bearing this culture onward. Today life has departed from any such synthesis as he envisaged, and only his highly subtle argument, much suspect for its rationality, remains.

The position of Hermann Cohen in relation to German philosophy and to socialism is familiar to a wider public than is the nature of his attachment to Judaism. Indeed, Mrs. Rosmarin is right in claiming a certain priority in her "aim to present Hermann Cohen's religious-philosophical views in a well-rounded whole, in order to thus introduce his philosophy of religion, which is practically identical with his philosophy of Judaism, to those who have no access to his writings." And the excellent bibliography with which the book is equipped will greatly aid a further study of the subject.

The present book lacks the technical expertness required to make clear the subtle distinctiveness of Cohen's reasoning. It presents only in very broad strokes some leading ideas of this man who was at once conservative in his practical religious observances, and a rationalist of the rationalists in

his thought. Characteristic is his view that Jews should retain Hebrew in their traditional prayers and Bible readings, but that the vernacular tongues should also be admitted to the synagogues both for teaching and devotional purposes. Judaism is a universal religion, not a national culture; fidelity to its traditions is a matter of reason as well as of piety. The forward-look of Messianic faith is particularly emphasized by Cohen, who interprets it, however, to be simply the faith that men will progressively become "fellow-men." Poverty and pity for human suffering in poverty are regarded as chief springs of that love between men that correlates them with God in bringing nature under the rule of ethics. Cohen's God-idea and these views about poverty and pity, which play a special rôle in linking his Judaism and his socialism, call for more critical elucidation than they receive in this book.

H. L. F.

*Catholicism, Protestantism, and Capitalism.* By AMINTORE FANFANI. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1935. v + 224 pp. $2.00.

The author of this book is an Italian scholar who has given special attention to the problems connected with the rise of Capitalism, problems which suggest the writings of Weber and Tawney, Sombart and Troeltsch. He writes with admirable clarity and fairness. Fanfani recognizes that Capitalism is older than Protestantism, and that therefore Weber's one-sided thesis concerning the relationship between Protestantism and Catholicism is untenable. On the other hand he shows quite clearly that Catholicism is essentially opposed to Capitalism. Whence, then, came Capitalism?

First, it is necessary to make clear what Fanfani means by Capitalism. He does not refer to any mechanism of production or distribution. Nor does he identify Capitalism with any system of ownership. Capitalism is in essence a spirit, and the "primary characteristic of the capitalistic spirit is the unlimited use of all means of acquiring wealth that are held to be morally lawful and economically useful." It is the spirit which is free from the restraints which come from non-economic standards, which regards the search for profit as a good in itself with the sky the limit. It neither limits acquired wealth to any reasonable estimate of human needs, nor does it pay wages with reference to human needs. The Capitalistic spirit is individualistic. On the other hand, Fanfani, in company with Berdyaev and Tillich, regards Communism as Capitalism carried to the extreme limit, on the ground that in Communism the autonomy of the economic process is even more pronounced than in bourgeois society. There is a real question as to whether this is correct, since when the economic process is planned with social ends in view it is checked by ethical standards even though those standards are without religious sanctions. It is obvious, as Fanfani admits, that the Capitalistic spirit is in one sense as old as human selfishness, but not until the fifteenth or sixteenth century did it become a respectable social force, rationalized, and embodied in powerful institutions. It is also obvious

—and this he does not emphasize—that the Capitalistic spirit has been checked by social legislation and the rise of labor unions, and by the development of a social conscience on many issues which to some degree takes the place of the ecclesiastical restraints of the medieval period. But as a tendency this Capitalistic spirit has had almost unlimited scope in some periods, and it is still the major fact in our contemporary economic life. The best that can be said is that it is on the defensive.

Fanfani devotes a chapter to the Catholic social ethic, and shows how incompatible it is with any way of life which is based upon the autonomy of the economic order. In answering the question as to how the Capitalistic development came to take place on Catholic soil, his main answer is that it came with the development of international trade, with the weakening of restraints when the trader is away from home, or when he is dealing with a stranger. Also, the rise of Humanism had the same effect in undermining the authority of the ecclesiastical ethic. This relaxing of restraints was further enhanced by the growth of economic risk which tempts the capitalist to take all the profits possible today in view of the uncertainties of tomorrow. This factor of risk was itself enhanced by the growth of foreign trade. When once this spirit of Capitalism gathered momentum it led to the quest for technical improvements, which of course further enhanced the risk of economic enterprise.

Though the development of Capitalism was not dependent upon the rise of Protestantism, Protestantism did encourage it. Fanfani rejects Weber's reason for this, based upon the Protestant conception of vocation, because this he also finds in Catholic thought. His reasons are as follows: The Protestant movement weakened ecclesiastical authority and encouraged the growth of secularism. Protestantism, in its denial of the connection between works and rewards, destroyed the incentive for preserving standards based upon supernatural authority. With the loss of those standards Protestantism had no ethic except what seemed rational in the situation. Capitalism seemed rational to capitalists and as a result it became sanctified. "The fundamental principles of Protestantism lead inevitably to the sanctification of the real."

Fanfani's claim that the doctrine of justification by faith really undercuts morality is an outside criticism of Protestantism which is natural enough, but which is essentially superficial. It does not reckon with the degree to which morality is corrupted by legalism and rewards. His criticism that Protestantism, as it gradually lost the ethic which was a compound of natural law and Christian teaching, and which did have ecclesiastical authority, was left with no relevant social standards by which to judge the historical situation, points to a serious weakness in Protestantism. The assumption that Catholicism does not share this weakness is only partly true. The Catholic ethic did not sanctify Capitalism because it was crystallized long before the rise of Capitalism, but it does tend to sanctify social conditions of the pre-Capitalist era—a hierarchical

form of society, for example. Neither Protestantism nor Catholicism can dispense with an ethic based upon rational reflection upon social consequences in the light of the Gospel. The Protestants need to be told that the Gospel does not take the place of such an ethic, and the Catholics need to be told that such an ethic can never be finally crystallized in terms of the social consequences in previous periods of history.

JOHN C. BENNET

*Present Theological Tendencies.* By E. E. AUBREY. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1936. x + 245 pp. $2.00.

This book is the best comprehensive account of contemporary theological trends which has been written. It deals with three definite types of thought: Protestant Modernism, the Dialectical Theology, and Neo-Thomism. There is a chapter on "Naturalism versus Supernaturalism" which gathers up a good deal of the current discussion concerning theism and the problems of religious knowledge. Opening and closing chapters relate the theological trends which are attributed to the crises of modern culture. Those aspects of theology which have most relevance to cultural problems are emphasized throughout the book. Professor Aubrey proves to be a master of sympathetic exposition in the case of views which are most remote from his own. His account of Barthianism is probably the best section of the book. There is no attempt to take up each trend under the usual headings of dogmatic theology. Instead the author is content to describe the presuppositions and the theological method in each case, and to show the reasons in the cultural situation for the rise of those presuppositions and methods. The book is so carefully documented that it is a useful handbook to the theological literature of the period.

This is a time of quite extraordinary theological ferment. The thinking which is being done may not be well balanced or constructive, but it is drastic and honest. The complacent conservatisms and liberalisms have become quite impossible. Professor Aubrey is surely sound in tracing this ferment to the social situation as a chief cause. There are three aspects of this situation which he emphasizes: lack of direction, lack of motivation, and poor morale. Profound disillusionment in regard to all of our ways of knowledge and our social hopes has forced men to challenge their naïve assumptions about science and progress, about individualism and democracy.

Modernism Professor Aubrey portrays as a method, and not as a set of theological conclusions. It is the method of seeking out the religious experience which traditional theological doctrines were intended to express, and stating in fresh terms, meaningful to the modern world, the insights which those doctrines contained. The current attacks upon Moderism are chiefly from those who still use the same method, but who are trying to escape from the involvements of the modernists of the past

generation; their tendency to capitulate to the pretensions of science, their individualism, their anthropocentrism, and their extreme optimism. Professor Aubrey uses the word "Modernism" for the method which he regards as permanently valid, and the word "Liberalism" for the results of that method which are now dated.

The summaries of the Dialectical Theology and Neo-Thomism show how two groups of sophisticated modern men face the same problems, especially social disintegration and subjectivism in thought, and how both return to periods in Christian history for their guidance—the one to the theology of the Reformation and the other to Thomas Aquinas. Now those two groups stand in sharp contrast to each other. The former escapes from subjectivism through a reassertion of the objectivity of a revelation which is beyond all rational tests, and they escape from social disillusionment by stressing the permanent crisis of the individual as he stands before God. The latter group escapes from subjectivism by way of a more thorough use of reason, and they escape from social disillusionment because of their faith in God's activity through the Church.

Perhaps Professor Aubrey's most important contribution to constructive theological thought in this country is his analysis of the relationship between those who are called naturalists and those who are called supernaturalists. (By supernaturalists he means, not Barthians or Neo-Thomists who could be described by that word, but thinkers who really belong to the Modernist group but who stress the necessity of using more than scientific method in discovering religious truth, and who believe in the transcendence of God as a mind prior to the process in which God is also immanent.) At least so far as the methods of religious knowledge are concerned, he shows conclusively that neither naturalists nor supernaturalists are limited to scientific method in any precise sense, and that the vague use of the idea of scientific method by such writers as Professor Wieman is the source of much confusion. It seems to this reviewer that the classifications in the book by Professors Wieman and Meland, *American Philosophies of Religion*, need to be considerably revised in the light of Professor Aubrey's discussion.

In this volume the author does not often reveal his own opinion, but he promises another volume which will be a statement of his constructive thought.

JOHN C. BENNETT

*New Faith for Old.* By SHAILER MATHEWS. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1936. vi + 303 pp. $3.00.

This book by the Dean Emeritus of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago is an autobiography which, in recounting personal experiences, also describes the changes in outlook and organization that have taken place in Protestant religious life during the last half century. It was inevitable that this combination should have been made. As the author states,

his original intention was not write an autobiography, but to trace the growth of religious movements in reference to new elements in social life. But there is no one who has been more closely identified with these movements than Dr. Shailer Mathews. The result is that he has produced a book of unusual charm and interest. It abounds in witty comments, entertaining anecdotes, and wise observations.

The story of his boyhood in Maine, in a world which "seems incredibly simple" is a fascinating picture of American life in that period. He remarks, "My generation was perhaps the last to be unaware that there are problems in education." The distance which he traveled in later years from that "age of innocence" may be seen in his chapters, "Religion and Science," "Religious Education in the Churches," and "Modernizing Theological Education."

The range of the book extends from "Mid-Victorian Evangelism" to the forecast, "And Tomorrow?" Within the span of a life-time the author has seen and led advances from "uncritical pietism" to an appreciation of the "social gospel," "church unity through federation," and the unfinished task of promoting international good will and the abolition of war.

Throughout Dr. Mathews' life there has been a steady growth in the understanding of faith. The "new faith" which he holds is a discarding of the old only in the sense that it has freed itself from hampering limitations and a circumscribed horizon. To read this book is a refreshing exercise as showing what a forward-looking mind and a will to venture can accomplish. It is especially commended to young people facing a world that is still constantly changing. To them he would say in the verse that is cited at the end of the book:

> "Take thou the splendor, carry it out of sight
> Into the great new age I must not know,
> Into the great new realm I must not tread."

R. C. K.

*A Theology for Christian Missions.* By HUGH VERNON WHITE. New York: Willett, Clark & Co., 1937. ix + 220 pp. $2.00.

Historians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are inclined to underestimate Christian missions. Of all the movements of the past century and a half the phenomenal expansion of Christianity has been one of the most widespread, and one of the most influential in shaping human society. In it both Protestants and Roman Catholics have been engaged. In the vast majority of lands Christian missionaries have been found. In countries such as India and China they have numbered many thousands. Their converts have run into the millions. Through schools, hospitals, literature, and various forms of social service, in a day of transition they have helped to mould the cultures of more than half the race.

Of late years many have felt that this Christian missionary enterprise is nearing its end. The convictions which supported it are said to be weak-

ening and the conditions to which it ministered are declared to be changing. This, however, is prophecy. Like all attempts to forecast the future, the event may well disprove it.

In this volume we have an indication of a continuing intellectual vigor and religious insight within the missionary enterprise which belie the somber predictions of the critcs. The author was long a pastor, and for the past several years has been a secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. This board is the oldest in the United States which is dedicated to foreign missions and is the organ of the Congregational churches. Since these latter are theologically the most liberal of those American denominations which have traditionally supported foreign missions, one would expect the decay of conviction there to have proceeded farther than elsewhere. It is, therefore, highly significant that Dr. White believes profoundly in foreign missions.

The book has arisen out of conferences which Dr. White has been having with pastors over the course of the last several years. It is an attempt to state what he believes to be the Christian message and the reasons which he holds valid for continuing to attempt to win all men to the Christian faith. Dr. White is philosophically trained and is thoroughly at home in the literature of both philosophy and theology. He makes no display of erudition, however, nor does he employ technical vocabulary. He writes simply and for the non-expert.

Theologically Dr. White is a liberal. Religiously he is what in the most inclusive use of that term is usually denominated an Evangelical; back of him is the tradition, historically so strong in Congregationalism, of a transformation of life through a personal experience of God and by a dedication of the self to God. True also to Congregationalism, he sees the social implications of this transformation.

Whatever his attitude toward Christianity and the Christian missionary enterprise, the thoughtful reader interested in current religious trends will find this book both interesting and rewarding.

KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE

*La filosofia della religione e il problema della vita.* By UMBERTO A. PADOVANI. (Pubb. della Univ. Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Serie Prima: *Scienze Filosofiche*, Vol. xxv.) Milano: Società Editrice "Vita e Pensiero," 1937. ix + 263 pp. L. 20.

A review of the history of the problem of evil, and an attempt to reconcile the Platonic and Aristotelian elements in Christian thinking on this problem, ending with a defense of the ascetic saints as supermen.

*Collected Poems.* By FLORENCE CONVERSE. New York: E. P. Dutton, Inc., 1937. 224 pp. $2.50.

A volume of distinguished verse containing a group of religious poems in the best tradition of Anglo-Catholic piety, expressing two major inter-

ests, the inner mystical life of the Church, and a deep concern for social justice.

*Trends of Christian Thinking.* By CHARLES S. MACFARLAND. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1937. 208 pp. $1.50.

A compilation and systematic arrangement of reviews of recent theological literature; the book serves as a convenient guide to the themes and trends of current religious thought.

*The Catholic Philosophy of History.* Edited by PETER GUILDAY. Vol. III. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons. 1936 xiv + 270 pp. $3.00.

Papers read at the fourteenth annual meeting of the American Catholic Historical Association, Pittsburgh, 1933. The book affords an interesting survey of various aspects of the Catholic approach to historical topics.

*Portals to Freedom.* By HOWARD COLBY IVES. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 1937. 253 pp. $2.25.

A publication issued in commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the visit to the United States in 1912 of 'Abdu'l-Bahá, son and prophet of the founder of the Bahai movement The book is an intimate record of the conversion of the author, a former Unitarian clergyman, and glows with the fervor of an uncritical discipleship.

*Make Life Worth Living.* By JOSEPH R. SIZOO. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1937. 190 pp. $1.75.

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*Contributions à l'étude de la pensée missionnaire dans le Nouveau Testament.* By B. SUNDKLER and A. FRIDRICHSEN. Uppsala, Sweden: Das Neutestamentliche Seminar zu Uppsala, 1937. 45 pp.

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